Interpreted dependency networks : a general framework for belief revision by Saward, Guy R.E.S.
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
Permanent WRAP URL:
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/106898/
Copyright and reuse:
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it.
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Interpreted  D ependency Networks:
A General Framework for Belief Revision
by
Guy R.E.S. Saward
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
July 1991
Supervisors:
Dr S.B.Russ
Dr A. G. Cohn (University of Leeds)
Department of Computer Science 
University of Warwick
A bstract
Belief Revision is a fundamental component of intelligent behaviour and is therefore an area of 
study within Artificial Intelligence (AI). In many cases the belief revision is the result of 
modifying a long term model of some domain by the addition of information specific to 
particular instances of a problem within that domain. This thesis argues the case for a 
Foundations approach to belief revision in which the level of belief in any proposition is 
supported by explicit justifications. Networks of such justifications can be used as long term 
knowledge stores thereby capturing the dependencies between different pieces of information.
Truth Maintenance Systems (TMSs), also known as Reason Maintenance Systems, are a class 
of programme that provides the functionality necessary to perform belief revision in just this 
way. However, each individual style of TMS contains embedded design decisions based on a 
particular problem solving domain and/or approach. An Interpreted Dependency Network 
(IDN) is the embodiment of the philosophy behind TMSs without the built-in assumptions. As 
such, IDNs allow for the easy specification of belief revision systems. Both the generality of 
IDNs and the ease of specification will be shown by rationally reconstructing existing 
approaches to TMSs.
This thesis provides a declarative semantics for IDNs along with general purpose algorithms 
for interpreting dependency networks. This means that IDNs have the necessary support to 
function as representations for long term knowledge. This is in contrast to the transitory nature 
of the information normally captured by TMSs.
The ability of IDNs to be used as knowledge representations is demonstrated by reconstructing 
several existing AI representation paradigms as IDNs. This also highlights the benefits of 
IDNs. For example, the declarative nature of the interpretation mechanism enables easy 
specification of the semantics of a representation while the explicit representation of 
dependencies enables a network to support several different modes of reasoning.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Most of science and much of everyday "common sense" reasoning uses abstract models of 
reality to reason about the world, be it the interpretation of observed phenomena, the 
prediction of future events or the planning of future events. Computers, by their very nature, 
are excellent tools for manipulating numeric models that operate using well-defined 
algorithms. The term Artificial Intelligence (AI) means many things to many people but 
there are characteristics that distinguish AI from other areas of computation, these being the 
type of domain being modelled, how the model is constructed and how it is used.
Depending on one’s view of Artificial Intelligence, the long-term goal of AI is the 
creation or modelling of "intelligent" computers. This means that domains to which AI is 
applied are those in which an agent is deemed to require significant amounts of knowledge or 
expertise if they are to operate successfully. The models that are constructed in AI are not 
numeric but symbolic. Although numeric models may contain concepts such as forces, bank 
balances or geometric information, the meaning is implicit in the model. AI deals directly 
(but not necessarily exclusively) with such symbolic concepts. This is a result (and/or cause) 
of the kinds of domains being tackled where the system that is being modelled is not a 
physical system, but is itself a model either of some physical domain or some intellectual 
activity, be it an expert’s understanding of how to diagnose diseases or an attempt to capture 
planning processes.
The need to represent symbolic knowledge has led to the development of a wide range 
of systems ranging from semantic networks and inheritance systems, through frame-based 
systems and production rules, to logic in all its various forms. The goal of all these systems is 
to capture some set of facts and the relationships between them. The information that is 
captured in this way can be divided into explicit and implicit knowledge, with implicit 
information being constructed from explicit information using some reasoning or inference 
method.
Any logical system demonstrates this distinction very well. Given a set of axioms, the 
explicit information, a proof theory can be used to derive implicit consequences of those 
axioms. Thus, given axioms {a, a  —► (3) in classical logic, the consequent (3 can be derived. 
However, p being true was implicit in the set of axioms for any model that satisfied a  and
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a  —» P would also satisfy p. There are problems with this approach to knowledge 
representation for it concentrates on the derivation of implicit information from explicit 
information to the detriment of exploring the consequences of changes in the explicit 
information.
1.1 Belief Revision
The interaction between a logical theory and the system being modelled can be more 
complex than simply having an explicit set of axioms to model a particular system and then 
applying some procedure to elicit the implicit information. The set of axioms may alter to 
reflect changes in the system over time, or the observation of more information, or the 
discovery of previous errors in the model or observations. Therefore, I wish to draw a 
distinction between logical truths (tautologies) and a set of axioms (or assumptions) which 
may change and which I will call "beliefs". Furthermore, we cannot talk about the truth of a 
derived proposition, unless it is a tautology, but merely in our belief or disbelief in it, given a 
particular set of assumptions. As the set of assumptions changes so does the belief or 
disbelief of information derived from those assumptions.
In this thesis 1 propose that knowledge in A1 domains subject to such changes should be 
captured in Dependency Networks: a directed graph in which nodes represent propositions; 
and arcs represent inferences capable of deriving or supporting a level of belief in one node 
given a particular level of belief in another. Each proposition should then have a level of 
belief that reflects the current support for it, i.e. the validity of assumptions and inferences 
from which the proposition can be derived.
The body of the thesis is devoted to describing a system for both labelling propositions 
with levels of beliefs and maintaining that labelling as the set of assumptions changes. This 
represents a generalisation of existing Truth Maintenance Systems (also known as Reason 
Maintenance Systems). In addition to rationally reconstructing such systems, I look at the 
complexity involved in constructing and maintaining such labellings in relation to the 
properties of the rules for combining beliefs and the topology of network. This approach to 
belief revision is then applied to several existing knowledge representations and reasoning
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paradigms to gain insight into their behaviour and to develop a rich interaction between 
system and user capable of supporting a wide range of tasks.
The rest of this chapter motivates ideas contained in the formulation of Interpreted 
Dependency Networks (IDNs). Section 1.2 looks at some existing areas of AI from the 
perspective of belief revision and examines their usefulness as belief revision mechanisms. 
This serves three purposes:
• it highlights the limitations of such approaches (§1.2.1-§1.2.4) as non-monotonic logics, 
consistency-based approaches to belief revision, and lattice-based approaches;
• it generates a set of criteria (§1.2.5) against which to measure the expressive capability 
and usefulness of belief revision systems;
• it introduces the foundations approach to belief revision (defined in § 1.2.3 and justified 
in §1.2.3.3) that is to form the heart of IDNs.
Section 1.3 expounds the idea that inference need not be based on general inference 
rules that are based on implicit links between propositions (through pattern matching and 
formula manipulation), and that there are gains to be made in the explicit representation of 
particular inferences (as explicit links).
Finally, section 1.4 briefly introduces the notion of networks as an intuitively appealing 
yet powerful medium of expression. As such, networks provide the ability to marry the 
explicit representation of inferences as links with a foundations approach to belief revision in 
a principled manner that will support a formal interpretation structure (Chapter 3), a detailed 
analysis of algorithms (Chapter 4), and particular formulations of existing AI representations 
or problems (Chapter 5).
1.2 Existing Approaches to Belief Revision
1.2.1 Non-Monotonic l.ogics
In classical logics, be they propositional or first order, the main focus is on theorem-hood - 
does a set of axioms entail a particular proposition or formula? As knowledge representation 
languages, classical logics score highly in having a well-defined semantics. We know what it
3
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means to say a particular statement is true or false, and given any statement we can interpret 
what it means, i.e. imagine what would have to be the case for it to be true or false. Classical 
logics also have the extremely useful property of being monotonie. As the amount of 
information in a theory or knowledge base £  grows, the information derivable from £, its 
logical consequences, grows. Thus a definite answer to a query (i.e. 7t is a theorem, or —i7i is a 
theorem) is guaranteed to remain the same no matter how £ is extended1.
So, given £  encodes information about the animal kingdom or more specifically 
animals (denoted by the predicate A) all of whom are birds (denoted by B), mammals (M) or 
reptiles (R) and may or may not fly (F), we can ask questions about whether Polly the parrot 
(p), Larry the lizard (1) and Rocky the racoon (r) fly.
£  = ( Vx.(A(x) «-> B(x) v  M(x) v R(x)),
Vx.(B(x) -> F(x)),
Vx.(R(x) -> 'F(x)) }
There are two possible approaches to ascertaining whether Polly being a bird, in conjunction 
with £  entails that Polly can fly. The first is to consider all possible logical models that 
satisfy £  u  { B(p) } and to see if F(p) is satisfied by them all, i.e. is true in all of them, in 
which case we write £  u  { B(p) } |= F(p). Alternatively a syntactic proof system (e.g. 
natural deduction | Lemmon 1965] resolution | Robinson 1965] analytic or semantic tableau 
(Smullyan 196X] - alternatively see |Fitting 1990] for a general view) for manipulating 
formulae is used in an attempt to derive F(p) from £ u  { B(p) ], written 
£ U ] B(p) ) |-  F(p). The essential property of such systems is that the transformation rules 
that are used are known to be sound or truth preserving (i.e. syntactic manipulation is 
incapable of producing false formulae from true premises or axioms) and complete (i.e. all 
true consequences of a set of axioms can be produced by syntactic manipulations).
Using natural deduction rules for the instantiation of universal quantifiers and the 
elimination of implications we can show that Polly can indeed fly
1 Even if £  becomes inconsistent, if a proposition n or — was previously a theorem, then it will remain a 
theorem. Unfortunately its negation will have alio become a theorem.
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Z u {  B(p) } |-F (p ) 
but that Larry can’t
Z u {  R(l) } I---- iF(l)
and that it is not possible to know if Rocky can or cannot fly but that either answer is 
consistent with the theory £
£ u  { M(r) } (- F(r) and 
£ u {  M(r) } f— iF(r).
The truth of F(p) or —>F(1) is not subject to change given further additions to 
£ u  { B(p), R(l), M(r) } even if Larry were found out to be a flying iguana that is part bird.
Unfortunately logic is in some ways too much of a precise language. To say that every 
bird flies is to say exactly that -  every bird flies without exception. Although in theory it is 
possible to use classical logics to write down exactly those conditions that make it possible 
for an individual to fly, as a modelling problem it seems an impossible task to keep track of 
the fact that birds can fly, unless they are penguins, unless of course they are penguins inside 
a plane, unless of course the plane is broken in which case they can’t, unless of course the 
broken plane is being towed as a glider or is mounted on top of another plane ... The problem 
of writing down all the possible qualifications and exceptions in a finite way (it is always 
possible to do this by writing down all the facts as they become known but this will not be 
finite, given an infinite set of objects) is known as the Qualification Problem | McCarthy 
19X()|.
Non-monotonic logics provide a way of bypassing or fudging this issue by allowing an 
increase in explicit information (A) to produce a decrease in implicit or derivable 
information. Thus it may be the case that £ |= 7t but that £ u  A t= tt. Thus without explicitly 
listing all the cases and possible exceptions to non-flying birds, it is possible to write a 
formal sentence that captures the intuition that birds normally fly.
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1.2.2 Different Approaches to Non-Monotonic Logic
The basic principle behind all non-monotonic logics is some minimisation process. That is, 
given a set of axioms a closure is defined that adds some minimal amount of information, or 
somehow encodes the fact that what is written down is all that is known.
The simplest approach is that of Closed World Databases [Reiter 1978] or reasoning 
under the Closed World Assumption (CWA). Given a theory2 T the closure of T is given by 
the function* Thms(T) where Thms:Pw(L)— >Pw(L) returns all the theorems derivable (in 
some language L) given some proof system denoted by |—. The Closed World Assumption 
says that anything that is not provable from the original theory is assumed to be false. So, in 
the same way that a database containing all the relevant information about the world should 
return all aeroplanes that fly between Stansted and Edinburgh in response to question 1 = 
"What airlines fly between Stansted and Edinburgh?", the database should answer "No" to 
question2 = "Does Aeroflot fly between Stansted and Edinburgh?" iff Aeroflot is not in the 
answer to question 1. Applying this principle to V we find that the closure of V under the 
Closed World Assumption CWA(V) is the closure of the original theory T extended by the 
negation of all the non-theorems of T:
(CWA) CWA = Thms(rKjrA) where r A = ( - ,y \y d  Thms(T) }.
In his paper, Reiter shows that complex queries4 of databases using the CWA can be 
answered without reference to the closure CVT/4(r) as long as T u rA is consistent, and that if 
T is consistent and consists of Horn clauses* then T u r A is consistent.
The CWA can give us non-monotonic reasoning in two ways: directly, when 
n-cWA6-Y f°r Y e r A but Tu{Ylf-cwA-1/. and indirectly, when F|~cwaY and 
Fu {y}/'-cway' where y' depends on —ry for its derivation. But this formulation of non-
2 In the original paper T is assumed to be a deductive database but the principle applies to any logical 
hinguage with a syntactic entailment |—.
1 I shall use the notation/ :  X — > Y to denote the function/from domain X to codomain Y
4 l.e. queries where compound formulae ¡»re constructed from atomic queries using -», a  ,v  but do not con­
tain quantifiers, although this restriction can be circumvented by using a slightly modified query.
, i.e. disjunctions having ¡it most one positive (i.e. non-negated) literal (sub-formula). The use of Horn 
clauses in T is interesting for it foreshadows problems to arise when looking at TMSs.
6 n-cW A ttisshorthand for a e  C W /4(r) or r u r A|—a
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monotonic reasoning is too restrictive. Firstly, one may not want to include every formula in 
the minimisation process. For example the database may not have information on my exact 
seat number, so in CWA(T) it won’t be la, lb, nor 46e and so on — I won’t have a seat on the 
plane! Things get worse if it’s known that my seat number is one of a set of alternatives 
(Ex.(seat-number(x) a  sitting(guy, flightl 77, x))> for then a contradiction will exist in 
CWA(Y).
One way around the problem is to apply the CWA to selected predicates only, but there 
is still no guarantee that the closure will be consistent. A more flexible approach to 
minimising the information contained in T is to explicitly add a formula that states that the 
information encoded in T by a particular predicate P is all the information for which P holds. 
So rather than saying that if Tf- P(y) then —>P(y) e CWA{Y) (where P is an n place predicate
and y= yi .....yn) we get if r|-P(y,) for i e  [1, m] then Vx.P(x) «-» x = yi v  ... v  x = ym. This
approach was developed by McCarthy [1980] and is called Circumscription. Formally, the 
circumscription of P in T (C/RC(Y, P)) is given by the (second order) formula 
(CIRC) CIRC(Y, P) = VP'.[ F(P') a  Vx.(P'(x) -> P(x)) -> Vx.(P(x) -> P'(x))]
where F(P') is T with every occurrence of P replaced with P'. So the formulae reads, for 
every predicate P ' that satisfies T, if P ' satisfies all those formulae satisfied by P then P ' = P. 
The advantages of circumscription are that it necessitates adding just a single formula to T 
and that the minimisation is easily controlled. The disadvantages of using it are that it 
involves a second order formula quantified over predicates (although in many cases this can 
be reduced to first order7), and that in order to get any useful results (e.g. my database says 
the only flights to Edinburgh from Stansted are by Aeroflot, so if you want to fly from 
Stansted you must fly Aeroflot), the predicate P' must first be guessed. This can be done by 
intuition or inspection on small examples but this is not a satisfactory long-term approach.
The Closed World Assumption and Circumscription both work by the minimisation of 
known information*. In the first case propositions not known to be true are assumed to be
7 If T can he written its A(P) a  Vx.E(x) —* P(x) where A(P) contains no positive occurrence of P and E is an 
expression containing no occurrence of P at all. then CIRC(r ,  P) =  A(E) a  (E =  P) where A(E) is A(P) with 
every occurrence of P replaced with E.
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false, while in the second certain predicates are assumed to hold only for those facts for 
which they are known to hold. In addition to their individual problems, both these 
approaches suffer from a lack of expressiveness. It is not even possible to explicitly write a 
formula with the content "if 7t is unknown then assume 7t" (or alternatively "assume —itt") or 
explicitly reason with it. This kind of reasoning must be done by the higher level functions 
of closing or circumscribing a theory making it impossible to reason about the absence of 
information within a particular theory (this being something we would want to do if we are 
attempting to capture expert knowledge).
A different approach, not involving minimisation, is taken by McDermott and Doyle 
11980] in their Non-Monotonic Logic I (NML-I) where they augment first-order logic9 with 
a modal operator M which has an intuitive reading of "it is consistent that ..." and can be 
prefixed to formulae Jt to give Mtt, read as "it is consistent that tr". This provides an explicit 
way of dealing with incomplete information and for making defaults explicit. In order to give 
an (operational) semantics for M, McDermott and Doyle define the non-monotonic theorems 
of a theory T (NM'(T)) by the recursive equation:
(NM') N M \  T) = Thm s(TvrA)
where TA = { My I —<y 4 NM'(T) a  My 4 Thms(T) }. This definition has a marked similarity 
with (CWA). If y can’t be proved then —>y is added to TA by (CWA) while M—<y is added by 
(NM'). A more important difference is that (NM ') is a recursive definition and there may be 
one, none or many fixed point solutions to (NM'), written FP(T). How does one select the 
"real" theorems from all the possible answers? McDermott and Doyle would prefer to define 
the theorems of T under non-monotonic inference as the formulae in the smallest fixed point 
of NM', but this leads to obvious difficulties if there are no solutions or more than one 
minimal fixed point. A conservative approach is taken so that the "real" theorems non- 
monotonically derivable from T, /VM(T), are defined to be the intersection of all the fixed
* It is interesting to note that Shohain 11W8| also uses minimisation as a way of doing non-monotonic rea­
soning hut his work is based on the meta level construct of preferences. Rather lh;in trying to change parlicukir 
models so that they capture non-monotonie reasoning, his logic works on the idea of using only some preferred 
subset of the possible sets of models.
In practice most of their work just involves simple propositions.
8
1.2.2 Different Approaches to Non-Monotonic Logic
points, or the whole language if there are no fixed points:
(NM) NM( r ) =  n  4» \iFP(Y)*<Z
'VeFP( r>
= L otherwise
In order to make the default inference that all Stansted to Edinburgh flights are by Aeroflot 
(unless known to be otherwise), we say
Vf.flight(f) a  connects(f,stansted,edinburgh) a  Mcarrier(f,aeroflot)
—> carrier(f,aeroflot)10.
Not surprisingly (given the difficulty of trying to characterise non-monotonic or default 
inferences) NML-I has its problems. Unfortunately the major difficulty comes at the heart of 
the logic, in the intuitive reading of Mjc as "it is consistent that Jt". There is no link between 
the truth value of M7t and —iJt so both can appear in the same fixed point without causing a 
contradiction. In practice this only occurs when Mrc occurs positively in a clause (i.e. is 
either an axiom or the left hand side of an implication) which should not happen given 
"correct" selection of T. However this is a very dangerous assumption to make, relying on a 
user of a logic to make sure it has the correct semantics.
Indeed, Moore [1983] defines a new logic Autoepistemic Louie by reconstructing the 
semantics of NML. This is done by interpreting Mit as —>L—i7t with L y  read as "it is 
known/believed that y ” and extensions of T are solutions to 
(AUTO') AUTO'(D = Thm s(rurA)
where TA = ( Ly I y e AUTO'(I~) ) [ -iLy I y 4 AUTO'(T) }. Under this definition, M7t
(i.e. —>L—i7t) and —<7C generate a contradiction.
From a computational point of view, as first order logic (FOL) is semi-decidable11 it is 
impossible to prove M7t true12 in finite time for all Jt (because that requires F f -  p) and given 
FOL’s semi-decidability NML-I is non-semidecidable. Given a particular formula 7t there is
10 with appropriate additional axioms saying Vx.y. carrier(f, x) a  carrier(f, y) —» x = y
11 I.e. there are prtxif procedures which when asked if it is a theorem ¡me guaranteed to terminate in finite 
time with an answer "yes" but may not terminate if the answer is "no".
12 In either NML-I or Autoepistemic Logic
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no guarantee that any answer will be received in finite time about the truth or falsity of k.
A similar approach to default reasoning is taken by Reiter [1980]. Rather than 
including default rules as implications using M, default rules are explicitly coded as extra 
rules of inferences A attached to T. The inference rules are of the form
“ l „..a ,,: p, pm / y
and are intuitively read as "if ct\ otp are true and it is consistent to believe (assume)
Pi pm then y should be believed (true/derived)". Yet again the same approach is taken to
define the closure(s) or extension(s) of <r,A> (a theory now being a pair) as the minimal
fixed point solutions to
(DL') D L \< T, A>) = 77im j(rurA)
where
r A = { Yl a ,  ..„a,,: p , p m /Y e A a 
Vi.ctj e D L\< T, A>) a 
Vj.-,pj 4 D L \< T, A>) }.
It might appear that this approach is less expressive than NML-I or Autoepistemic 
Logic as the defaults are specified outside T and it is not possible to reason about default 
rules. However, this is not the case: Konolige [1987] shows that Autoepistemic Logic and 
Default Logic are equivalent.
One important result that holds for Default Logic |Reiter 1980] is that the extensions of 
<r, A> can be constructed in an iterative fashion:
E0 = r;
E,+i = Thms(Et) u  ( Y1 «1 .••.<*„: Pi .... pm / y e  A a Vi.a, e Ej a Vj.-iPj 4 E };
E e DL(<T, A »  iff E -  u E j.
1=0
So starting with T and applying at each iteration a default rule whose antecedents are 
currently satisfied, if a point is reached when no more rules can be applied and nothing has 
been derived to invalidate all the rules that have been used, then the resulting set of theorems 
forms an extension of <I~, A>. By varying the order of application, different extensions may
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be produced. By not taking the theorems of <r, A> to be the intersection of the fixed points 
but their union, Default Logic is radical (rather than conservative) and leads to cases where 
both 7t and —i7t are theorems (but in different extensions).
Several interesting points can be highlighted by the study of non-monotonic logics. 
Most of the systems are computationally expensive, being defined in terms of closures of 
infinite sets involving non-semidecidable procedures or using second order logic. Many have 
problems with multiple extensions. The most important point is that although these systems 
to a certain extent can model changes in beliefs (i.e. propositions that are theorems under one 
theory may not be theorems in another), this process is cumbersome and not sufficient (on its 
own) for modelling changes in a theory.
1.2.3 Modelling the Dynamics of Epistemic States11
Unlike non-monotonic logics which are concerned with the retraction of certain designated 
inferences given the addition of contradictory information, Gardenfors’ [1988] work is 
concerned with modelling the process of adding and subtracting information from belief sets 
through the processes of expansion, contraction and revision. The aim of his work is to 
present a series of postulates about what (epistemic) states should be considered as a suitable 
basis for building a theory of cognitive states (be they theoretic or realisable entities) and 
transitions between states. The definitions of postulates is motivated by several guiding 
principles and by intuitions of how belief sets should behave.
Presupposing a language containing propositions recursively defined using the standard 
propositional connectives (a , v , —i and —>14), and some notion of logical consequence (i.e. 
provability: \— ), contradiction and of the acceptance or rejection of propositions, the 
following rationality criteria for belief sets are advanced: 1*
1 ' The subtitle of "Knowledge in Flux" (Gardenfors 19881
14 note —> is material implication
1 I
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• "The set of accepted sentences should be consistent."
• "Logical consequences of what is accepted should also be accepted."
These criteria result in belief sets being defined as sets of formulae T of the language L s.t. 
T =  { « I T  i - a }
otherwise written as T = Thms(T) where Thms:Pw(L)— >Pw(L) returns all the theorems 
derivable in L given some proof system denoted by |-  The only requirements on |-  are that:
• if a  is a tautology then |-a ;
•  if | - a  and |—a —>P then (—P (i.e. Modus Ponens operates);
• ot|—P iff |—a —>P (i.e. the deduction theorem holds)
• and that {- -L,
where -L is a distinguished element representing contradiction.
These conditions on |— ensure that |— contains classical propositional logic. It is 
therefore possible to argue for or against Gardenfors postulates (as they stand) on the basis of 
properties of classical propositional logic. Gardenfors [1988, p24] does say that "if more is 
known or assumed about the structure of the object language, it may be possible to formulate 
other, more specific rationality criteria".
On this definition of belief sets, postulates are given that define: the expansion of a 
belief set K by the addition of a , written K,£; the contraction of K by a, K^; and the revision 
of K by oc, K,*. By assuming the Levi identity [Gardenfors 1988, p69] which states that 
K  = (K ^ ) i ,  we need only to concern ourselves with the postulates for expansions and 
contractions. These basic postulates for expansions are as follows [Gardenfors 1988, p49- 
51]:
(K+l) K,^  is a belief set;
(K+2) a e  K£
(K+3) K c  K«;
(K+4) If a  e K then KÎ = K;
12
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(K+5) If K c  H then £  H £ and
(K+6) for all belief sets K and all sentences a, K* is the smallest belief set that satisfies
(K+l) - (K +6).
For contractions a similar set of basic postulates are expounded thus [Gardenfors 1988, p61 - 
63]:
(K~1) K(j is a belief set;
(K“2) K ^ c K ;
(K'3) if a  ^ K then = K;
(K~4) if / - a  then a  4
(K“5) if a  e K then K c  (K^)«!
(K~6) if |— a  <-> p then = Kjj
From these postulates a number of important consequences arise, in particular:
(3.21) If a  e K then (K^)„ c  K |Gardenfors 1988, p62]; and
Thm 3.1 The expansion function + satisfies (K+1) - (K+6) iff 
K,+ = Thms(K u  |a} ) IGardenfors 1988, p51].
An integral part of Gardenfors work is the view that belief sets are flat, i.e. they have 
no internal structure but are merely a set of propositions. Contraction and revision functions 
rely on maintaining consistent belief sets according to the principle of informational 
economy, i.e.
"When we change our beliefs we want to retain as much as possible of our old beliefs" 
How beliefs have been derived is considered as irrelevant to the process of contracting or 
revising beliefs and is only considered when looking at "extra-logical information" that may 
help in making choices during the revision process. In support of his use of consistency as a 
guiding principle, Gardenfors quotes Harman |1986| who draws a distinction between 
foundations theories of revision on the one hand and coherence theories on the other. The 
latter are characterised by their use of consistency as a guiding principle, while the former 
depend on the structure of beliefs and their derivations.
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Although agreeing with the goals and direction of Gardenfors work, I have a series of 
objections that prevent it forming a major part of this thesis. In brief his work is monotonie 
in nature; it relies on infinite closures of sets of axioms under entailment; it favours a 
coherence theory of revision over a foundations approach; and finally as it is based on, or 
capable of replicating propositional logic, any proposition is entailed by a contradiction. In 
the following section I shall examine these criticisms in depth and show how they support a 
foundations approach to belief revision.
1.2.3.1 Objections to Epistemic Dynamics
One of the goals of this research is to look at belief revision in general and one interesting 
application area is in non-monotonic style reasoning, a common everyday type of reasoning, 
as shown in §1.2.1. By placing a monotonicity constraint on expansions, i.e. 
(K+3) = K c  KjJ, systems based on Gardenfors’ postulates are forced to consider only 
monotonie systems of entailment. To see this, suppose |-  were non-monotonic and for some
r,
T | -  P but T u  {a }  f -  p.
By (K+3) if there existed any K s.t.
K f -  r, K /-  a  and K (- P
then
K C K
However
KpÉOOr
as p e Thms(Kur) but P 4 77iw.v(Ku{a)ur). This contradicts (K+5). So either (K+3), or 
(K+5) must be given up, or |— must be monotonie.
Another drawback to Gardenfors approach to reasoning is its reliance, as with many 
non-monotonic logics, on a fixed point construction over entailment. In the same way that 
this leads to computational intractability in non-monotonic logics, the need to construct
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infinite sets of theorems leads to admitted computational problems [Gardenfors 1988, p36] in 
attempting to construct belief sets15.
In order to demonstrate why I believe a foundations approach to revision is superior to a 
consistency approach I wish to do three things: show that (K~5) leads to problems with 
retracting information and should be dropped; argue that an alternative to (K~5) should be 
introduced and that this leads naturally to a foundations approach; and finally criticise 
Harman’s rejection of a foundations approach.
Given (K~5) and (3.21), if a  e K then K = (K^)„. Informally this means that in any 
state K the effect of retracting any information a  can be counter-acted or nullified by the re- 
introduction of that information. I shall call this property negative recoverability to indicate 
the fact that is possible to recover from the removal of information by reasserting it.
This property has some undesirable consequences. Consider the proposition a  and the 
minimal subsets Tj contained in K s.t. T* |-  a. Furthermore, consider an operator ® where
A ® B = | {a, b[ l a e  A, b e  B }
i.e. A ® B is identical to A x B except the latter produces a set of ordered pairs or tuples 
whereas the former produces a set of sets.
As a  4 K„ and K~ is closed under |— then there must be some
T] ® ... ® r n
s.t. K , j n r 4 = 0 .
I.e. at least one element in each Tj must have been removed from T to prevent the proof of a. 
Given this definition,
V yerA .y^K ^.
But as y, e K, and K = (K^)„ = Thms(K~t u  (a ) ), then K,j[, a |-y ,. So16, |- a  —» y,. As
15 This particular problem has been resolved by Nebel - see § 1.2.3.4.
16 by propositional rules of attachment and detachment - remember |— is assumed to include propositional
calculus.
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K„ is closed under |-  (being a belief state) then a  —> y, e  K~. In particular, if 
ViTj = {y}, i.e. a  has a set of singleton "causes" y —>a then (K- 5) forces us to include 
a —*y in our belief state and a proposition becomes identified with its antecedents, a<-»y17
The result of all this is that when contracting a belief set, all the information required to 
restore the beliefs removed in the contraction must actually be included in that retraction! If I 
wish to contract K so a  is removed, and in order to do this I must remove p, then I must also 
put a  —> P in the contraction - this is so that when a  is reasserted, p can be recovered.
It should be noted that a lot of this argument rests on well known problems that arise 
from the use of material implication to model causality and it might therefore be unfair to 
single out Gardenfors’ work. However, he does choose to use material implication, and even 
if he did not use material implication similar problems remain. Given the definition of K~5, 
if P depends on a  and a  is retracted, there must be some coding of this relationship in the 
resulting belief state so that when a  is reasserted, P can be recovered.
As an example of the problems that occur in trying to retract information, assuming the 
language is propositional calculus using standard semantics and entailment, let 
K = Thms{ B —» F, P —» F )18. By asserting B then B, F, F —» B, P —> B, e Kr. By 
asserting P then P, F —> P, B —> P e  (Kp)p. If B is to be successfully retracted, either one of 
the proposition F or the proposition F —» B and one of P or likewise P —» B should be 
retracted. Similarly, if F is to be retracted, one of B or the implication B —» F and one of P 
or (as before) P —> F should be retracted. In the light of our original set of theorems, in the 
first case (retracting B) it would be preferable to reject the spurious implications F —> B 
along with P —> B as they were introduced to satisfy (K- 5). In the second case (retracting F) 
the implications form part of the original theory and it is more in accord with our intuitions 
to reject the atomic facts.
17 In first order logic this also arises as a result of considering K = Thm s(K) for if a , p e K then by 
strengthening the antecedent: y —> a , y  —» (5 e K for any y  and in particular tx <-> (}.
IS One possible interpretation might be that B = "Tweety is a bird", P = "Tweety is in a plane" and F =
"Tweety can fly”
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In general, Va,(îe K. a  —> P e K and one would expect the retraction of P to lead to: 
the removal of a  —» P for all those facts a  not used in the derivation of P; and the removal of 
a  for the facts used to derive p. Thus determining the effect of retracting P requires 
information on how P was derived - this is surely a foundations theory of revision!
As a final remark, if the retraction of F leads to the removal of B and P, then asserting F 
leads to their réintroduction even when this may be undesired. For example, B and P may be 
two known causes of F, but there may be other causes for F and the assertion of F may be an 
observational report capable of occurring independently of B and P. In this case (K~5) is too 
conservative in tying possible effects with causes.
Gardenfors considers the dual question: should K = (K^)„, for all K and a. This is a 
property I shall call positive recoverability in contrast to negative recoverability. His answer 
is no, for if —<a e K and —>a e  H with H * K then = K^=Kx19 and given —a (contraction 
with respect to a) is a well-defined function, K = (K^)^ = (H|£)^ = H contradicting H * K. In 
order to defeat this objection one has to prevent a contradiction leading to the derivation of 
all possible facts. By using a foundations approach based on relevance logic firstly the source 
of a contradiction, a set of propositions Tx, can be isolated, and secondly the appearance of 
contradictions does not permit the derivation of any formula but merely prevents the 
derivation of those that depend on Tx. Thus for —ia e  K and H, and rather than
having a single absurd belief set there are many.
Another reason (Gardenfors does not mention this) is that if K = (K„)ü = (K„)^ then 
and +„ are inverse functions for any a  and are therefore isomorphisms and for all K, H, a , 
= H„ => K = H and similarly => K = H. Thus for any given state there is only
one other state from which it can be derived with a given epistemic input (i.e. an argument to 
a contraction or expansion function). This means that a series of updates and a final state 
enables the reconstruction of an initial state. Unless belief revision is deterministic, this 
argument implies that it is only possible to have one or other of these dual properties: i.e. 
positive or negative recoverability. Having rejected (K~5) we are free to assume positive
19 Kx is the absurd belief set containing a contradiction and all that it entails.
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recoverability.
1.2.3.2 Foundations vs Coherence
Rejecting (K~5) and accepting positive recoverability (hence abbreviated PR) is equivalent 
to choosing between a foundations and a coherence theory of belief revision, for if K = (K,*)' 
then any P that can be derived in K using oc, given p 4 K, is added when a  is added and is 
removed when a  is removed, unless an independent derivation has since been added.
Harman [ 1986] raises a series of objections rejecting a foundations theory in favour of a 
coherence theory. Before accepting the former these objections must be defeated. The 
primary objection relies on arguments about belief perseverance in humans [Ross et al 1980] 
where either a proposition Jt remains believed even after the evidence that originally led to 
its acceptance has been removed (and no other evidence that might support it has been 
added), or after evidence has been added that contradicts or undermines jt.
Imagine that Karen is a student studying history20 and that her grades in the past have 
been good. However, an aptitude test shows that she has very little aptitude for the subject, 
and she therefore concludes, after some deliberation necessary for her to choose how to 
revise her beliefs, that the course must have been easy and that she is in fact no good at 
history. On discovering that the aptitude test was incorrect (the scores were for another 
student of a similar name and unfortunately Karen’s have been lost) what does Karen believe 
about her ability in history? Harman claims that belief perseverance would mean that she 
still felt that the course was easy and she had no ability. Therefore a foundations theory 
cannot be correct as K * (K„)^ for a  = "aptitude tests reports lack of ability in history".
I would not argue with the scenario but with the description of the processes involved. 
Karen does not merely add and subsequently retract a: there is a further belief revision on K 
in order to remove the contradiction about K |-  P a  —>p, for P = "good at history". Thus the 
revisions are modelled by K ' = ((K,J)^p)^ = (((K,J)p)*p)^. Now one would not expect, a 
priori, p e K' having removed it from K, unless its removal were solely dictated by the 
2,1 This is a cut down version of Harm all's example.
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addition of a. In other words, one model of Karen’s belief revision is that the addition of a 
forces a contradiction over P which in turn leads to the retraction of p. The removal of a 
removes the contradiction which, according to the foundation theory should undo the 
retraction of P which was predicated on the presence of a. This assumes that the retraction 
process was predicated, i.e. dependent, on a. Imagine such a contradiction occurring - how 
does Karen go about deciding whether to accept —>P or alternatively throw out a? It is 
possible that determining factors in this resolution process are independent of the existence 
of the contradiction, e.g. friends had reported finding the course easy (which she may have 
discounted because she found it hard), and would persist after the contradiction is removed. 
Thus belief persistence can be explained in the way contradictions are resolved.
Another argument cited against the foundations approach is the psychological 
preference for positive rather than negative undermining. The principle of positive 
undermining states that
"One should stop believing Jt whenever one positively believes one’s reasons for 
believing P are no good",
while the principle of negative undermining states that
"One should stop believing 7t whenever one does not associate one’s belief in Jt with an 
adequate justification (either intrinsic or extrinsic)".
The first principle is associated with a coherence theory while the second defines a 
foundations approach. People in belief perseverance experiments keep unsupported beliefs 
(act in accordance with a coherence theory) but can be made to give up those beliefs if they 
are made aware of the principle of positive undermining, i.e. that they have no good reasons 
and all their reasons are no good. This, Harman claims, is further proof of the psychological 
validity of the coherence theory. However, the two principles appear to disagree only when 
there are no reasons for belief, in which case negative undermining says it should no longer 
be believed while positive undermining says n should still be believed (until some reason 
arises for it to be discarded, e.g. inconsistency, inelegance, compactness etc), so it is only 
this case that differentiates the principles.
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If it is assumed that people use a self-referential or introspective argument as 
justification for their beliefs, e.g. "I believe 7t because 7t is currently in my belief system" or 
more specifically using a historical argument, e.g. "I believe Jt because at some point in the 
past was introduced into my belief system21", then all the observed phenomena that are 
explained by a coherence theory can be explained by a foundations theory. Positive and 
negative updating agree when other justifications are present, and if only the self-supporting 
argument remains then n  still supports itself. Only when there is evidence that it is not 
possible for k to continue being believed is this self-referential argument removed, thus 
leaving rt with no support thus necessitating its removal. Furthermore, one can envisage that 
self-referential justifications do not apply to all propositions, particularly when their 
derivation is obvious. However, it is part of the process of entrenchment to replace explicit 
justifications with implicit self-referential justification. For example, if 1 am told (by a 
reliable source) that a seminar on proof theory is being given tomorrow then I will not 
believe it because I believe it, but because someone told me. In contrast, if I was told that 
Santiago is the capital of Chile (1 believe it is!) in school or read it in the paper I have lost 
those justifications for believing it but now believe it because I believe it!
1.2.3.3 Why Foundations?
Having shown the objections to a foundations approach are ill-conceived, why should a 
foundations theory actually be preferred (talcing Occam’s razor into account - i.e. if we don’t 
need justifications why add them)? In the first instance, in order to reason in the face of 
contradictions, something that non-monotonic logics were devised to do (i.e. retract 
contradictory default inferences), a reasoner needs to know the following:
• what causes the contradiction, i.e. which propositions are inconsistent;
• what information (the culprits) is used to derive (supports) the contradictory 
propositions; and
*' This introduction of new beliefs only being possible when there is some evidence, justification or motive- 
lion for doing so.
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• how to decide which culprits are to be removed so as to guarantee the removal of the 
contradiction.
All this information is exactly what is maintained by a foundations approach to belief 
revision. By maintaining the information necessary to implement such a theory, a reasoner 
can easily deal with contradictions.
Secondly, there are the arguments between (K“5) and PR, two mutually inconsistent 
postulates, the first stating that
K = (K ^ î
while the second states that 
K = (Ki)"
Which of these is the better principle to be included as a postulate about belief revision? Is it 
that having mistakenly added a , all traces of it (i.e. everything that was capable of derivation 
using a )  can be removed by retracting it, or is it that having mistakenly removed a  (and all 
information capable of deriving it), the belief set can be restored to its previous state? Now 
(K~5) supports a coherence theory as
V a ,p .(ae  K a P s K a  P e K)
thus all the propositions in a given belief set are identified with each other and the revision of 
the set of beliefs can be considered a global process. In contrast, as outlined above, PR 
supports a foundations theory for whenever new information is derived from newly asserted 
premises, e.g. P 4 K but P e K, ,^ it must be retracted when that premise is retracted.
Harman claims that while the first has more psychological validity, the second is more 
principled. So, discarding motives of correspondence with how humans reason, and given we 
can model a coherence theory within a foundations theory, I propose that a foundations 
theory has a greater utility. In order to defeat Harman’s previous objection to having (PR), 
namely that if -it* e  K and H with H *  K then H„ = K,^=K± so either K * (K„)^ or 
H * (H,^ ),“, the principle of a contradiction entailing everything must be removed.
21
1.2.3.4 Belief Bases
1.2.3.4 Belief Bases
Nebel [1989] proposes doing belief revision on belief bases - defined as finite sets of 
propositions that (unlike Gardenfors’ belief sets) do not have to be deductively closed. This 
removes the problems of: knowing whether to retract original or derived propositions: of 
retracting antecedents of implications (cf p i4); and the computational problems that arise 
from using infinite closures.
However, it is interesting to note that the contraction function defined for belief bases 
does not (initially) satisfy the recoverability postulate K~5! This postulate is only satisfied in 
general by extending the definition of contractions so that the proposition B v —>x is added to 
the contraction of B w.r.t. x. This is effectively explicitly encoding the original belief set in 
the contraction22. Nebel’s proposed contraction function has additional problems. Either it 
has to treat multiple possible contractions as disjunctions, e.g.
(a a  a —^ b a  b)b = (a) v  (a —» b)
or a selection function must be defined that relies on an ordering for all the propositions in a 
belief base. This ordering may itself be different for different bases and therefore require 
revision itself as transitions are made from one belief base to another.
Another interesting problem that arises when using belief bases is that of extracting 
information from a particular belief base. If one wants to know if a proposition holds in a 
belief base a proof must be constructed for it, or some reasoning performed. If the belief base 
changes and we still need to know the status of that particular proposition we must 
reconstruct the proof, or at the very least, recheck our old proof. What is this but Truth 
Maintenance at the (symbol) level of dependencies between propositions! This throws up an 
interesting parallel with the ATMS.
The ATMS could be viewed as operating on belief bases of assumptions, and similarly 
requires a secondary interpretation phase to determine the status of the nodes in the network 
given a particular current context (or belief base) or set of assumptions. But at least in the 
ATMS this can be done with a simple subsumption test on a node’s label. Without storing 
22 Considering —> as material implication. B v ->x ■ x —> B.
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any information at the symbol level, belief revision performed solely using belief bases 
would be a cumbersome tool.
Nebel wishes to proceed in the same manner as Gardenfors (by giving definitions of 
belief states and transition functions between states) and do so on an abstract "knowledge" 
level, i.e. without reference to the structure of propositions or (non-logical) dependencies 
between them. Yet it is interesting to note that he himself believes [Nebel 1989, p30S] that 
"Choosing the ’right’ form of the premises seems to be one of the central tasks before 
any kind of belief revision can be applied."
I believe that belief revision of the kind proposed by Nebel and Gardenfors, operating solely 
at the knowledge level to be too difficult to manage without the kind of information 
contained at the symbol level, in propositions and the dependencies between them. Without 
this, one will always be searching for the right form of premises so that belief revision 
performs in the desired way.
1.2.4 Handling Contradictions
One of the problems with classical logic is that because of the definitions of entailment and 
implications, a contradiction (i.e. rt and —itt occur in the same theory, or both are true in a 
particular model or interpretation) implies or entails any formula. This is obvious from the 
(truth table) definition of —» whereby a  —» P is true if a  is false and in particular 
a  a  -ia  —» p, or by using natural deduction rules:
(1) ->ot
(2) - .a  v p (l)v -I
(3) a  —» P (2) by definition or proof [Lemmon 1965, Thm48 p58]
Similarly, given semantic entailment is defined by a  |= p iff iW(a) c  ^f(p) (where !Af(a) are 
the models satisfying a) and no model by definition makes a proposition both true and false, 
M(a.A—<a) = 0  c  iW(P) for any p. So, in the presence of contradictions [Belnap 1977]
"If ... (a computer reasoner) is a classical two value logician it must give up altogether 
talking about anything to anyone, or equivalently it must say everything to everybody ... 
contradictions are never isolated infecting as they do the whole system."
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Non-monotonic logics are not a great help. They do provide a way of making unsound 
default inferences and retracting them when they would otherwise lead to contradictions, e.g. 
Ma —> a  |— a  but M a —» a  , —ia /-  a . However, if a  and —itx are true by virtue of first order 
(monotonic entailment) then the same "infection" occurs. Similarly, belief revision based on 
first order logic will generate an absurd belief set from the addition of a  to a belief set 
containing —>a, —ia e K => = K^. In order to avoid this, K must be revised through the
removal of —i(x and the addition of a: /—a  => (K“a)^ # Kx . However, in attempting to assert 
Jt this approach commits a system to trying to prove 7t and to invalidating all proofs that exist 
before actually adding 7t.
Belnap [1976, 1977] proposes a logic whereby the introduction of a contradiction does not 
"infect" a theory to make all formulae theorems. Imagine a computer knows of certain 
propositions and that these may be marked as true and/or false, or have no value associated 
with them. These values are either asserted by external agents or derived from formulae that 
already have values. The possible combinations of being told or not told true and/ or false 
leads to four "truth values"2  ^ n (neither told true nor told false)/  (told just false) t (told just 
true) and b (both told true and told false). Given an assignment s : FI— >V from atomic 
propositions n e  n  to values V = {n, / ,  t, b), s is extended to all formulae in the usual 
recursive fashion with negation defined by
a n r t b
-ia n t r b
and a and v  respectively defined as the meet (lowest upper bound) and join (greatest lower 
bound) operations over the lattice L4
21 Fox |1990] holds that as there are in reality only two truth values there can only be two told "truth 
values", even though four "infonnation-slates" exist. This insistence on only two external truth values means 
that even if nothing is known about n, it is either true or false and in any case rt v  -tiz is true. This appro;ich is 
siinikir to that of V;in Fraassen’s supervaluations 11966, 1968, 1969] in which fonnulae lacking truth values for 
some component are evaluated under all possible assignments :ind if all assignments agree then this value is 
used.
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t
n b T increasing level of truth
/
Using the definition of material implication (a  —> (3 = -itx v  p) we get
P
a  -» p n r t b
n n n t t
r t t t t
t n f t t
b t b t b
Although .v(a —» P) = t if .v(a) = /, if ,v(a) = b (i.e. a  is contradictory or inconsistent) then 
s(a p) e {b, t 1 and it is impossible to assign a true value to the implication solely on the 
basis of a contradiction. Similarly from .r(a —► P) = t and ,v(a) = b it is impossible to say 
what value P must have.
Entailment is defined by a|~P (Belnap actually writes a  —» p but I will reserve —> as a 
symbol within the language) iff x(a) £ s(P) for all assignments s. Interestingly (although not 
totally unexpectedly, given this work is equivalent to Anderson and Belnap’s relevance logic 
119751) if we construct a new implication based on this principle where
s(a (—> P) = t iff .v(a) <. i(P),
,v(a i— > P) = y iff ,v(a) > .t(P), 
s(a l— > P) = u otherwise
then it is impossible to construct a truth-functional characterisation of I—» using a , v , and —i.
Ginsberg 11988) generalises Belnap’s work by defining a bi-lattice as two partial orders 
k^> andS, over a set B with gibs v, + and lubs a , • respectively, and a negation operation 
B —> B s.t.
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(1) (B, a , v) and (B, -, +) are complete lattices
(i.e. bi©b2 e B for all b] , b2 e B, l~a+ e { a ,,v , -,+  ) .)
(2) Vbe B. —■(—.b) = b
(3) Va,be B. —i(a a  b) = (—ia) v  (—.b) and Va,be B. -i(a v b) = (
(4) Va,be B. ->(a • b) = (—.a) • (—ib) and Va,be B. —.(a + b) = (—.;
Obviously L4 fulfills these criteria and for any bi-lattice the elements of L4 will appear as 
distinguished elements n ', / ' ,  t and b ' s.t. Vve B.( « ' <k v a  v <k / '  a  t '  <, v a  v <t b'). 
Given an assignment ()>: L — » B, if <|>(a)^<|>(P) then p contains at least as much information 
or knowledge as a  and if <|>(a)<t<|)(p) then P is at least as truthful as a.
Briefly inference is characterised as the process of closing a truth assignment (J) by 
choosing those assignments y  that contain just enough extra information, i.e. 
Vote £.(f>(a)<kVj/(a) (if y  fulfills this condition then y  is an extension of <)>) so that if 
a|=P then y(a)<ty(P) (if y  fulfills this condition then y  is apparently closed)?4 Having 
found the apparently closed extensions of <(>, /4(<|>), the closure could be defined as the 
pointwise k-minimum value of each formula25: 
c/(<J>)(a) = y! (a) •... • y n(a) for yi e A(<t»).
Some apparently closed extensions may draw stronger conclusions than are warranted 
by the evidence but if y i <k y 2 (i.e. V aeA .yi (a)Sky 2(oO) then y 2 is filtered out by the 
minimisation. However it is possible that y 2 makes some (unjustified) inference that 
increases the value of one proposition while preventing an increase in another so that neither 
Vi-kV2 nor M^kVt • An additional order relation on assignments is defined with 
( ( K l y s ^ y v  37c.«t>(7Ci) + ... + <)>(jin)£ky(pi) 
where 7t, 7t| e A = ( a  I y(a)*<|>(a)}
:4 For brevity I have skipped extra conditions that are necessary for \|/ to be apparently closed. These fulfill 
the role of making sure that the information contained in each compound formula is as much as the information 
contained in the subformulac.
This is analogous to taking the intersection of extensions in NML-I to obtain the set of non-monotonic 
theorems, or to any other cautious approach to non-monotonic reasoning.
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So the closure is defined as the meet over the <l-minimal apparently closed extensions of <(>: 
c/(<|>) = n  (y  e -4(<|)) I y '  e >4(<J>), y ' <1 y  => y '  = y )
In order to show how to perform default reasoning using lattices the lattice I) is defined. 
_L
f t
* T increasing knowledge
df dt
u
increasing truth
Imagine we have propositions Tweety is a bird (b), Tweety is a penguin (p), and Tweety flies 
(f), and we have a inference rules b —» f26 and p —» —if. Now birds by default fly so the 
inference b —» f is assigned a value dt while penguins not flying is a "real" or definite 
inference rule and is assigned the value t. Given an assignment
K b P f b -> f p —» -if
<t>(7t) t u u dt t
and given b a  b —» f |-  f, then c/(<)>)(f) >k dt a  dt = dt. Continuing in this fashion the closure 
can be constructed:
K b P f b -> f P -> i f
clUf»(it) t df dt dt t
If it is asserted that Tweety is in fact a penguin then the closure of the resulting extension y
of <(> is:
26 The notation here is a little vague - a  —» P is really an inference rule but it acts like an implication within 
the language anti can he assigned an element in I).
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K b P f b —» f P -> - 'f
c/(«t»)(ic) t d f dt dt t
V|/(7t) t t dt dt t
c7(\|/)(7t) t t f f t
So increasing the knowledge (about p) has led to a decrease in truth (about f) and the 
reasoning is non-monotonic. However this non-monotonicity in truth is bought at the 
expense of monotonicity of knowledge - it is impossible to throw away knowledge, be it 
asserted or derived, unless one goes back to a basic starting assignment for facts known 
about the world and then recloses it.
This approach to reasoning and representation is useful in that contradictions do not 
dominate theories so that anything is derivable from a contradiction. However, as with 
normal logics, the problems of updating and revising beliefs in the absence of explicit 
justifications remain. This is readily admitted by Ginsberg when he says that when using D 
one "must essentially re-derive all of our earlier conclusions at every step" [Ginberg 1988, 
p278]. He claims this is necessary for any default reasoning system, but I hope to show in 
this thesis that this is not the case.
1.2.5 Criteria for Belief Revision
In this section I have looked at various ways of capturing everyday default or non-monotonic 
reasoning. Any system that attempts to capture the process of doing belief revision must 
satisfy five main criteria:
(i) non-monotonicity
the system must be non-monotonic, capable of undoing inferences that have previously 
been made;
(ii) justifications
the system must keep track of justification information in order to allow the retraction 
of information in general and contradictions in particular;
28
1.2.5 Criteria for Belief Revision
(iii) contradictions
more strongly, the system must be able to handle contradictions by preventing their 
occurrence "infecting" the system allowing anything whatsoever to be derived;
(iv) reference to lack of information
the system must be able to explicitly refer to the lack of information about some 
proposition and make inferences of the form "if I don’t know anything about n then 
infer y";
(v) computational tractability
and finally, to be useful a system should be computationally tractable, an issue that in 
many cases has been ignored by non-monotonic formalisms to date.
1.3 Capturing Consequences
The purpose of formalism is to capture information about, or construct a model (in the 
informal sense of the word) of some domain so that a compact representation can be used to 
derive information about that domain without interacting with the domain directly. In order 
to make sense of such formalisms, an interpretation of the elements of the formalism is 
needed. In the case of logic this is a mapping of logical symbols to objects (be they 
individuals, properties or relationships) along with a truth assignment that indicates whether 
the relationships between elements of the formalism holds in the domain. The formula
B(p) a  F(p)
could be interpreted as follows: p denotes Polly my parrot, B is the property of being a bird, 
and F is that of flying, and they are both deemed to be true of Polly.
A logical model of a set of sentences T is an interpretation in which all the sentences in 
F are true. So the process of capturing knowledge about some domain requires the 
construction of some set of sentences (an axiomatisation O  that represents some explicit 
information in such a way that any logical model of T (i.e. an interpretation in which all ye T 
are true) is a logical model of the desired implicit information 0  that is to be captured. 
Semantically the axiomatisation T restricts the set of possible interpretations so that any 
model of f  is a model of 0 . Any formula 0 that is true in all models of T is a logical
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consequence of T and is said to be entailed by T. The complete set of implicit information 
entailed by T is a logical theory (of T).
In §1.2 it was shown how non-monotonic logics were developed from particular 
definitions of entailment (or extensions or closures) so that simple "common sense" theories 
could be captured by particular, intuitive, axiomatisations. Such work proceeds by choosing 
(or having preconceived ideas about) pairs <r,0> of explicit and implicit information and 
attempting to define (through the definition of entailment) a function that captures this 
relationship. This can be difficult (as with the Yale Shooting Stick Problem [Hanks and 
McDermott 1986])!
Rather than working on the basis of T defining 0  in model theoretic terms and/or some 
associated proof theory using implicit links between propositions, I maintain that 
representations of domains should explicitly include the potential inferences that can be 
made, in terms of direct links between propositions, and that reasoning is a process of using 
those links to manipulate and/or create interpretations of those propositions.
1.3.1 Mental Models
Johnson-Laird [1983] proposes and defends the thesis that
"reasoning ordinarily proceeds without recourse to a mental logic with formal rules of 
inference";
that is, rules that take a set of propositions (about the world or some abstract domain) and 
through purely syntactic manipulation return new propositions. The fundamental idea 
behind reasoning without rules of inference is that people construct mental models from a set 
of sentences (the antecedents or premises of a formal inference), symbolic representations of 
states of affairs, and manipulate these models to test the validity of relationships (conclusions 
or consequences) between objects or sets of objects in the model.
For example, having been told that all men are mortal and that Socrates is a man a 
model is constructed in which a representative set of men (this set is open to arbitrary 
extension at any time) are all designated as mortal and in which Socrates is identified as a 
particular case of a man. Therefore a link has been established between Socrates and those
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individuals that are mortal and the conclusion that Socrates is mortal can be drawn.
man = mortal
Socrates = man = mortal 
(man) = mortal
mortal 
(mortal)
Socrates is a man all men are mortal
|the brackets around "man" and "mortal” are to suggest that these objects and their 
relationships can be replicated indefinitely] If an inference is to be implicit (i.e. occur 
unconsciously as a natural side effect of comprehension of written or verbal communication) 
then the construction of a model that satisfies the premises is sufficient. If an inference is to 
be explicit then a model generated to satisfy the premises must be tested to see if it is 
possible to alter the model so that it still satisfies the antecedents but the conclusion no 
longer holds. In the case of Socrates it is not possible to add or remove objects and/or links 
so that Socrates is still a man, all the men in the model are shown to be mortal, but Socrates 
is not mortal.
The interesting point to come out of Johnson-Laird’s work is not that he can explain 
and predict how humans will, in general, cope with reasoning tasks but his idea that one 
explicitly manipulates models rather than using logical statements to restrict the class of 
models, and then uses rules of inference to find out what holds in all of the models of this 
restricted class.
1.3.2 Mental Models in AI
When using logic to capture a body of knowledge it is sufficient to write down an 
axiomatisation without explicitly specifying the deductions that are to be made from those 
axioms. The rules of deduction for the logic will generate the set of consequences for that 
axiomatisation. Most AI systems not only capture a specific body of knowledge in terms of 
objects and the relationships between them but also explicitly say how that information is to 
he used to make specific inferences. Thus the actual information being encoded also specifies
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how that information is to be used.
A prime example is that of production rule or rule-based systems where the rules 
themselves are a cross between a declaration of relationships between objects and real rules 
of inference. A rule of the form "p(x) —> q(x)" used in a forward chaining system not only 
says that property q holds for all things satisfying p, but also that having had p(a) derived or 
placed in the working memory for some a then derive q(a). Alternatively a prolog or 
backward chaining rule of the form "p(X) q(X)" says that in order to derive p(X) for some
X, prove q(X). The "is-a" link "p — > q" in a semantic network is again both a declarative 
statement (things of type p are also things of type q) and an inference rule (things that are p 
inherit characteristics of q’s).
The same could not be said to apply to material implications of the form 
Vx.p(x) —> q(x)27. This statement does express a relationship between the properties p and q 
but it gives no guide as to its use. It could be used to prove q(a) given p(a), or —>p(a) given 
-iq(a), or Vx.p(x) —> r(x) given Vx.q(x) —» r(x) or a host of other consequences involving 
Vx.p(x) —>q(x).
It should be noted that saying "rules specify how information is to be used" is somewhat 
of a simplification when meta-level reasoning systems are taken into consideration. There 
are systems (see [van Harmelen 19911 for a review) that provide a meta-level language for 
specifying how information at the object level should be used or interpreted. Most of these 
systems2* are based on explicitly representing what has previously been implicit control 
information. This means a control structure can itself be reasoned about and modified in 
particular situations. This does not however alter the basic point that many AI 
representations encode how information is to be used. Adding meta-level reasoning normally 
extends this by giving the power to say when information is to be used.
27 the nearest thing that logic gets to a rule of inference actually in the object language, given « —> [1 iff
ai=p
2* This includes those systems whose focus of action is either - to use van Harmelen categorisation - in the 
object level or is mixed between the object- and meta-levels rather than those whose focus is primarily in the
meta-level.
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In as much as AI systems can be said to embody particular theories about the world or 
particular expert domains, these theories represent a model of the inferences about a 
particular domain. Manipulating the model corresponds to applying particular rules to reach 
a desired goal. Non-monotonic reasoning systems have difficulty in describing just exactly 
what inferences should and should not be made. In particular the existence of multiple 
extensions, for example the Yale shooting stick problem [Hanks and McDermott 1986], is 
problematic with much (naive) discussion as to what inferences are intuitive or one would 
expect. It may even be possible that the whole field of non-monotonic reasoning (or at least 
the intuitive modeling thereof) is doomed to failure by looking for general principles of 
reasoning where they may not exist. This supports the idea that part of the process of 
modelling a domain should be the elicitation of exactly how information is used to derive 
new information.
1.3.3 Causal Models
Intuitively, causality is a simple conceptual notion: a  causes (3 if whenever a  occurs then [3 
occurs as a result of a , and P would not have occurred without the occurrence of a  or some 
other cause of p. However, the concurrency of a  and P is insufficient to distinguish between 
genuine causality, reverse causality (a  really causes p but it is perceived that P causes a  e.g. 
the idea that images in the eye are produced by the emission of some substance that 
illuminates the object rather than the reception of light from those objects), spurious 
causality resulting from statistical correlation (e.g. being red causes apples to be sweet), and 
epiphenomenalism (in which a  is a "side" effect of some genuine cause y of p, thus it 
appears that a  causes P).
In the Situation Calculus (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969] causality is expressed as an 
(material) implication between pre-conditions of an action holding in a situation s and the 
result of that action holding in some future situation s'. However, given the paradoxes of 
material implication, in any situation that does not satisfy some pre-conditions T, a material 
implication T —» p could represent a causal connection between T and p. So "if I am the king 
of France then I am bald" is a true implication and there is a causal connection between 
being the king of France and being bald. Ginsberg [1985| presents a way of analysing such
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counter-factual implications (where the antecedent is false) in terms of possible worlds: a  
counter-factually implies (3 in world T iff in all worlds most similar to T in which a  is true 
then (3 is true. Counter-factuals are loosely related to causality for many counter-factuals 
capture a causal relationship. For example given "the dinner will be on time if the power in 
the kitchen doesn’t fail"29, the power failure is seen as a cause for the lateness of dinner. 
Intuitively this is what it seems to mean for a  to cause P: if a  can be made to be true (by 
some action which moves us to a different world or situation) then one would expect p to 
subsequently happen. However, being a true counter-factual is insufficient evidence of a 
causal relationship. Although it is the case that "if the power does not fail then the guests 
will arrive on time" is a true counter-factual, moving to the nearest possible world (in which 
the power fails) does not affect the arrival of the guests and there is no causal connection.
Most AI systems that attempt to capture causality work with a built-in model of the 
causal connections. The causal links are explicitly modelled as such but there are no reasons 
for supposing that given a "causal connection" in the model that one actually exists. This 
applies not only to using implication as a causal link but to statistical causal models (e.g. 
|Pearl], Prospector) or semantic networks (e.g. CASNET) or to ad-hoc knowledge 
representations. What these systems do share is an explicit representation of causal links and 
a process of reasoning about the causal model by manipulating or passing information along 
such links. This means that
"... the reasoner can succinctly axiomatise the domain-dependent information needed to
infer that a ... (property) persists and reason about persistences in the same manner as
changes" | Weber 1989]
1.4 Networks
The choice of a network representation is based on three factors: intuitive appeal; familiarity; 
and computational considerations.
2'' this example is from Ginsberg 11985]
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The intuitive appeal of networks is founded on the apparent accessibility of graphical 
relationships. This is one of the justifications of such approaches as: semantic networks 
where inference can be performed through simple graph traversal algorithms, though the 
representation is no more powerful than restricted predicate calculus; or the use of graph 
reduction techniques to Rule Based Systems using certainty factors [van der Gaag 1987]. 
Another benefit is provided by the topological clustering of information, and although much 
of this benefit is available to linear representations given appropriate indexing schemes, 
graphical representations offer the efficiency and flexibility of special purpose reasoning 
algorithms.
The drawback of such graphical systems also lies in this flexibility that they offer: it is 
easy to define an algorithm and representation with no clear idea of what the algorithm does, 
nor what the representation means, other than pointing to the results in particular situations. 
For example this has led to myriad different interpretations for the "is-a" link in semantic 
networks (see §5.4).
One of the goals of this thesis is to provide a principled way of defining network-based 
belief revision systems so as to prevent such problems arising. In the case of different 
approaches to the same problem, (i.e. more than one way of interpreting the same type of 
network), the relevant definitions will be available in order to highlight the differences 
between interpretations.
The familiarity of networks as representations in AI, Computer Science and 
Mathematics has led to the development of a wide ranging vocabulary to describe properties 
of networks. Graph-related topological concepts such as connectedness, directedness and 
cyclicity all provide useful ways of classifying particular types of networks.
Such vocabulary occurs in diverse areas ranging from the structure of arguments |Loui 
1987, Lin and Shoham 1989] to constraint satisfaction problems [Dechter and Pearl 1988], 
In this thesis concepts such as directed graphs, cycles and acyclic networks, cutsets and 
reducible graphs will play a key role. Additionally, because of a large body of work a 
number of existing graph theory algorithms can be used or modified for use in the algorithms 
presented in Chapter 4.
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Finally, the use of graph-based representations raises the hope of directly transferring 
the processing of network-based algorithms to parallel computation devices, using the 
topology of the knowledge representation network to determine the connectivity of 
processing elements and the passing of information between them. Although this is not 
investigated in depth in this thesis, passing attention is paid to existing examples of this idea. 
In particular semantic networks are particularly amenable to such highly parallel 
architectures ]Bic 1985 and Fahlman 1980] and attempts have been made at applying this to 
Assumption Based Truth Maintenance Systems (Dixon 1988],
1.5 Conclusion
The main thrust of this chapter has been to examine why existing work in AI fails to provide 
an adequate approach to belief revision, that is, the management of changes in some explicit 
body of knowledge. In the course of this examination a set of criteria have been established 
which serve as a guide to the flexibility and utility of belief revision systems. It has also been 
proposed that a foundations approach to belief revision offers the best way of fulfilling those 
criteria.
This chapter has also put forward the idea that inference can be performed through the 
explicit representation of links between antecedent and consequent and the direct 
interrogation or manipulation of such links. Finally several reasons have been put forward 
for a preference for network-based algorithms, providing a clear semantics is given.
The following chapter focuses on Truth Maintenance Systems (TMSs) - a class of 
network-based systems capable of:
• supporting a foundations approach to belief revision |Gardenfors 1988, p35];
• explicitly representing rules of inference |Morris 1987]; and
• meeting all the belief revision system criteria established in §1.2.5.
Chapter 2 will contain:
• a review of the developments of TMSs and of the major developments contained in the 
various approaches taken by different systems;
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• an examination of unifications of the different approaches;
• an examination of the qualitatively different approaches to such concepts as defaults, 
premises and assumptions;
• a survey of existing applications and how they are suited to different TMS approaches; 
and
• an examination of some problems that arise in trying to apply such systems.
This will in turn lead, in Chapter 3, to the development of a general framework for 
specifying and implementing belief revision systems.
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Chapter 2: Truth Maintenance Systems
Truth Maintenance Systems are a class of systems that have been developed to act as 
intelligent caches of information and to provide certain book-keeping functions. In particular 
TMSs are used to record inferences and resolve inconsistencies that may arise and as such 
TMSs act as mechanisms for doing belief revision. Of the five characteristics that are 
desirable for belief revision systems (see §1.2.5), all TMSs provide mechanisms for 
resolving contradictions, and all use some form of dependency to record the sources of 
support for propositions with the majority using uni-directional justifications. The three 
remaining characteristics of non-monotonicity, computational tractability and ability to 
explicitly represent reasoning that involves the absence of information, are possessed in a 
variety of combinations by different systems.
This correspondence between TMSs and the belief revision criteria indicates that TMSs 
are prime candidates for building general belief revision systems. To this end, the three main 
styles of TMS will be examined in §2.1 with differences in style and application being 
discussed in §2.3. On a more formal level, various unifications have been proposed and these 
will be discussed in §2.2 while the applicability (or otherwise) of Gardenfors’ to TMSs will 
be examined in §2.4. The classification of various TMS activities and the identification of 
common elements of structure and functionality possessed by TMSs that arise from this 
chapter will be used in Chapter 3 to define a general approach to Truth Maintenance and 
belief revision, the Interpreted Dependency Network, that forms the main contribution of this 
thesis.
2.1 Development of TMSs
Truth Maintenance Systems first emerged as individual differentiated mechanisms with 
Doyle’s seminal paper [Doyle 1979] that represents the culmination of work started by 
Stallman and Sussman [1976| and developed further by de Kleer et al [ 1977]. Developments 
included a different style of Truth Maintenance by McAllester |1978, 1980] and a further 
change in style by Martins and Shapiro (1983] that was developed by de Kleer 11986].
The original idea behind TMSs is to act as a mechanism for providing efficient 
management of search. As a problem solver develops a line of reasoning the premises and
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conclusion of arguments are recorded as propositions or nodes in the TMS, and the inference 
is represented by a dependency or justification linking the antecedents to the consequent. The 
validity of the lines of reasoning are indicated by the labels explicitly assigned to particular 
nodes and derived for all other nodes and justifications. The benefits of using a TMS come 
from the way contradictions or dead ends in the search space are handled. Having 
ascertained that a particular line of reasoning generates a contradiction (and has therefore 
ended in failure), some action is taken to invalidate parts of that argument, potentially 
invalidating arguments supporting other nodes or even giving rise to new arguments based 
on non-monotonic justifications. Because the TMS records failures, and more importantly 
the underlying reasons for those failures, the problem solver linked to the TMS is guaranteed 
never to explore lines of reasoning known to produce contradictions.
2.1.1 Justification-Based Truth Maintenance
The TMS presented by Doyle in [1979a] and [1979b] - henceforth referred to as a 
justification-based TMS or JTMS - is a very general system capable of representing 
premises, assumptions and contingent beliefs. The difference between premises, assumptions 
and contingent beliefs is not explicit, but comes from the structure of the dependencies: a 
premise will not be dependent on any other nodes; an assumption will be dependent on the 
disbelief of some node (e.g. "not A" not being believed provides support for believing "A" is 
true is equivalent to assuming "A" unless "not A" is believed); and a contingent belief is a 
node that has some dependencies but cannot be classed as an assumption.
The purpose of the JTMS is to provide a consistent interpretation of the nodes by 
assigning a value of "believed" or "not believed" to each node on the basis of whether that 
node has a valid justification, or reason for belief, making it in the current set of beliefs, or 
not, in which case the node will be out i.e. not in. Doyle identifies two main types of 
justification although it would be easy to define additional types1 The first is the "support- 
list" (SL) justification of the form "If aj ,..., am are believed and bi .... bp are not believed
1 However, as the TMS is designed to be a domain independent system, the types of justilication should 
represent general kinds of justification and not be domain specific.
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then n is believed", written
( a l »•••* ^m )in (t*l »•••» ^p)out ^SL^*
The second is the "conditional proof' (CP) justification of the form "If c is believed 
whenever aj am are believed and bi bp are not believed then n is believed", written
(ai ,...» am)in (bi .....bp) out c cons ^CPn -
The a, ’s are called "in-nodes or -hypotheses" (for SL- or CP-justifications respectively), the 
bj’s are "out-nodes or -hypotheses" and c is the "CP-consequent". Whenever a dependency d 
supports a value in we say that d has a value in or is valid. So, using this notation we could 
differentiate the following:
a premise P justified by ------ > S L  P
an assumption A justified by (-«AJout— > s l A
or more generally ( a l  *•••♦ a m ) i n  ( ^ 1  *•••» b p ) o u t  * S l A
a contingent belief C justified with ( a l  »•••» a m ) i n
where a, and bj are arbitrary nodes.
The basic interactions between the problem solver and the JTMS consist of the problem 
solver asserting and retracting justifications and marking nodes as contradictions2 with the 
TMS answering queries about the status of particular nodes. The addition or removal of a 
justification from a node n invokes the "Truth Maintenance" (TM) procedure which updates 
n’s value so that it corresponds with that supported by n’s justifications. I.e. if all the 
justifications are out n should be out but if one or more justifications are in then n should be 
in. Any change in n’s value is propagated to the consequences of n, i.e. those nodes whose 
values depend (in part) on n’s value. On termination of TM no node’s value should conflict 
with that supported by its justifications.
Doyle’s |1979] algorithm works by constructing a list of nodes whose value is 
dependent on n (where n is the node where the justification is added or removed) and by
2 There is no need to explicitly create nodes as this is done automatically when they are mentioned in some 
justitication.
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labelling them nil: successive attempts are made to determine a value for each node by 
considering only those nodes labelled in or out, and then by assuming that all nil values will 
become out. The assumption that nil values become out is a relaxation process designed to 
assign values to nodes in cycles whose values would otherwise be incalculable. This process 
is explicitly captured by Goodwin [1987] in an improved version of Doyle’s algorithm which 
explicitly deals with strongly connected components3.
When a node is marked as contradictory if that node is in then a Dependency Directed 
Backtracking (DDB) procedure is called (similarly if a previously marked contradictory node 
is in at the end of TM then DDB is also invoked). DDB traces back through the nodes 
supporting the contradictory node, say c, to discover the underlying inconsistent assumptions 
S = {A) An ), i.e. those nodes that support c (either directly or through a chain of other 
derived nodes) and who are in turn supported by some node being out. A "no-good" node Ng 
is created to record the inconsistency of S, and is used to reject one (called the "culprit") of 
the "no-good" assumptions A, by justifying one of the A j’s supporting "out-nodes". So 
whenever all the no-good assumptions would have previously been in, one of the A j’s out- 
nodes is in as well, invalidating A j’s supporting justification thus preventing the 
contradiction from becoming believed.
The only other procedure used by the JTMS is one that approximates CP-justifications 
as SL-justifications as it is difficult in most circumstances to test the validity of CP- 
justifications. Doyle [1983] does give a formal specification of how the JTMS should 
consider CP-justifications even if the algorithms described do not achieve this. The 
mechanics of approximating CP-justifications will not be discussed here and is only 
considered in passing in §3.3.2. Furthermore, some of the problems of using CP-justifications 
to record entailment relationships can be seen in §3.3 and §4.3.2.3 which demonstrate that in 
general it is very difficult to establish entailment relationships purely through examining the 
dependencies linking propositions.
1 A directed graph is strongly connected if every pair of nodes is connected i.e. given nodes n and m there is 
a path from n to m and vice versa.
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The algorithms presented by Doyle and Goodwin have a number of design and 
implementation problems. The most important implementation problem is the inability to 
deal with unsatisfiable dependency networks which cause incorrect termination before 
finding solutions, or no termination at all. DDB is also prone to failure in that alternative 
derivations of a contradiction may exist but are not removed.
The JTMS was initially presented as an algorithm for doing Truth Maintenance and 
Dependency Directed Backtracking. It was only after this that a formal specification was 
given, first in terms of generating grounded admissible expansions of a network [Doyle 
1983] and latterly as modal logics [Brown 1985, Brown and Shoham 1989], operations over 
lattices [Brown et al 1987, Ginsberg 1988], and most recently using stable sets [Elkan 1990], 
No proof of the correctness of Doyle’s algorithm has been given and although Goodwin 
claims such a proof for his algorithm there is in fact an error4.
Finally, the complexity of such systems has only been briefly investigated. Goodwin 
(incorrectly) claims a complexity of polynomial degree 2 for updates to a network, while 
Elkan [1989] has shown, by transformation of propositional satisfiability, that the problem of 
deciding if a given interpretation is admissible for a given dependency network is NP- 
complete. In chapters 3 and 4 I will address these issues in depth and present solutions to 
some of them.
2.1.2 Assumption-Based Truth Maintenance
The design problems raised by de Kleer’s attempts to use the JTMS in Qualitative Physics 
led to the development of Assumption-Based Truth Maintenance Systems (ATMS) |de Kleer 
1986|. The main problem de Kleer encountered is that the JTMS maintains a single 
consistent problem solving environment at all times, and that changing contexts through 
Dependency Directed Backtracking is a time consuming, hit and miss process due to the 
inability to explicitly select the new target environment. This goes exactly against the type of 
methodology used by de Kleer in which many choices need to be made and many possible 
4 See Appendix 1 for an example of incorrect behaviour in Goodwin's algorithm.
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solutions need to be constructed and examined in parallel [de Kleer 1984].
The ATMS] is based on the familiar structure of nodes and justifications, but instead of 
using the justifications to assign values of in and out, each node is assigned a set of 
environments, {Ej ,..., Em ]5. Each environment E, = {A| ,..., Ap ] represents a minimal set 
of assumptions from which the node in question could be derived. So given the problem 
solver is currently working in a particular environment Ec, then for every node n with a label 
{Ei ,..., Em}, n is derivable in Ec iff E; c  Ec for some i.
The ATMS can been seen as a way of simultaneously maintaining a set of JTMS 
environments but with one important change: the justifications appearing in the ATMS are 
restricted to having only in-nodes. Assumptions and premises are specifically designated by 
assigning nodes particular values while contradictions are not explicitly marked as such but 
are generated by having nodes justify or support the distinguished node nx representing 
falsity or a contradiction. A premise P is given a value {{}) indicating P can be derived, i.e. 
is true, in any problem solving environment. An assumption A is given a value {{A () where 
A is a unique assumption identifier indicating that A has been assumed. Obviously if A is in 
the problem solver’s current context (i.e. the set of assumptions currently being used) then A 
is true.
The environments assigned to nx represent contradictory or no-good sets of 
assumptions: these are used in assigning labels to contingent nodes to prevent contradictory 
facts being derived. Given a justification
(U| a m )in >s|n
where each a, has a label L; = {Ejj ,..., Ejiln ) the justification is valid in any environment E 
that supports each a,, i.e. when
Vie [ 1 ,m|3j.Exj c  E.
In particular, n can be derived in any environment E e L where
'  This idea appears at an earlier date but in a less sophisticated form as contexts in the Multiple Belief Rea- 
soner (MBR) | Martins and Shapiro 1983). and later in |Martins and Shapiro 1988)
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L = ( E 1 u . . . u E m l Ejg Lj}.
L may contain redundant or superseded environments so L is reduced to minimal 
environments by removing Ej if 3Ej.EjC=Ej. Similarly any no-good environment (i.e. an 
environment that has a subset that supports nx), is removed from L. This results in a label L 
such that V EeL.(^NGeL^.NGcE a  ^E'e L.E't^E). If a node has more than one 
justification then the labels they support should be unioned and rechecked for redundancies6.
In the same way that the JTMS uses Truth Maintenance procedure to update in/out 
values, the ATMS updates labels as new justifications are added. Adding new assumptions or 
justifications generally leads to the addition of new environments or the expansion of old, 
while changing derived nodes to premises or marking contradictions will lead to the removal 
of environments.
Having constructed an interpretation consisting of labels for each node, it may be 
necessary to reason about or in a particular problem solving context. To actually construct 
such a context requires a second phase of interpretation. Given the set of assumptions that 
characterises a particular problem solving environment Eps, each node n is included in the 
context iff one of its environments is a subset of the problem solving environment, i.e.
3  E je L n .E jC E ps.
Obviously the whole context may not need to be constructed in order to find a solution i.e. 
where only the truth or falsity of some nodes relative to a particular context are required.
h Computationally, if ¡1 factorial number of subsumption checks tire needed to guttranlee minimal labels then 
it is more efficient to check for redundancies at both a justification and a node level unless the number of redun- 
d:int environments removed within till dependencies is tipproxiinately less than 2N/Avxd where N = number of 
nodes, Av = average size of label (i.e. number of environments per node) and d = average number of dependen­
cies per node. This assumes a even spread of redundancies throughout the network.
If the environments keep their original order i.e. L = (E) 1 .. E j „E j,! ..E 2 ,m ...E j p ( and redundan­
cy is cheeked from left to right then if E 2 ,m is redundant at a justification level then only n tests (against E | , ) 
are needed to eliminate it at the node level. However, this does not prevent it being involved in up to p! other 
(unnecessary) checks prior to this.
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2.1.2.1 Extensions to the ATMS
De Kleer [1986b] shows how to extend the ATMS so as to be able to construct more 
expressive relationships. In particular, all the justifications in the basic ATMS are 
monotonic i.e. contain no antecedents of the form "if a  isn’t true then ..." but in the extended 
ATMS it is possible to code such justifications. Most ATMS labellings are capable of 
generating several specific contexts and the functionality added in the extended ATMS (e- 
ATMS) helps to restrict the set of possible contexts or select particular ones.
Constraints of the form choose{ A\ ,..., An} force all environments to contain at least 
one of the Aj’s. Constraints of the form ignore?{B } means that any environment in a node’s 
label that contains B will be ignored, i.e. not visible to the problem solver, unless B is forced 
to be included in an environment in order to satisfy some choose. E.g. given choose {A, B), 
ignore{B | the preferred environments are those containing A. If A is excluded (because {A } 
is a no-good) then all environments must contain B.
Negation of an assumption can be achieved by forcing a choice between A and -iA 
( choose [A , —iA) ) given the extra conditions that an assumption and its negations are 
contradictory ( {A,-iA}in— >sl -L) and that assumption A is preferred over the negation 
(ignore[—iA }). If and only if A is contradictory does -iA enter a particular environment. 
This schema can also be used to encode the negation of any node n by introducing a new 
node -in and ignored assumptions N and -iN and forcing one to be in every environment. If 
one node produces a contradiction then the other is included but if neither or both are 
contradictory then either can be included.
Non-monotonic justifications with in-nodes A and out-nodes B, Ain,B„UI— >slc* are 
transformed into A u  ] N >jn— »slC- Extra assumptions are added to represent the status of 
the out-nodes: N representing the assumption that none of the out-nodes are actually in the 
current context, and O is the assumption that some of the out-nodes are in fact in the current 
context. The constraints choose[ N, O) and ignore{O | mean that unless there is evidence 
contradicting N then it will be added to any environment, in preference to O. An extra node 
o is needed to capture the environments that contain some out-node giving o the intuitive 
meaning "all the out-nodes are not out". For each b e B, the justification bjn— >sl 0 is added
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to the network as is Oin— »sl°- Finally the justification
{o, N}jn— >sl -L ensures that if any out-node is in then N is a contradictory assumption7. So 
given A is contained in the current environment and no b e B is in the current context then N 
will be in the context as will c.
This approach is also taken by Dressier [1987] in his "Extended Basis ATMS". Like de 
Kleer, Dressier adds an assumption (an out-assumption, distinguished from normal 
assumptions) that all the out-nodes in a non-monotonic justification are indeed out. Out- 
assumptions are treated as normal assumptions for the purpose of constructing labels but are 
also used to create \i-extensions of particular environments. A p-extension of environment E 
with respect to a set of out-nodes O is a minimal set of assumptions that contain E and 
includes Out(b) if M is incapable of supporting b or —>b. The main difference comes in how 
extensions to environments are actually constructed. Whereas de Kleer uses explicit choose 
and ignore constraints to prefer the assumption that the out-nodes are indeed out. Dressier 
gives an explicit special purpose algorithm for generating p-extensions.
Another interesting extension of the ATMS is the incorporation of mechanisms for 
dealing with uncertainty. In particular several independent presentations [Laskey and Lehner 
1988; Falkenhainer 1987; D’Ambrosio 1987] exist for the idea of using Dempster-Shafer 
belief theory to assign a numeric value of belief to each node. In particular, given weights 
assigned to each assumption, the rules for combining evidence allow a single value to be 
derived from its label.
The last two extensions of the ATMS to cover non-monotonic or uncertain reasoning 
result in a three (rather than two) phase model of use. Rather than propagating values and 
constructing a single interpretation from a characterising set of assumptions (as happens with 
the ordinary ATMS) it is necessary with an extended or non-monotonic ATMS to calculate 
labels for all nodes, construct a characterising set of assumptions given the constraints 
imposed (either through creating a p-extension or using choose and ignore), and finally to
' This is a somewhat simplified presentation th;in the one given by de Kleer. There, an extra node i is in­
cluded with a justification A ln— >sL' >n order to "gate" the dependency {o, N | , n— »«¡l n^ by including i as 
an in-mxle. viz (o , i, N ),n— >sL n ^ . Also the justifications for generating the contradictions between O and 
N arc overcomplicated and incorrect.
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use this to create the interpretation. Similarly, Dempster-Shafer-based ATMSs create a 
labelling of nodes with assumptions, assign weights to assumptions and then calculate 
weights for each node based on its label and the weights for assumptions.
Semantics for the ATMS have been provided by theoretical frameworks designed to 
unify both J- and ATMSs. Explicit algorithms for calculating and updating labels have not 
been given in the literature but this is less important given the clear semantics and ease of 
implementation. Obviously no correctness or termination proofs can therefore be given.
Provan [1987] investigates the complexity of using an ATMS in a vision recognition 
system. He concludes that in trying to find the maximal consistent environments unless there 
are a large number of small no-goods, a large proportion of the possible environments 
(numbering 2n for n assumptions) will be constructed and considered. So for problems with 
many (partial or complete) solutions the behaviour is exponential. This prompts the 
development of strategies for considering a single solution at a time. This applies to the 
process of actually constructing environments and contexts and not to the actual construction 
of node labels.
Dependency Directed Backtracking can be incorporated within the ATMS [de Kleer 
1986d] through the use of disjunctions and consumers [de Kleer 1986c], local demons for 
controlling the addition of justifications to an existing dependency network. This makes it 
possible for the ATMS to construct the environments in a depth-first rather than a breadth- 
first manner8. More general approaches to controlling the construction of environments exist 
IForbus and de Kleer 1988] where the choice of focus (which environment to work with) is 
the responsibility of the problem solver, not the ATMS.
It might be expected that the lack of non-monotonic justifications in the basic ATMS 
would lead to a reduction of complexity. It is certainly true that the introduction of non­
monotonic justifications and the construction of contexts from environments |de Kleer] or 
p-extensions from environments [Dressler| gives rise to a proof of NP-completeness. The 
basic process of constructing labels itself is also computationally expensive. Either no-goods
K This represents a step "back", toward DDB systems that "backtracking without choices" was supposed to 
have eliminated or made redundant.
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are removed from labels as they are generated resulting in INGI iterations to remove all no­
goods (where NG is the set of no-goods) or the no-goods are accumulated to be removed in 
one pass having constructed all the minimal labels. This approach will result in (possibly) 
exponential growth in the number and size of environments in node labels as the depth of the 
node increases.
2.1.3 Logic-Based Truth Maintenance
A different approach to Truth Maintenance, both in terms of objectives and implementation, 
is the logic-based (LTMS) approach |McAllester 1978, 1980, 1982] based on satisfying 
clauses. Chronologically it comes between the J- and ATMS but in terms of purpose and 
style it represents a divergence from the J/ATMS mainstream.
McAllester [1978, pi] states that the purpose of a TMS is to " ... maintain the logical 
relations among the beliefs that (problem solving) systems manipulate" and to " ... 
incrementally modify the belief structure when premises are changed ... ". The LTMS’s 
primary function, as with the JTMS, is to provide a consistent interpretation of propositions 
according to user defined dependencies. The key difference is that the LTMS assumes 
consistency unless there is evidence to the contrary and uses it to perform "simple 
propositional deduction" in the form of unit clause resolution. Thus belief values are not 
assigned on the basis of explicit support and justification, but on the basis of already assigned 
belief values in conjunction with this assumed consistency.
This gives rise to the following differences:
(a) the LTMS works within a three valued rather than a four-valued logic that underlies the 
JTMS. Any node is assigned a value of "true", "false", or "unknown" dispensing with 
the need to have one node represent a proposition and another its negation for there is 
always a strict relationship between a node and its negation. If 7t is unknown then so is 
-i7t; if 7t is true then —ijt is false and vice versa.
(b) a proposition is deemed to be a premise, assumption, or contingent belief not by the 
structure of the justifications or by the value of its label but by the way the belief value 
is assigned, be it asserted or assumed by the user (using an LTMS function) or deduced
48
2.1.3 Logic-Based Truth Maintenance
by the LTMS;
(c) being a contradiction is not a property that can be ascribed to any particular proposition 
(or sets of propositions) but describes the state of the TMS when a relationship between 
some propositions cannot be satisfied and a consistent assignment of value(s) cannot 
therefore be made.
The propositions of interest are still represented as nodes but the relationships between 
them are not expressed in terms of support and justification but as disjunctive clauses of the 
form
((P,. v t) or (P2. v2) or ... or (Pn. vn))
where the P^ ’s are the related propositions and Vj e {true, false}. These clauses act as 
constraints on the values of the nodes, and can be used to represent any formula in 
propositional logic:
not P 
P or 0  
P and 0
P implies 0
((P. false))
((P. true) (Q. true)) 
((P. true))
((Q. true))
((P. false) (Q. true))
and, for example
(A and B) implies C s  ((A. false) (B. false) (C. true))
As with the JTMS, the basic action performed by the LTMS is the addition and removal 
of dependencies and additionally the assertion or assumption of a belief value for a node. 
When new constraints or values are added, the LTMS deduces any belief value that is 
necessary to maintain the consistency of the system, i.e. to make sure all the constraints are 
satisfied, and marks that node as dependent on the other nodes in the clause. When 
constraints or values are removed, the LTMS checks these dependencies to verify that each 
dependent value is still implied by the consistency condition and removes any that are not. If 
a contradiction occurs DDB is used to find the assumptions and premises that underlie it and 
an attempt is made to remove it by progressively revoking assumptions, by assigning the
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opposite value to that assumed. If this is unsuccessful, the LTMS will signal the user that a 
contradiction has arisen between the identified premises, and will ask the user to choose one 
to be revoked. Because the assignment of belief values is dynamic the LTMS is also given 
the ability to detect contradictions that would occur as the result of the assertion of some 
particular value (P. v), and can construct a clause to deduce the negation (P. —>v) thus 
avoiding a contradiction. If the user still wishes to assert (P. v) then a contradiction will 
occur as normal and DDB will be called to resolve it.
Input Deduced Constraint Deduced Values Status of Value
(Assert (P or Q or R)) ((P. true) (Q. true) (R. true)) (P. unknown) initial value
(Q. unknown) initial
(R. unknown) initial
(Assert (P. false)) no constraint deduced - (P. false) asserted
(Assume (Q. false)) a value is simply assigned (Q. false) assumed
(R. true) derived
If (R. false) is asserted at some later state, then this value takes precedence over the deduced 
value and a contradiction occurs as ((P. true)(Q. true)(R. true)) is now unsatisfied. DDB 
traces the source of the contradiction back to the assertions of (P. false) and (R. false) and the 
assumption (Q. false). Given the weaker status of (Q. false), this value is revoked and a new 
value (Q. true) installed. If all the traced values had equal status then it is necessary to appeal 
to the user to resolve the contradiction.
The LTMS as presented by McAllester represents a shift away from Doyle’s general 
JTMS to a more structured TMS through the assumed consistency and the logical form of the 
representation of the dependencies between nodes. This can be carried further | McAllester 
1980] so that the user does not have to transform a logical dependency into a disjunctive 
clause to be input into the system. Instead, the logical dependency can be specified in terms 
of normal logical connectives which are then automatically interpreted as a series of 
constraints that give the same power as before. This allows the formulae themselves to be 
assigned a belief value and gives added expressiveness as relationships between nodes can be 
altered without retracting clauses but by changing the truth value of the connecting formula.
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For example, consider the relation (P or Q) previously [McAllester 1978] represented
as:
(P or Q) = ((P. true) (Q. true)),
but subsequently IMcAllester 1980] as
In the earlier of the two examples, asserting "P or Q" is true will result in a relationship 
between "P" and "Q" so that in any interpretation one of "P" or "Q" has to be true. In the 
second example asserting "P or Q" is true generates a set of clauses links "P", "Q" and 
"P or Q". This process is necessary to give "P or Q" the intended semantics so that every time 
"P" or "Q" is true then "P or Q" is true and so on. It is the addition of 
("P or 0 "  .true) that actually asserts that the relationship between P and Q holds, causing C2 
and C3 to be satisfied and reducing Cl (functionally) to ((P. true) (Q. true)). Retracting 
("P or Q" .true) removes this relationship between P and 0  and it is no longer possible to 
derive a value for P based solely on the value of Q.
This imposition of logical structure culminates in the formal reasoning system RUP 
("Reasoning Utility Package") IMcAllester 1982] that provides a variety of Truth 
Maintenance functions within the context of automated reasoning.
2.1.4 Development of TMSs (again)
Chronologically, the initial development of TMS ideas from the JTMS through the 
LTMS and the Multiple Belief Reasoner (MBR) [Martins and Shapiro 1983, 1988] to the 
ATMS represents a coming full circle as the basic ATMS returns to a more simplistic 
structure of nodes and justifications compared to those of McAllester and Martins and 
Shapiro. In another sense the ATMS is the culmination of a move away from the 
expressiveness and flexibility of the JTMS, through the assumption of consistency (LTMS), 
the application of a logical framework (LTMS and MBR), to a simple search mechanism.
I he underlying philosophy seems to have changed from belief through justification, to
(P or Q) (("P or Q". false) (P. true) (Q. true)) 
(("P or Q". true) (P. false))
(("P or Q". true) (Q. false))
( C l )
(C2)
(C3)
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validity from premises and finally to values from choices.
2.2 Unifications of TMSs
Many different approaches have been taken in providing semantics for TMSs. Of these 
approaches, most have concentrated on either the JTMS or the ATMS, no work being done 
on the LTMS and little work being done on a unified approach to all three. Attempts to 
provide a unified framework for the A- and JTMS have centred around the use of lattices 
(Brown et al 1987, Ginsberg 1988]9. One could view non-monotonic ATMSs and the 
provision of Dependency Directed Backtracking for the ATMS as attempts to unify A- and 
JTMS style Truth Maintenance but these are only unifications in the sense of trying to 
provide similar high level functionality. There is no clear correspondence at a detailed level.
Brown et al centre their unification on the structure of justifications. A dependency 
network is viewed as a set of equations with each node corresponding to a variable or lattice 
unknown. Justifications give rise to conjunctive expressions of the form
(Xi A ... AOtn
where each a  is a lattice form: that is recursive combinations of a set of distinguished 
situations (effectively constant, singleton elements of the lattice) and lattice unknowns using 
the lattice operations a , v and —i. In a given dependency network each node may have none, 
one or many justifications that must all be taken account of when assigning that node a value. 
This is captured by the idea of a lattice equation X = Y where X is a lattice unknown (node) 
and the right hand side is, in theory, any lattice form. In practice the lattice form will be a 
disjunction of lattice forms corresponding to dependencies:
s = di v ... v d m.
A complete dependency network corresponds to a lattice equational system: that is a set of
'' It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the concept of a lattice as a partial order over a set with: dis­
tinguished elements lop (T ) and bottom (X): a join (greatest lower hound) operator a meet (least upper hound) 
operator; and a complement (negation) operator where a a  -,a = X and a v  -.a = T.
Note - this is in fact the definition of a complemented lattice rather than tin ordinary lattice, hut for this thesis 
any lattice will he assumed to he complemented unless otherwise stated.
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equations in which only a finite set of unknowns appear, and in which each unknown only 
appears on the left hand side of at most one equation.
Apart from the lattice unknowns, forms, equations and equational systems, there is also 
the underlying lattice 'B built on the set of situations mentioned above, using the operations 
a , v and —i.
In this (lattice-based) formulation, Truth Maintenance is the process of finding 
solutions, a mapping V:U— >“B, to a lattice equational system and of updating that solution as 
equations are added or deleted. The difference between doing ATMS or JTMS-style TM 
arises from using different underlying lattices ®. As noted in §2.1.2 the ATMS uses a 
restricted set of JTMS justifications so it would be possible, within this restriction, to switch 
from ATMS to JTMS by recalculating the values for the unknowns using the appropriate 
lattice. By mapping ATMS assumptions to JTMS premises (i.e. making each assumption 
letter equivalent to in or out), and JTMS premises to ATMS assumptions (i.e. making each 
premise justification — >sl n assign an assumption letter) the transition from ATMS to JTMS 
represents the instantiation of a particular context (i.e. the selection of the context 
represented by the assumptions mapped to in) while the transition from JTMS to ATMS 
represents a fragmentation of a particular context into a multitude of possible contexts (by 
being able to selectively assert premises by including the relevant assumption within a 
particular context). For example, see the transformation below where the assumptions G and 
H map to out while I and J map to in.
The JTMS lattice tBj consists of just two elements T  and J. corresponding to in and out 
with T  > _L. The ATMS lattice 'B\ is more complex with elements consisting of ATMS 
labels, i.e. = Pw(Pw(X)) where A is the set of assumptions and for v e 'B,
v = |E | .... En 1 where each E, is an environment or set of assumptions10. For two elements
v,w e i ,  v S w if for each environment Ej e v there is some environment 
Fj e w s.t. Fj c  Ej. Ob 'iously T  = {()) as {) e  E for any E c  ^  and -L = {). The
111 This is similar to Ginberg’s 11987| formulation of the ATMS bi-lattice in which each node n is assigned a 
value from Pw(Pw(JA)) X Pw(Pw(JA)) where the first element is the set of environments supporting n while 
•he second corresponds to those supporting the negation of n.
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difference in lattices carries over to the creation of premises and assumptions: in the JTMS 
premises are created by including the element in (= T) in a node’s lattice equation, while in 
the ATMS the element ({}} (also = T ) is added. Unlike JTMS assumptions which are not 
fixed but are a transient phenomenon associated with particular labellings or solutions, 
ATMS assumptions correspond to the inclusion of an environment (A,} in a lattice equation.
Kxample
Given nodes a, b, c and d and justifications (a, b)jn— >slc ar|d (d)in— >SLc the equation for c
is:
c = (a a  b) v (d)
If b is a premise, i.e. b = T , and partial solutions TnMS and Tatms have already been 
constructed for a and d:
Tjtms = ((a, out) (d, in)}
TaTMS = ((a, {{G H } {I }) (d, {{J))}
then we can calculate a value for c:
r,TMs(c) = (Tni*s(a)ArjrMS(b))vr,IMi(d) = (out a  in) v  in = out v in = in 
r ATMS(c) = ( r ATMS(a)ArATMS(b ))v rATMS(d) = ({{g h m i}}a <{}})v u j }} = 
{{GHMI}} v  {{J} > -  {{GHMIMJ})
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In comparing the results of the lattice equations with that returned by the original 
algorithms one would expect the same results. This is the case with the JTMS but despite the 
example above the coding for the ATMS is incorrect, for the ATMS is supposed to produce 
minimal consistent labels. Simple lattice operations on ®A are insufficient to produce this. 
Ginsberg [1988] accounts for no-goods by mapping elements of ®A to the lattice ®AG, where 
NG is a set of no-goods and ®A° = [y e ®A I Vnge NG.y £ ng ). I.e. ®AC is ®A with all the 
inconsistent environments removed: no-goods or supersets of no-goods (which are by 
definition less than the no-good) are mapped to J.. Redundant environments remain 
problematic: given labels v = (Ej ,..., En} and w = [Ej ,..., En, E') where E ' a  E, for some 
i . v S w  and wS v. It is necessary to factor ®A by equivalence classes so that L is replaced by 
[L], the set of labels generated from L by introducing redundant supersets of the 
environments in L.
This approach to unification is of interest for it shows how the switch from J to A I MS 
can be accomplished by simply c hanging the set of values used to solve the lattice equation
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system. However, by insisting on a lattice structure on the values and by restricting the 
operations to —i, v, and a  (and by assuming an underlying classical logic in the case of 
Ginsberg) this approach is too restrictive when we want to consider other knowledge 
representation schemes in Chapter 5.
2.3 Comparison of (Problem Solving) Methodologies
Not only does the lattice-based approach to unification place too many restrictions on the 
values to be assigned to dependency networks but it fails to bridge the gap between the 
declarative semantics of the various Truth Maintenance operations and the procedural 
semantics. From a declarative point of view one would not expect part of the semantics to 
change as problem solving progresses. However, this is the case when ®A is mapped to ®AC 
to remove no-good environments from the ATMS lattice. From a procedural point of view 
the lattice-based approach does not capture how values are asserted and retracted nor the 
other differences in the approach to problem solving that different TMSs cater for. In this 
section I shall explore some of these differences.
2.3.1 Premises, Assumptions and Defaults
In addition to having different approaches to the structure of the information passed to the 
TMS, the systems outlined above have different approaches to the every day meta-level 
concepts of assumptions, defaults, premises and contradictions. At first glance, it might 
seem that assumptions, defaults and premises are the same; they all represent the assignment 
of a truth value to a proposition, be it implicit, e.g. "I assume the sky is blue" or explicit, e.g.
I assume ‘the sky is blue’ is true". However, there are both qualitative and quantitative 
distinctions, i.e. differences both in the strength of that assignment and how it is made (and 
revoked).
Informally a premise is "a statement on which reasoning is based" (dictionary 
definition), and to assert it is "to declare as true" (dictionary definition) that statement, be it 
true in the real world, or "a priori" by definition of some particular formal system or theory. 
Given this definition, it is not possible to change a premise without fundamentally changing
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the reasoning system that one is dealing with, and anything derived from it should be held to 
be true without reservation (unless there is doubt about the soundness of the inference
process).
This differs from an assumption which is "taken to be true before there is proof" and 
can therefore be disproved, or shown to be inconsistent. Anything that is derived from an 
assumption should be held to be true or false, contingent on the truth or falsity of the 
assumptions used in its derivation.
A default is also an assignment of truth without proof, but unlike an assumption, a 
default is only true when some specific condition holds, so assumptions could be viewed as 
unconditional defaults, or defaults viewed as conditional assumptions. In practice, default 
conditions are commonly expressed as the failure of some other condition either in terms of 
explicit negation or by a negation as failure (see §1.1).
Another way of looking at the difference between defaults and assumptions is by using 
the distinction between cause and evidence [Quine and Ullian, 1970 p6]: assumptions 
provide a cause for belief but no evidence, whilst defaults provide both cause (by there being 
a default rule) and evidence (because some condition does not hold). To say that an 
assumption A should be made on the absence of contradictory information —iA (the approach 
taken in consistency based non-monotonic logics) is putting the cart before the horse - this is 
a default rule not an assumption.
Another difference between defaults and assumptions is the way they behave in the 
presence of contradictions. When a contradiction occurs as a result of an assumption the 
assumed data should be retracted as there is no evidence for its support, but where a default 
leads to a contradiction what should be done?
The status or value of an assumption is independent of the values of other propositions 
and therefore not subject to change due to changes in values of other propositions. The only 
time it does change is when an assumption is refuted or revoked as the result of some 
procedure called to restore consistency when a contradiction has arisen. Default conclusions 
do depend on other propositions. When a default is involved in generating a contradiction 
the default conclusion cannot simply be revoked: there is evidence for a default conclusion.
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In order to revoke the default the evidence supporting it must be removed. Additionally, it is 
possible for a default conclusion to become invalidated without actually removing the 
default rule that supported it.
With regard to TMSs how are these differences handled? The LTMS does not capture 
qualitative differences between all premises, assumptions and defaults but simply uses 
different tags to order propositions for retraction on the basis of strength of the labels. The 
JTMS does not really capture assumptions as such. What Doyle calls assumptions are merely 
nodes where the addition of a valid justification will (potentially) remove a contradiction. If 
assumptions are to be true but defeasible then to assume some proposition Jt it is necessary to 
have a node n„ justified with (nn)out— >sLn7i where nn has an intuitive meaning "it is 
inconsistent to assume 71" and has no attached justifications. Again, this really represents a 
default rather than an assumption, "if there is no evidence that Jt is inconsistent then assume 
Jt"*'. This is what the JTMS is good at capturing - default rules for non-monotonic 
reasoning.
Conversely the ATMS was designed for representing and manipulating assumptions 
and is therefore good at it, but is bad at representing defaults as shown by the extra apparatus 
needed to encode non-monotonic dependencies (§2.1.2).
2.3.2 Contradictions and Retractions
One of the main tasks of TMSs is to handle contradictions or inconsistencies. Classically, 
logical contradictions are well formed formulae (wff) of the form it a  -.Jt although a 
contradiction may refer to the presence of both 7t and —iJt in a set of theorems derivable from 
some set of premises without actually deriving Jt a  —iJt. Any set of premises from which a 
contradiction can be derived is said to be inconsistent. The use of contradictions in logic is 
limited to the proof of propositions whose negation would otherwise lead to a contradiction 
through the use of reductio ad absurdum (RAA):
11 This approach is full of danger as shown in §1.1.1.1 when looking at NML-I [McDermott and Doyle
In order to force the JTMS into giving npi this intuitive reading additional justifications must be added 
linking n_,n and nn and a contradiction must be set up between nn and n„.
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if T, a  |-  P and T, a  |----if) then T |— itx.
The reasoning for this rule is based on the intuition that propositions can take only one truth 
value in both formal interpretations and in the world itself. In itself RAA says nothing about 
belief revision, i.e. how assertions and assumptions should be managed for if a  is already 
asserted to be true (along with T) then RAA only leads to more contradiction. TMSs provide 
facilities for doing just this kind of management of beliefs.
In terms of problem solving and search, it is normally the case that a system is trying to 
satisfy some goal state through the application of operators that transform the initial state, 
subject to some set of constraints. This gives rise to the notion of contradiction in a broader 
sense. A contradiction is a proposition or set of propositions T that is judged should not 
occur or be worthy of further exploration. This can be done without the use of formal logical 
machinery by simply excluding such states from further computation12. Such states may 
(although not necessarily) contain a logical contradiction but it may be difficult and counter­
productive to derive it as such. Thus such non-logical contradictions as "free market 
capitalism contradicts socialist notions of equal pay for all" is not of the form of a logical 
contradiction but provides a guide for revising beliefs: if one believes both in free market 
capitalism and equal pay for all then one may consider revising ones beliefs.
This distinction between logical contradiction as multiple truth assignment to a single 
proposition, and non-logical contradiction as a guide for eliminating states or revising 
beliefs, is apparent in the way different TMSs define and deal with contradictions. In the 
LTMS a network is represented by a set of clauses asserted to be true (potentially to a lesser 
or greater degree), and a contradiction is defined to be an assignment of values to nodes that 
does not satisfy every clause. In fact the LTMS will generate a logical contradiction because 
of the way it performs limited inference (resolution) to derive values. Given a clause 
(((P or Q). false) (P. true) (Q. true)) and a labelling (V) that assigns values to nodes such that 
V(P or Q) = true, V(P) = false, the LTMS will have already made V(Q) = true so that the
12 If however one subscribes to the law of excluded middle (n v ->«) and double negation (Jt <-> -,-at) (not 
something that Intuitionist or Constructivist logicians would hold with) then implicit in saying P is contradicto­
ry is the assertion that -C  is the case.
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assertion ((Q. false)) will assign Q two values.
In the case of the J- and ATMS contradictions are user-defined. In the JTMS individual 
nodes are marked as contradictions and a labelling becomes inconsistent when a 
contradiction is labelled in. In the ATMS contradictions are represented by a single node nj  ^
and contradictory propositions or sets of propositions T are indicated by having them support 
n i ,  T  — »s l u I 13.
Despite the syntactic differences in the representation of contradictions, all styles of 
TMS approach retraction in the same way. Backtracking takes place to identify some class of 
justification that supports the contradiction. Some automatic procedure is used to remove the 
contradiction or where necessary the user is informed of the contradiction and asked to 
remove some justification when there is no clear candidate. In the case of the LTMS the 
backtracking proceeds to nodes whose values have been externally justified and the lowest 
ranked of these is removed. If two assertions are tied then the user is asked to make a choice 
| Me Allester 1980 pi 1). Similarly the JTMS recursively traces the supporting justifications14 
of the contradiction to the underlying assumptions and premises. A random choice of which 
node to retract is made from the set of assumptions13. If no assumptions exist then the user 
is informed and expected to provide a resolution. In both cases TM is called to propagate any 
changes arising from the retraction.
The process of backtracking and refutation is less obvious in the ATMS. In fact no 
reference is made to either in de Kleer’s papers16. The justifications supporting nj_ generate 
the set of no-goods (contradictory environments) and because the environments consist 
exactly of the assumptions that characterise it there is no need to actually backtrack to
11 In actual fact the JTMS can use the same scheme as the ATMS with mxles previously marked ¡is contrad­
ictions used to support n^ . Dependency directed backtracking suuls at a lower point hut is otherwise un­
changed.
14 In the JTMS any node that is in  has an associated supporting justification that is valid (i.e. all the in-nodes 
are in and the out-nodes out - these are the supporting nodes). An assumption is a node whose supporting 
justification has a non-empty nudist. A premise is one that has no supporting nodes itself.
' '  It is easy to propose ad hoc criteria for which assumption to revoke in terms of number of other attached 
dependencies or nodes in the dependency but these have no sound theoretical hacking. More dependencies may 
indicate stability or generality, more nixies may represent specialisation and the number of justilications a nixie 
supports may indicate its criticality or entrenchment.
Ifl In fact de Kleer originally sets out to remove backtracking altogether.
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discover them. Nor does any explicit retraction actually take place: no justifications are 
added to or removed from the dependency network. However it is necessary to remove all 
no-goods and their supersets from all node labels (retraction of environments). Rather than 
checking each label it is only necessary to check for where the environment is known to 
occur ("forward-tracking"). If {A B C) is known to be inconsistent then only the nodes in c 
= desc(A)r\desc(B)r\desc(C) need be checked17. Furthermore if {A B C) is a subset of an 
existing no-good {A B C D | then c can be refined even further and only 
c = [desc(A)r\desc(B)rvJesc(C)]/desc(D) need be checked. If a non-monotonic ATMS is 
being used it would be necessary to invoke TM to recalculate labels rather than simply 
performing subset tests. In this case it is even more relevant to use forward-tracking as the 
cost of recalculation is higher than for simple testing.
From this it can be seen that the process of retracting contradictions is inherently cyclic 
through the process of backtracking and recalculation. It is this cycle that can lead to much 
work being done as several passes are needed to remove a set of contradictions. It is this 
same circularity that leads to the computational problems of default logics as we shall see in 
Chapter 5.
The important point to make in this section is that the user needs to have the ability to 
specifically exclude particular interpretations through the avoidance of user defined 
"contradictions". Additionally, the retraction process often needs to call on the user to make 
choices about the refutation of assumptions. These refutations can be seen as meta-level 
operations in that they change the underlying network (and the theory that it instantiates) that 
is being interpreted. This is not actually the case in the ATMS as only the labelling is 
changed. However, as we shall see in the next section, this process takes place through a 
secondary interpretation of the ATMS labelling when particular contexts are constructed 
from a particular set of assumptions or environment. Reichgelt [ 19XX) is supporting this 
claim when he proposes an architecture based on an inference engine, a knowledge base and 
a knowledge base manager. The knowledge base is equipped with TM facilities and it is the 
17 The function desc returns the descendants of a node as defined in §3.2.1.
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role of the knowledge base manager to propose assumptions and instantiations of defaults. 
In the case of TMSs the user (be it a human or machine reasoner) needs to have access to the 
designation and removal of contradictions
2.3.3 Traditional Interpretation Construction and Search Strategies
In reviewing existing TMSs, three levels of operation can be discerned: basic truth 
maintenance, automatically invoked (network restructuring) procedures, and user-initiated or 
involved procedures. The most basic of these tasks is the result of the coupling of a problem 
solver with a TMS - the problem solver generates propositions and inferences that are 
subsequently stored in the TMS as a dependency network. As nodes and justifications are 
added or removed the labelling of the network is updated. Automatic network restructuring is 
invoked when particular standard events occur in the network due to the addition or removal 
of nodes and/or justifications and subsequent changes in the labelling. Finally user initiated 
or involved procedures are invoked when a certain, network specific state has been reached 
and the problem solver needs to access information contained in the structure of the network 
or in the values of the labelling.
The three levels of functionality can be broadly categorised into three levels of 
interpretation or semantic activity. The first level of functionality (Truth Maintenance) 
provides basic justification-based belief revision. Changes to the network, i.e. asserted facts 
or relationships, result in changes of belief in the network and these changes are propagated 
as if inferences were being made. The second level (automatic network update) corresponds 
to maintaining consistency18 of the network and its interpretation. When a contradiction (a 
general, well specified event) occurs, steps are taken to restore consistency in a standard, 
pre-defined way that holds for all instances of a particular network. Such procedures 
represent meta level inference rules or strategies such as reductio ad absurdum - if a  and P 
together generate a contradiction then assert the negation (i.e. remove) one of the assertions 
that led to the contradiction. The third level (user interactions) represents meta-level 
ll< or potentially other high level characteristics
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reasoning on the part of the user, acting either to favour or construct particular interpretations 
of the network. This can be seen in the positive choice of particular interpretations which 
occurs through secondary interpretation of the ATMS, corresponding to picking the 
interpretation associated with a base set of assumptions and in the action of choose or ignore 
constraints. It also occurs in the disambiguation of networks if the user is involved in 
explicitly choosing how contradictions are to be resolved in the J- and LTMSs. Meta-level 
reasoning also occurs in the restriction (negative choice) of possible interpretations through 
the designation of contradictions, either through adding no-goods to the ATMS, or the 
marking of particular JTMS nodes.
These three levels of interpretation correspond to different levels of competence and/or 
complexity in existing TMS systems. The LTMS operates within a single interpretation and 
operates very much on the first level, propagating belief values and filling in values that 
would otherwise lead to contradictions. This indicates a predisposition towards consistent 
interpretations. Automatic procedures exist to track the sources of contradictions but there is 
no notion of a default inference and therefore no procedure to resolve them, beyond the 
simple notion of a user supplied ranking of assertions. User involvement in selecting 
interpretations is limited to resolving contradictions through choosing which premises to 
retain and interpretations can only be excluded through the addition of propositions and 
justifications to the network.
The JTMS is also a single interpretation system but operates in more complex ways on 
more levels than the LTMS. Non-monotonic inferences can be modelled and Dependency 
Directed Backtracking (DDB) is capable of deciding how consistency should be restored 
when non-monotonic inferences result in contradictions. By having control over what is 
designated a contradiction, the user has control over the invocation of DDB.
Finally the ATMS is the most complex of the three types of system examined. It 
maintains multiple interpretations simultaneously, and spawns new interpretations when new 
assumptions and justifications are added. User intervention is required to select a particular 
interpretation, either by the addition of contradictions leading to the exclusion of 
interpretations and/or the choice of a characterising set of assumptions. Consistency is
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maintained partly through the assertion of no-goods and partly through the propagation of 
belief values, as this is done with reference to the set of no-goods.
It would be wrong to say that each system operates exclusively at set levels with the 
LTMS at level 1; the JTMS at levels 1 and 2; and the ATMS at levels 1,2 and 3. However, 
the facilities at each level correspond directly to the type of search strategy for which a 
particular system is best suited as shown in the next section. Not only do these three levels 
provide an insight into the competence of TMSs in various tasks that form the basic criteria 
for judging general belief revision systems, but these levels provide a starting point for the 
definition of the general framework of Interpreted Dependency Networks.
In designing a particular class of belief revision systems, it will be necessary to define 
the elements of a type of dependency network, the values that could be assigned to those 
elements, and the basic TM procedures for calculating those values. On top of this a designer 
may wish to add procedures for performing generic high level problem solving tasks, such as 
contradiction resolution and checking entailment relations. It is up to the user of such a 
system to provide the data that generates a particular network and to manage the assertion 
and retraction of that information, e.g. through the selection of assumptions and the 
switching of contexts.
2.3.4 Gardenfors' Postulates and TMSs
If TMSs are to be considered belief revision mechanisms, how well do they comply with 
Gardenfors’ postulates? In order to answer this, the notion of a belief state must be 
adequately defined. This must wait until Chapter 3 where TMSs are reconstructed as 
Interpreted Dependency Networks. To preview the results, as one would expect of systems 
based on a foundations approach, TMSs do not satisfy some (or many, depending on the type 
of TMS) of the postulates. It is interesting to note that it is the non-monotonic dependencies 
of the JTMS which prevents it from satisfying many of the postulates and it is the lack of 
such dependencies in the ATMS which means it satisfies more.
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2.4 Applications of TMSs
The difference in the basic network, interpretation and procedures of a particular TMS are a 
reflection of the underlying ideas of consistency, contradiction and assumption. These in turn 
are a reflection of the underlying problem solving methodology for which a TMS was 
developed. This in turn is usually reflected in the kinds of applications for which a particular 
TMS is used.
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the original TMSs were developed to aid the 
exploration of a search space. An obvious distinction arises from the difference between 
recording a single problem solving state and multiple states. Given the state-related notion 
of assumption (a JTMS assumption is defined by a particular type of dependency in a 
particular type of interpretation) and the difficulty that this provides in changing states, the 
first is more suited to a depth-first search to find a single (or possibly a few) solution, 
backtracking when an inconsistency is found.
The indexical, stable nature of assumptions in multiple context TMSs is more suited to 
a breadth-first approach. All possible solutions are developed in parallel and it is only in the 
secondary interpretation phase when a number of possible interpretations have been 
eliminated through the assertion of no-good sets of assumptions that particular 
interpretations are constructed. This is done in order to minimise the number of complete or 
partial interpretations that have to be constructed. However, it should be noted that the 
development of DDB and focusing for the ATMS has muddied this distinction as it is now 
possible to explore a limited breadth of the search space to some depth with an extended 
ATMS.
This categorisation is no chance result of the choice of structure for interpretation and 
assumption. Rather it was the desire to pursue these problem solving strategies that led to 
those choices being made. De Kleer [1984 p79| explicitly states this when he says
"Qualitative reasoning and constraint languages both require making choices among 
alternatives. (Existing TMSs) have proven to be woefully inadequate for even the 
simplest qualitative reasoning tasks .. they are intrinsically incapable of working with 
multiple contradictory choices at once - something one needs to do all the time in
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qualitative reasoning."
In de Kleer’s approach to constraint satisfaction [1986 p i34-137] the direct connection 
between search and problem solving can be seen. The problem solver has to choose values 
for variables in constraints and each choice (assumed value for a variable) represents a 
branching at some vertex in a search tree. DDB provides facilities for moving (vertically) up 
and down branches. The ATMS provides efficient mechanisms for recording choices thus 
making it easy to traverse the tree (horizontally) across branches.
The distinction between ATMS and JTMS as instantiations of different search strategies 
is borne out by some of the tasks within particular domains to which they have been applied.
2.4.1 Application Domains
Vision
A good example of different tasks needing different TMSs comes in the domain of vision 
and scene analysis.
Herman and Kanade [1986| are interested in building a single model from a series of 
wire frame descriptions generated from pictures of the same scene but from different angles. 
Assumptions are made about the structure of occluded regions and these assumptions must 
be updated as the scene changes. This requires a JTMS-style, single context, dependency 
network.
Bowen and Mayhem [19K7| are also interested in generating scene interpretations from 
a pair of stereo wire frame descriptions. The processing is less incremental with data being 
added to the model as is the case with Herman and Kanade. Rather than seek a single 
consistent interpretation and backtrack in the case of error, the static nature of the data means 
that it is possible (and more efficient) to
... follow the development of alternative solutions in parallel, and compare final 
solutions to choose the best".
This would just not be possible for Herman and Kanade. For this reason a multiple context 
TMS similar in style to the ATMS is used.
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Provan [1987a, 1987b] is interested in the recognition of complex objects within a 
particular scene. Given there are many possible objects or combinations of objects that 
could form part of the desired complex object, Provan states that it is natural to pursue a 
multiple context approach. However, given the combinatorial explosion that naturally occurs 
in such problems he finds that the ATMS is unable to cope. Here we see the natural 
breadth-first approach of the ATMS needing to be altered to provide a narrow search by 
focusing the behaviour of the TMS.
Problem Solving Architectures
At a higher level of generality, different TMSs have been used to augment particular 
problem solving strategies or methodologies. A traditional rule-based approach to problem 
solving can be viewed as a search space requiring a single context thus more suited to a 
depth-first approach19 Given this, it is unsurprising to find justification-based TMSs used to 
provide control over the problem solving context [de Kleer et al, 1977] and to provide non­
monotonic IF-THEN-UNLESS versions of standard IF-THEN rules [Schaefer et al, 1986|.
An obvious example of a TMS tied to a methodology or representation is that of the 
LTMS (which has not seen any published applications, perhaps because of this tie). Here the 
target knowledge representation is deeply entwined with the TMS and it should come as no 
surprise that the LTMS forms the basis of a theorem proving system [MeAllester, 1982a, 
1982b).
Problem solving that requires an explicit notion of state is one that is well suited to an 
ATMS approach rather than a JTMS one, given the former has some notion of different 
states within a given interpretation which the latter does not possess. This has led to the 
development of KEE-Worlds for the representation of actions or state changes | Morris and 
Nado, 1986], This is a general mechanism for problem solving but is obviously very useful 
in the context of planning or scheduling [Filman 19881.
11 Obviously different search strategies can be employed with regard to which rule is executed (or fired) or 
which goal is expanded, hut by concentrating on a single context the overttll strategy is essentially depth-first.
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Planning and Others
Planning has proven to be a fruitful application area for the ATMS, given its multiple context 
facilities. Multiple flight scheduling [Mott et al 1988] (given constraints on the number and 
types of flights that must be flown and the available time, aircraft and personnel) and 
personal flight planning [Padala et al 1986] (given constraints on flight availability, cost, 
time and destination) have been treated in this way.
Diagnosis has also seen the application of the ATMS |de Kleer and Williams 1986], 
Again, the multiple contexts allow the comparison of competing diagnosis and the indexical 
natural of ATMS assumptions (each component is assumed to be working thus generating 
contradictions and pinpointing the failed components) allows for multiple faults to be 
diagnosed at a single pass.
Other sundry applications of TMSs include user modelling [Jones 1987], logic 
programming [Flann et al, 1987; Drakos 1987], circuit design (de Kleer and Sussman, 1980], 
and Qualitative Reasoning, the application that forced de Kleer to write the ATMS |de Kleer 
and Brown, 1984],
2.5 Conclusion
The starting point of this chapter was that a foundations approach to belief revision 
combined with an explicit network-based representation of inferences would produce a 
competent belief revision system. Truth Maintenance Systems in general take a foundations 
approach to belief revision based on a explicit representation of inferences and in most 
systems these inferences are represented as an explicit network. However, the review in this 
chapter shows that this is not in itself sufficient to produce a general purpose belief revision 
system. In particular it can be seen how TMSs developed as a response to different problem 
solving tasks, methodologies, and application domains. The result of this is that each type of 
network representation is limited in the kinds of inferences in can represent and the kinds of 
beliefs that can be managed.
Furthermore, although existing unifications of TMSs can account for the similarity at 
the basic level of the network and the labellings, this is insufficient to capture the operation
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of the TMS as a whole. In particular supposedly common notions of assumption, default, 
contradiction and interpretation turn out to have specific, individually tailored definitions and 
uses. This in turn has implications for the way each type of TMS constructs and manipulates 
a network in a particular problem solving example or domain.
Given these problems with existing TMSs and their unifications, it appears that a single 
general belief revision system would be inadequate. What is needed is a general way of 
specifying foundation-based belief revision systems. One of the major contributions of this 
thesis is in providing just such a framework in the form of Interpreted Dependency 
Networks.
The following chapter does this by proposing a network structure capable of supporting 
a variety of different interpretations along with definitions of what constitutes a valid 
interpretation. This can be viewed as analogous to defining a logical language along with its 
semantics and this and other semantic issues will be explored. With regard to this chapter, as 
IDNs are a generalisation of existing TMSs, it will be shown how existing systems tit into 
this framework. With regard to Chapter 1, Gardenfors’ postulates will be examined and it 
will be shown where Gardenfors’ postulates fail to apply to this framework, and why.
In broad terms, Chapter 1 has produced a general set of criteria, from examination of 
existing work, that one might want a belief revision system to fulfill. This chapter has 
examined a set of existing systems (TMSs) that come close to satisfying those criteria (but 
are not capable in themselves of acting as general purpose belief revision systems) in order 
to identify common structure and functionality. In the following chapter this commonality 
will be used in defining a general approach to belief revision. As a side effect, it will be 
possible to: overcome some existing problems with TMS implementations; provide general 
algorithms for constructing TMS interpretations; and embed information from a problem 
solving system in a TMS-like belief revision system.
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Chapter 3: Interpreted Dependency Networks
Truth Maintenance Systems provide one way of managing belief revision: they provide a 
foundations approach to maintaining a proposition’s level of belief. It is only through 
changes to the arguments supporting a proposition that its value can change. However, in 
order to be able to revise beliefs, one must also be capable of representing those beliefs and 
the links between them in a uniform and meaningful manner.
This chapter will do three things in order to promote the use of Interpreted Dependency 
Networks (IDNs) as belief revision and representation systems:
• §3.1 shows why TMSs are flawed as representation mechanisms despite their 
capabilities as (potential) belief revision systems:
• §3.2 defines Interpreted Dependency Networks as a way of generalising TMSs in such a 
way as to give it a sound theoretical basis: and
• §3.3 reconstructs existing TMSs to show how their functionality can be captured within 
the framework of IDNs.
As a side effect, having given a formal semantics to IDNs and their interpretations, the 
application of Gardenfors’ postulates for belief revision can be examined in a more critical
way.
3.1 TMSs as Representation Mechanisms
The review in Chapter 2 suggests that TMSs can be viewed as belief revision mechanisms, 
despite problems in implementation, flexibility etc. These limitations would mean that they 
are not ideal as representation mechanisms but could provide a foundation upon which to 
construct a more general approach. However, as this section will show, there are more 
fundamental flaws in the conception of TMSs that mean they cannot function as belief 
revision systems.
3.1.1 Kxisting TMSs
*P to this point existing TMSs and their behaviour have been critically examined. Despite 
<his, it is worth reiterating their motivation and uses before going on to consider their use as a 
general modelling mechanism.
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The primary use of TMSs is as a component in a system that searches for solutions to 
problems or queries. Traditionally the TMS does not add anything to the capabilities of a 
problem solver, save in efficiency, and serves no purpose as a "stand alone" application. 
Each TMS performs a specialised function within a problem solving methodology. Doyle’s 
JTMS provides Dependency Directed Backtracking [Stallman and Sussman 1976] enabling 
defeasible inferences to be made and automatically withdrawn. As such it provides a way of 
implementing depth-first search through a series of defaults or assumptions. De Kleer’s 
ATMS provides a means for recording the derivability of propositions from sets of 
assumptions. The initial motivation was to provide an efficient way of reducing a search 
space by the prevention of exploration of areas that could not lead to a solution.
The high level task that these procedures perform, as opposed to how they operate, is to 
maintain one or more consistent problem solving states. In the case of the JTMS, consistency 
is maintained by revoking one of a set of contradictory assumptions; McAllester’s LTMS 
selectively revokes propositions according to a weighting scheme indicating the relative 
strengths of defaults versus assumptions versus premises; and in the ATMS, derivations are 
not allowed under contradictory sets of assumptions.
In each case, the TMS acts as an intelligent cache of information derived by the 
problem solver. New information and a record of their derivations is passed from problem 
solver to TMS, and information about the status of propositions is passed from TMS to 
problem solver. The TMS acts as an intelligent record of problem solving activity providing 
a more structured history than a simple transcript.
As originally put forward, TMSs are not representation mechanisms per se. They were 
not proposed as long term stores of problem solving information. At the start of a session the 
J MS contains no information and it is only as the problem solver derives information that it 
is passed to the TMS. The network of justifications grows incrementally as does the 
interpretation or assignment of values within the network - justifications are added and the 
interpretation is revised accordingly, more justifications are added and the interpretation is 
revised again and so forth.
71
3.1.1 Existing TMSs
If we want to use TMSs or the dependency networks on which they are based as tools 
for recording and manipulating long term information then we must alter our conception of 
what constitutes a dependency network and how we use it.
3.1.2 TMSs as Modelling Tools
In this thesis I advocate the use of dependency networks as a knowledge representation 
technique, and as such it is necessary for them to have a fixed declarative semantics. It must 
be possible to interpret any network independently of a program that constructs 
interpretations. Furthermore, if the dependency network is used to represent long term 
declarative knowledge then the process of interpretation will not be incremental, as is the 
case with TMSs. We must be able to construct interpretations of arbitrary networks from 
scratch, without regard to the incremental behaviour that is usually seen in TMS/problem 
solving interaction.
In particular, the interpretations should not be sensitive to the order in which the 
elemets of the network were added - this implicit temporal information will not be part of the 
stored network representation. If the temporal order is important1, it should be explicitly 
coded into the network and/or interpretation structures. This could be done, for example, by 
explicitly storing temporal information as part of a proposition attached to the node. 
Alternatively the temporal information could become part of the interpretation so each node 
might have many values, each flagged with a particular time stamp. The latter approach is 
analogous to storing values for quantified expressions as demonstrated in §5.2.4 except that 
in this case variables represent the same object at different points in time (rather than 
representing different objects or individuals).
For example, Morris [ 19K7] uses the JTMS as a tool for representing defaults and 
directly codes implications as dependencies. To actually construct an interpretation of the 
information using the JTMS one would have to pass each statement in turn into the system. 
Not only is this time consuming, but more importantly, because of the procedural nature of
1 It is easy to imagine systems when: temporal information is used in detennining how information is to he
interpreted.
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the JTMS (it is only a program) and the fact that it can have multiple interpretations, 
different orders of instantiation of dependencies gives rise to different interpretations. For 
example, the following operations:
operations network interpretation
nodes(N) dependencies (D)
assert a„ut—>st.b {a, b} i «tout *SLb) ((a out) (b in))
assert bout ^sLa {a, b) (aout— >sLt>, bout—>sLa ) ((a out) (b in))
gives us a final interpretation where b is believed and a is not. But the same operations in a 
different order:
operations network interpretation
nodes (N) dependencies (D)
assert b o u t — >S L a  { a, b ) { b o u t— >SLa) ((a in) (b out))
assert a ou, — >SLb {a, b) { b o u t ----- >SLa’ a o u t ----- » S L b ) ((a in) (b out))
gives the opposite result, a is believed but b is not. This is particularly important because this 
type of example routinely occurs when dealing with interacting defaults.
The example shows how problems may arise in incremental updates, but this is not an 
argument against incremental behaviour per se - this thesis looks at this kind of behaviour in 
§4.3.l.l. This is really an argument for saying there must be some criteria for establishing 
what are valid interpretations for a network. In the previous example we need to know that 
there are two or more solutions.
If IDNs are to be a useful representation and revision mechanism then there must be 
some principled way of constructing interpretations that is independent of how the network 
>s temporally constructed. If it is necessary to have a history of the sequence of actions that 
led to the creation of a network in order to interpret that network, then the network has no
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meaning, independent of the history. It becomes impossible to give a simple, declarative 
semantics to the network structures.
3.1.3 Intuitive Semantics of Support
The intuitive (procedural) semantics of dependency networks as used by TMSs is clear. The 
network represents a record of inferences made by the problem solver. The values assigned 
to nodes reflects the system’s current "belief"2 in the proposition attached to the node. In the 
JTMS this belief is supported by only one justification, (although there may be many 
justifications attached to a single node) whereas in the ATMS the belief is calculated from all 
the possible justifications. The values are updated according to how the validity of the 
inferences change over time, effectively adding or subtracting support for a proposition.
If networks used by IDNs are not a record of inferences made by a problem solver and 
the inferences’ current validity or status, what are they? Intuitively, the nodes represent 
propositions (both in the naive sense of a statement and in the logical sense of an irreducible 
formula) and the dependencies represent or act as potential inferences. As proposed in 
Chapter I, it is this set of inferences that can be used to capture a particular theory. The 
semantics of these inferences is determined by the functions or algorithms that determine 
how the values of the antecedents of a dependency support the consequent. These functions 
correspond to a theory or method of belief combination. A valuation corresponds to a 
Herbrand model in that there are no "external" semantics in terms of what is denoted by the 
propositions attached to nodes or the predicates they may contain. This semantics must be 
supplied by the user of the system.
The main point behind TMSs and IDNs is that the value assigned to each node or 
proposition should reflect the dependencies that support it. A node cannot be assigned a 
value, except a null value corresponding to "no other value is supported or justified", unless 
there is some reason for that assignment, even if it is only a dependency representing the
What constitutes a "belief' for different systems depends on the ptirticular TMS - e.g. for the JTMS "be- 
hcl is just that, a proposition is either believed or not. but for the ATMS "belief corresponds to those worlds 
in which a proposition is believed, with any other world corresponding to a lack of belief.
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justification or reasoning "I am going to assign this node this particular value". We want to 
exclude valuations that do not have this characteristic (i.e. those interpretations where a 
node’s value does not reflect the level of justifications supporting it) in the same way that 
classical interpretations of logic cannot have an interpretation / where /(a) = 0, /(b) = 0, and 
/(a v b) = 1. The semantics of the dependencies through their associated functions maintain 
an internal consistency.
One can think of dependency networks as a kind of propositional formula with root 
nodes, i.e. nodes that are the consequent of no dependencies, representing propositional 
letters, dependencies representing connectives and interior nodes representing compound 
formulae. The construction of interpretations for a network corresponds to the construction 
of a truth table with assignment of values to root nodes (analogously the propositional 
letters) and the calculation of values for dependent nodes (compound formulae) being done 
according to the rules governing the support of dependencies (connectives).
3.2 II)N Definition
Having established the need for a general dependency network representation with a 
declarative semantics in the preceding section, this section will provide just that. First the 
network structure and concepts will be defined and then a formal treatment of the (informal) 
semantics of supporting dependencies will be given. The combination of the dependency 
network and the interpretation mechanism together form the basic Interpreted Dependency 
Network and it is this definition of IDNs that forms the major contribution of the thesis. 
Without this definition there would be no context for the rest of the work contained within 
this thesis.
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3.2.1 IDN Definition: The Dependency Network
The formal definition of a basic Interpreted Dependency Network (IDN) comprises:
• a network <N,D> where N represents a set of propositions L and D is a set of 
dependencies of various types defined over N; and
• an interpretation structure (covered in §3.2.2) consisting of an arbitrary set of values V  
including a null value nil, and a set of summation functions S  that govern the 
assignment of values from T’to nodes in N.
The attachment of propositions to particular nodes is recorded by the mappings P:N —> L and
its inverse node:L —> N.
Each dependency belongs to a given type and we can partition D accordingly, i.e.
D = D] u  ... U Dp where d e D, is of type i and the Dj’s are pairwise disjoint.
Each dependency d is of the form (A j,... , Aq, c) e FwfN) x ... x Pw(N) x N. Each Aj is a 
set of antecedent nodes of a given type and the antecedents of d are ants(d) = Aj u  ... u  Aq.
A node being a particular type of antecedent is a function of the structure of the dependency 
and is not a property of the node itself, and therefore a single node can be of many different 
antecedent types depending on the dependencies within which it occurs. The node c is the 
consequent of d, i.e. cons(d) = c and we say that that c is supported by d and d supports c, or 
alternatively that d is attached to c. Similarly, the antecedents of d are said to support d.
The function D:N— >/V(D) returns all the dependencies that support, or are attached to, 
a particular node. The parents of a node n are the antecedents of all the dependencies 
supporting n: pars(n) = u  ants(d). Analogously, C:N— >fV(D) returns all the
deD(n)
dependencies that are supported by a particular node and the children of a node n are the 
consequents of all the dependencies supported by n: chld(n) = u  cons(d). The transitive
deC(n)
closures of D and C are the ancestors lanes) and descendants (desc) of a node respectively.
The number of types of dependencies and the number of types of antecedents for each 
type of dependency is unrestricted (providing it is finite), and is determined by the IDN 
designer and influenced by the type of information the IDN is being used to capture. For 
convenience I define a function /:DxfV(N)— > (0, 1, 2, ... } x {0, 1, 2, ... ) that returns the
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type of a given dependency or set of antecedent nodes within the context of a particular 
dependency. For example, for a dependency of type i, i(d, 0 )  = (i, 0) which I shall 
abbreviate to i. For a set A of antecedent nodes, if A is of type j within dependency d (which 
is in turn of type i) then r(d, A) = (i, j). Where the context of A is apparent, I will write f(A) 
instead of f(d, A) and refer to the type of A as j rather than (i, j).
Rather than write dependencies as n-tuples, if d is of type i, I shall write 
d = A j , ..., Aq — c ford = (Al t ..., Aq,c)
If Aj is empty for some j then I will omit it from the dependency, similarly if Aj contains just 
a single element a, then I shall write aj instead of Aj or {a } j . When actually defining the type 
of dependencies and antecedents for given 1DN systems the numbered types may be replaced 
by other (unique) identifiers.
For example, rather than defining JTMS SL-dependencies to be type 1 dependencies 
whose type 1 antecedents correspond to in-nodes and whose type 2 nodes are out-nodes, they 
could be "SL" type dependencies with "in" type in-nodes and "out" type out-nodes, e.g. 
dl = ((a b e) (d) f) = {a bc>j {d}2 — >i f = (a b c ) jndoul — >SL f 
d2 = ({) | ac )  g)= {ac}out — >SLg
This then is the basic structure of the network: a set of nodes with dependencies (of 
different types) supporting them. The dependencies attached to a node are supposed to 
provide some kind of justification for a given level of belief in the proposition represented by 
that node. This support is provided through the interpretation structure as shown below.
3.2.2 IDN Definition: The Interpretation
The basic idea behind IDNs is that the belief value assigned to each node is a function of the 
belief values associated with each dependency. For example, if a single node were supported 
by two justifications, one of which had an interpretation saying "believe this proposition (i.e. 
the proposition F(N) attached to the node) to be true" while another, independently had the 
interpretation "there is no evidence for believing this proposition" then one might expect the 
node to have a value "believe this proposition" as the first justification provides evidence for 
believing it. Alternatively the same case might have a different interpretation: the
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justifications could be independent and individually sufficient reasons for believing a 
proposition and that belief could be statistical in nature. In this case, a value of 0.5 for the 
first dependency combined with a value of 0.3 for the second would result in a conditional 
probability for the node (given either dependency were to be true) of 1 — (1 -  0.5)x(l -  0.3).
Which particular theory of belief representation and combination is used for a particular 
network is determined by two things: the values assigned to nodes; and the functions that 
determine how those values are combined at various levels within the network structures:
• at the node level there is a single summation function SN that determines how the 
support provided by each dependency, in the form of belief values, are combined;
• at the dependency level, for every type of dependency there is a summation function SP 
that determines how values from the various sets of different type antecedent are to be 
combined; and
at the antecedent level, for every set of typed antecedents j there is a summation 
function that determines how values of each antecedent are to be combined.
The summation functions form a three levelled hierarchy of functions which could be 
thought of as a generalisation of an AND/OR graph, or of a disjunctive normal form. At the 
node level, SN corresponds to a disjunction over the support provided by the attached 
dependencies. For each type i of dependency, SP corresponds to a conjunction over the 
support provided by each class of antecedent A, j ,  where the antecedent class support is 
calculated using S ^. It should be noted that the disjunctive normal form is only a metaphor 
for the structure provided by the summation functions, and although dependency networks 
will frequently have this structure, it is by no means necessary.
The actual semantics of the network elements is provided by the summation functions, 
and it is these functions that will determine if a network is interpreted as an AND/OR graph, 
or an OR/AND graph or even a MAY-BE/PERHAPS/MAY-BE-NOT network (given an 
appropriate set of summation functions, if one existed)! What is common however is that at 
each level there is a combination and distillation of belief values: values for antecedents are 
grouped by dependency and antecedent type before being combined to a single value for 
each antecedent type (for a given dependency), which are then in turn combined into a single
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value for each dependency. These dependency values are in turn combined into a single 
value for each node. What started as a set of values for antecedent nodes have been 
manipulated, combined and reduced to just a single value.
(a)
antecedent values: V(a)
antecedent class values: V a (A)
S P
dependency values: V D(d)
I 5 N
' N
node value: V (n)
Both the distillation of values and the disjunctive normal form can be seen in Doyle’s 
11979 p240] seminal TMS paper where an SL-justification "is valid (i.e. supports a value in) 
if and only if each node in its /'«list is in, and (added emphasis) each node in its ou/list is 
out". A node is only in iff at least one of its justifications is in*.
There is the added proviso that the in justification should nol he self-supporting. This is captured hy the 
kind of interpretations allowed for the network as shown later.
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This then is the basics of the semantics of the network. The summation functions 
determine the meaning of the dependencies attached to nodes, and give a set of rules for 
saying how values might be combined. But a declarative statement is also needed to say 
when the semantics of the dependency structure has been adhered to and the resulting 
interpretation is a valid one.
3.2.3 Formal Semantics of Support
Formally, a labelling of the nodes in N, or more specifically a valuation V over a network 
<N,D> is an assignment of values to nodes V: N —> T'. Given a fixed ordering on N we can 
write V as an n-tuple (V(nodei) ,..., V(nodeiNi)) and the set of all possible valuations is
VINI.
We are now in a position to write formal conditions to capture the idea that each node’s 
value, with respect to a particular valuation, must correspond to the value supported by the 
dependencies attached to it.
The value of a given node n under a valuation V, written VN(n, V), is defined to be the 
sum (as defined by the summation functions as outlined in the preceding section) of the 
values of the dependencies, V®(di, V), for each dependency attached to n:
Vs : N x VINI — > V,
(n,V) l—» SN(KD(di ,V ).....KD(dm, V))
where dj e £)(n)
The value of each dependency d, ^ ’(d, V), is similarly defined with the value being equal to 
the sum of the values, ^ (A j  j, V), of the antecedent classes:
TD: I) x  V ini — * "V,
(d.V) l > 5»d)(FA(A,, V ) FA(Ap, V))
for d = (A ,...... Ap, c)
Finally, the value for each class of antecedents is defined to be the sum of the values 
assigned to each node in the class.
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VA: Pw{ N ) x V ini —
(A ,V)(—>S^A)(V (a ,).....Via,))
for A = { ai aq }
The valuation functions provide a framework in which to place the user defined 
summation functions. Strictly speaking each summation function is a one place function 
taking an arbitrary n-tuple of values X = (vj ,..., vn) £  l /  and returns a single value v e V,
i.e.
S:Pw(‘S ) — >V\
(v, ,...,vn)l— » S ( ( v , .... vn) )
For convenience sake, to prevent a proliferation of brackets, I have treated them as variable 
arity functions thus
(vi  vn)l— > 5 ( v ,   vn )
There are no restrictions placed on the summation functions save the following: a node 
with no attached dependencies shall have a value nil, and a node with a single dependency 
shall have the value of that dependency. I.e.
Defn (n, V) = SN(0 )  = nil where D(n) = 0 ,  and
TN (n, V) = SN(v) = v where I)(n) = {d } and l^’fd, V) = v
The first restriction forces a correspondence between the meaning of nil as the value 
corresponding to "no supported value exists", and the fact that only dependencies are capable 
of supporting values. The second restriction corresponds to the intuition that the summation 
functions are a way of combining information about evidence or belief. If there is only a 
single value, i.e. there is no other support to be considered, then that value should remain 
unchanged.
We are now in a position to define those valuations in which the values assigned to the 
nodes correspond to the support given to them by their attached dependencies. We shall call 
such valuations admissible.
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Defn A valuation V of <N,D> is admissible iff V n e N, V(n) = ^ ( n ,  V)
I shall write VA(<N,D>) for the set of admissible valuations of <N,D>.
We can also formally define the notion of a dependency supporting the value of a node, 
given a particular valuation. Intuitively we want d to support n if the value of n is a function 
of the value of d so that if the value of d is changed then the value of n is changed. Thus
Defn dj e D(rt) = ]d[ dm } supports VN(n, V) iff 3 v e T's.t.
SN(1/D(d,, V ) ^ ( d j - t . V ) ,  v, V/D(dj+,,V).... VD(dm,V)) *
SN(KD( d , , V ) V D(dm,V))
and v is a value that could actually assigned to some dependency4.
3.3 Semantics of II)Ns
So far, this chapter has covered the need for formal semantics; sketched the informal 
semantics of support; defined the network and interpretation structures for IDNs; and 
provided a formal definition of a well supported interpretation, i.e. an admissible valuation. 
This in itself is sufficient for the work that follows in the rest of the thesis.
However, if we wish to relate the structure of the network to the admissible valuations 
in such a way as to be able to prove relationships between the values of different nodes we 
need more structure. I.e. for IDNs to be a formal system with a well defined semantics, 
equivalent to a logic of some sort, we must have the following (from |Patel-Schneider 1987])
• a syntactic language of sentences £;
• a class of semantic structures C;
• a set of truth values V,
• and an interpretation function i that maps sentences in the language to elements of the 
set of truth values, given a particular semantic structure. I.e.
Va e C ,S e  C.i(a . S) e V
1 Given the presence of assertionul dependencies, this should always he the case.
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For example, first-order logic consists of a language containing constant and variable 
symbols, function and predicate symbols, and quantifiers and connectives e.g. a , v , V. In 
Tarskian semantics of FOL [Boolos et al 1974] the semantic structures consist of:
• a domain or universe of discourse from which objects can be assigned to variables;
• a mapping from constants in the language to objects in the domain (denotation);
• a mapping from functions in the language to functions in the domain; and
• a characteristic function for each predicate, mapping sets of objects in the domain to 
truth values.
The set of truth values is { "true", "false" }, and the interpretation function is just the set of 
rules for determining the truth value of a compound wff from its constituent elements.
The preceding section defined a variety of structures that could potentially fill one or 
more of the roles outlined above. The rest of this section is devoted to exploring one possible 
way of mapping IDN structures to the elements outlined above.
In attempting to relate IDNs to the constituents of a formal system, the first problem is 
deciding on the language: what are the things we actually want to talk about? Obviously we 
need to talk about networks and we have defined above what constitutes such a network. We 
defined a class of semantic structures or valuations. The semantics of support through 
valuation and summation functions give us an interpretation function for assigning values of 
"satisfied" or "unsatisfied" to the network, given a particular valuation:
Defn /(V, <N ,I)»  = "satisfied" iffV e  FA(<N,1)>)
= "unsatisfied" otherwise
Additionally, we want to talk about individual nodes or dependencies within the network and 
the relationships between them. For example, if we have an SL-dependency linking a and b, 
a —>sl b, that represents an inference of b is believed from a, we want to be able to write 
theorems like:
Ihm "a — >SLb g <N,D> and a being believed (to be true) entails b being believed 
(to be true)"
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and
Thm "a being believed (to be true) entails a — »sl b supports b (to be true)”
Before formally defining entailment, we must consider how to formally write such 
theorems. In FOL, propositions are either true or false and given the two-valued nature of the 
semantics one can write " a is false" as —>a and write theorems like:
Thm ->b , a -> b |=fOI -.a
The semantics of (FOL) entailment allow a reading of "not b and a implies b entails not a” or 
"if ‘not b’ is true and ‘a implies b’ is true then ‘not a’ is true” or "if b is false and a implies b 
then a is false".
Given we may be dealing with three or more values in V, we cannot get away with this 
(i.e. have prefix modifiers to indicate intended truth values or restrictions on interpretations), 
but must include the restrictions we want to make in the sentences (this is like introducing 
meta level predicates). So instead of writing |= a  I will write |= (a, true). Similarly, instead 
of |= -iCt I shall write |= (a, false). So the basic formulae in our logic of IDNs are pairs 
consisting of a node or dependency and a value, or extra-logical statements for example 
about the structure of networks. The nodes/dependencies value pairs are interpreted as 
follows:
I)efn /(V, (n, v)) = "true" iff V(n) = v 
= "false" otherwise 
Defn /(V, (d, v)) = "true" iff FD(d) = v 
= "false" otherwise
We can now formalise the theorems above and write 
I'hm a — >sl b e <N,I)>, (a, in) |=,DN (b, in) 
and
Thm (a, in) |=,I)N (a — >SL b, in)
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In general, entailment defines a particular relationship between two formulae over all 
semantic structures. In particular, for FOL, entailment is defined by:
I)efn a  1=^, p iff V S e C, i(S,a) = "true" => i(S.P) = "true" 
where C is the set of all possible models 
and
Defn T |=poL P iff V S e C, ( Vy e T, i(S,y) = "true" ) => 
i(S,P) = "true"
So equivalently for IDNs, entailment relates the "satisfiability" of networks and values for 
nodes and dependencies. So given formulae that may be networks, dependencies or nodes, 
Defn a  |=,I)N P iff V V e V INI, /(V,a) e { true, satisfied ) =>
/(V,p) e { true, satisfied )
Defn T |=,UN a  iff V V e V 1N1, ( Vy e T, i(V,y)e ( true, satisfied } ) => 
i(V,a) e ( true, satisfied )
In using a formal system to represent and reason about knowledge, one attempts to 
derive conclusions a  from a set of initial premises T, i.e. one is attempting to establish 
whether an entailment relation holds, whether T |= a. In using an IDN to represent 
knowledge, the initial premises are the network used to represent a set of inferences or a 
theory about some domain. So in most cases, we want to consider entailments between 
nodes with respect to a given theory, and the network acts as a restriction on the valuations 
or models considered. The network is effectively a part of the semantic structures - we can 
talk about assignments to nodes without reference to dependencies but we cannot then define 
admissible valuations. Even in those cases in which there is no explicit reference to a 
network, there is an implicit reference. To say a — >sl b, (a, in) |=nm (b, in) is equivalent to 
saying for any admissible valuation of a network containing a —>sl b, if a is in then b is in.
So I redefine a semantic structure not to be a valuation V:N— but to be a pair 
(<N,D> , V) and the restriction that interpretation of networks are admissible valuations 
becomes a restriction on the class of semantic structures.
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The class of semantic structures is no longer V 1N1 but
C C (Pw(9{)xPw(rD)) x  •]/
C= { {<N,D>, V} I N c ^ . D c C V e  KA(<N,D>) } 
where I\£is an infinite alphabet or set of node names. The interpretation of node/dependency 
value pairs remains the same, the case of n 4- <N,I)> being covered by V(n) = undefined 
implies /({<N,D>, V}, (n, v)) = "false". Dependencies are similarly covered, with 
/({<N,D>, VJ, (d, v)) = "false" if d 4- <N,D>. Additionally, we can now interpret unvalued 
nodes and dependencies by: 
l)efn / ( {<N,I)>, V), n)) = "true" iff n e N 
= "false" otherwise
Defn /( (<N,1)>, V}, d)) = "true" iff d e I)
= "false" otherwise
If we view a network as a conjunction of nodes and dependencies the definition of 
interpretation of networks becomes:
Defn /( {<N,I)>, V), <N',D'>)) = "true" iff N 'cN, D 'cD  
= "false" otherwise
I shall write <N',D'> c  <N,D> if N 'cN, D'cD. This definition places no semantic 
conditions on the relationship between <N,D> and <N',D'>. This interpretation of unvalued 
nodes, dependencies and networks is a way of checking that a given model consisting of the 
theory represented by <N,D> and its consistent interpretation V actually refers to the objects 
under consideration.
Our truth values now correspond to {true, false) and the definition of entailment can 
revert to that of FOL entailment (except for the different semantic structures). In particular, 
unpacking the definition a little, we get:
l.emma^ For n,m e N, v,w e V, (n, v) |=,„N (m, w) iff 
V |<N,D>, V) e C, V(n) = v => V(m) = w
'  Because of the restriction of network valuation pairs,
V|<N,D>, Vie Cm V<N,D>e Pw(:A0x/V(!D).VV6 K4(<N,D>).
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Here we can see that the truth values used to talk about nodes and dependencies are not 
{true, false) but really Vand we can read (n, v) |=,DN (m, w) as "if n is ‘v’ then m is ‘w’" as 
we would read a  1= ^  —.(3 as "if a  is true then P is false".
If we want to talk about entailment in the context of a particular network or networks, 
we further restrict the domain of semantic structures to include just those networks. So 
instead of writing
Thm a — >SL b, (a, in) 1=™ (b, in)
we could write
Thm (a, in) |=r (b, in)
where T = { <N,D> 6 />w(iV)x/,w(!D) I a, b e  N, a — >sl b e  D)
So in order to establish whether a value v assigned to node n entails a value w at node b 
within the context of a particular theory <N,D>, one must consider whether 
(a, v) |=<N,p, (b, w). However the admissible interpretations of <N,D> may restrict the 
valuations considered to such a degree that we do not even consider valuations in which 
V(a) = v. For example, consider (a, in) |=<NiD> (b, in) where <N,D> = < {a, b), {a — >sl b) >. 
The only admissible valuation is V = { (a, out), (b, out)) which means we get the following: 
Thm (a, out) |=<N-D> (b, out) and (b, out) |=<N,D> (a. out)
This problem is the result of missing part of the semantics found in FOL. Part of the Tarskian 
semantics is the definition of characteristic functions for predicates. This is responsible for 
asserting the truth or falsity of ground literals and corresponds to an assignment of truth 
values in a propositional interpretation. Because of the insistence on admissible 
interpretations we cannot arbitrarily assign values to nodes but must justify those values. It 
is not enough to consider the network < {a, b), {—>sl a- a — >sl b) > for then we get:
I hin (a, in) l=<N,n> (b, in) and (b, in) |=<N D> (a, in)
Although this results in the desired behaviour in one case (i.e. (a, in) |=<NiD> (b, in)), by only 
considering the case where the left hand side of the theorem is true, (and therefore the right 
hand side is true if the theorem is indeed a theorem), it allows the right-hand side (i.e. (b, in)) 
to prove the left ((a, in)). What is necessary is some way of considering the set of inferences 
represented by the dependencies in the network to be static and allowing the set of initial
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assignments of values to propositions to vary. To this end I define:
Defn An assertional dependency is a dependency of the form — >v, having no antecedents, 
and an associated summation function such that 
W e  V INI, V?(V,d) = v.
Each type of assertional dependency is written Dv and the set of all assertional 
dependencies is written Da = DV| u  ..... u  DVn.
In general when specifying a particular IDN, one would expect to have an assertional 
dependency for each node and value combination, the one exception to this being the lack of 
nil value assertions. There are exceptions to this, e.g. see § 3.3.3.
I can now use these dependencies to extend the initial network so as to include a given 
initial interpretation. This does not preclude the inclusion of assertional dependencies as part 
of the original network but does include the restriction that not more than one extra assertion 
is attached to each node. This is merely a restriction of convenience with the action of any 
two assertions being capable of reproduction by a single assertion. Hence 1 define the 
extensions E o f a network,
Defn £(<N,I)>) = ( <N,I)U D> I D £  D„, s.t V n e N, | D o  D(n) | £ 1}
The definition of entailment is accordingly adjusted.
Defn a  |=<N,D> (J iff V( <N',D'>, V },
if <N\D '>e£(<N,D>) and /({<N',D'>, V),ct) = "true" 
then /({<N',D'>, V),p> = "true"
Returning to the example where <N,D> = < (a, b), (a— >st.h} >. the only type of 
assertional dependency supports a value "in" and corresponds to an SL-justification with no 
antecedents so I shall write — >sl for — and so D„ = { — >SLa. — >sL.b }.
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The semantic structures containing <N,D> are
{ < {a, b}, {a— >sLb) >, {(a, out) (b. out)) }
{ < {a, b), {a— »stA — >SLa) >. {(a, in) (b, in)) }
{ < (a, b}, {a— >sLb, — »sl^ I >. {(a, out) (b, in)) 1 
{ < {a, b}, (a— >SLb, — »SLa, — »st.b) >. {(a, in) (b, /'«)} )
and so we have 
Thm (a, in) |=<N,D> (b, in) 
and
Thm (b, out) |=<N>D> (a, out)
The second theorem is akin to the contra-positive, a  —» |3 1= ^  -i(3 —> —ia, which appears in a 
variety of forms. First, if we interpret the negation of formulae by 
Defn /( (<N,I)>, V}, -,a)) = "true" iff /((<N,I)>, V), a)) = "false"
= "false" otherwise 
then we get the general theorem
Thm If (a, v) |=<NiD> (b, w) then ->(b, w) |=<NiD> -.(a, v).
Now, if we interpret the negation of values in node/value pairs by 
I)efn /( (<N,I)>, V),(n, -,v)) = "true" iff V(n) * v 
= "false" otherwise 
then we have the following:
Ihm If I'M = 2 then -i(n, v) |= Sill> (n, -.v) and -.(n, v) |=«N>D> (n, -iv)
Notice that in general -i(a, v) is not equivalent to (a, -iv). Finally, as a corollary to theorem 
X, we have the following:
Ihm If I'M = 2 and (a, v) |=<N,D> (b, w) then (b, -.w) |=<N,D> -.(a, ->v)
xy
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One of the main points of this thesis is that dependencies should be used to explicitly 
represent inferences. If this goal were realised then it should be possible to determine 
entailment purely by checking the network structure and the corresponding summation 
functions. Similarly, a node’s (n) value should only be entailed by those nodes on which it 
depends (i.e. ancs{n)). There are several problems that prevent this being realised.
The first is the use of standard model theoretic entailment where ot|=P iff 
M(a) £  9W((3) where M(n) is the set of models for Jt (i.e. those semantic structures that 
satisfy 7t). This gives the following theorems:
Thm _L 1=5^  a  where a  is any wff and -L is a contradiction or unsatisfiable wff 
and
Thm a  i=m  T where a  is any wff and T is a tautology or valid wff
In particular, given a set of formulae T = oti ....  a n, if T 1=5^  (3 then we can arbitrarily
strengthen the antecedent so that T u  d> 1=5^  P whether or not the formulae in 
= Yi ,..., Ym are relevant.
If we want entailment in IDNs to reflect some notion of relevance then the notion of 
entailment must be restricted or modified to remove this property.
Another problem arises when using a standard notion of negation - i.e. if 
M{-ia) = c  \  M(a). This definition of entailment allows the derivation of contra-positive 
forms of entailment: if a|=P then —iPl=—>a. If entailment is supposed to capture some notion 
of the nodes in the left hand side being ancestors of nodes in the right hand side, the contra­
positive form will pose problems.
Finally, there are problems introduced by having more than two values. Unless the 
definition of entailment captures some notion of ordering of values it becomes impossible to 
describe any entailment other than for fixed point values. For example it is impossible to say 
something along the lines of "whenever a  has a belief greater than 0.75, the value of P is 
greater than 0.9". This issue is explained in more detail in §4.3.2.3.
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The upshot of all these problems is that it appears difficult to tie any notion of 
entailment to the structure of the network.
3.4 Reconstruction of TMSs
Having formally defined what constitutes an Interpreted Dependency Network, I can now 
reconstruct various TMSs as IDNs. Before doing this I will make a distinction between 
inferences in the network, and inferences about the network. I will then define summation 
functions for the J-, A-, and L- TMSs to cover the basic inferences in the network.
3.4.1 Basic and Meta-Level Inferences
In an 1DN as in TMSs, the nodes of a network are used to represent propositions and the 
dependencies in an IDN represent inferences providing support for nodes. These inferences 
are strictly related to the nodes. As yet there is no way that inferences about the properties or 
structure of a network can be made or represented in that network. Such inferences represent 
meta-level inferences relating to derivability, unsatisfiability and the like. This lack of meta­
level inference in IDNs is at variance with both the spirit of the JTMS, and the extended 
ATMS |de Kleer, 1986b| where dependencies and other (non-dependency network) 
structures are used as part of the network in the construction of valuations.
For example, in the JTMS conditional proof (CP) justifications
t-cons, l*tl *•••» I in-hyp ibj *•••* tyi } out-hyp C^'P d
are valid or in "if the consequent node (ccons) is in whenever
(a) each node (aj) of the in-hypotheses ( {aj ,..., a  ^} ¡n-hyp ) is in and
(b) each node (b,) of the out-hypotheses ( {bj .... bh ) out-hyp ) is out."
This is exactly a statement about the entailment of c from ai .... bh viz, the conditional proof
justification is valid if (a |, i n ) (a^, in), (b j, out),..., (bh, out) |=|„N (c, in). In actual fact, as 
mentioned in §2.1.2, CP-justifications are not evaluated as such, but are dynamically 
converted to a set of SL-justifications that approximate to the action of the CP-justification.
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In the extended ATMS constructs such as choose[C\ , C2, ...} and ignore{B ( are added. 
They are meta-level devices because they explicitly deal with the assumptions or values 
assigned to nodes, i.e. they are constructed from and act directly upon V  which is part of the 
semantics, and not on N. Disjunctions, as represented by choose, act as filters on the labels 
assigned to each node, removing contexts (i.e. sets of assumptions) that cannot contain some 
assumption C1 (because o f contradictions), and forcing the inclusion o f one assumption from  
each disjunction in every valuation. Similarly ignore forces the removal of any environment 
containing an ignored assumption.
In addition to these structures, operations to change the structure of networks are also 
considered to be meta-level inferences for they represent changes to the underlying theory or 
model as represented by the network. In the following sections describing the summation 
functions for TMSs, I will partition inferences by type, e.g. basic or meta-level, and ignore 
meta-level inferences. I will return to meta-level inferences in §6.5 where I consider 
extending IDNs through the use of procedures attached to nodes.
3.4.2 The JTMS as an II)N
For the basic JTMS-1DN we have the following.
• The set of node names
• The set of possible dependencies, all support-list justifications,
© = | Ain,B„ut— >SLc I A, B c  X, ce <X. 1 C Pw(X) x Pw(3V) x <K. 
and the set of assertional dependencies 
•>« = { — >s l  a I a e X .) C ©.
• The set of values = {/'w, out) with in corresponding to "believed to be true" and out 
corresponding to "not believed to be true", equivalent to the nil value stipulated by the 
definition of T'in §4.2.
• The set of summation functions
s ={  sN,sR,sfLin,stLA»)6
h f?r convenience sake I shall drop (he D and A superscripts and write S ^  for Ssi., S,n for Sst..,„ and S„u, 
for S&m.
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SN(0) = out
SN(V] ,..., vn) = out iff Vi e [l,n], V; = out 
5 n (vj ,..., vn) = in iff 3i e [l,n], Vj = in
A v ,  ,V2) = out iff vi = out or V2 = out 
5sl (vi ,v2) = in iff V] = in and V2 = in
SL
Sm (vi vn) = out iff 3i e [l,n], Vj = out
SL
Sm (vi vn) = in iff Vi e [l,n], v; = in
SL
•Sout(vi vn) =out iff 3i e [l,n], v* = in
SL
,..., vn) = in iff Vi e [l,n], Vj = out
If we replace V  = {in, out) with V  = {0, 1} then SN is equivalent to Boolean
,J SL SL
disjunction, y  and S¡„ are Boolean conjunction and S<m is equivalent to Boolean 
conjunction over a set of negated values.
Of the three basic procedures contained in the JTMS, truth maintenance (the propagation of 
changes of value) is covered by the task of finding admissible valuations of the networks 
described above and is the only one to count as basic inferencing. The other two procedures, 
dependency directed backtracking and the interpretation of CP-justifications through 
approximations to SL-justifications, are meta-level inferences and are covered in §4.3.2.4.
3.4.2.1 Semantics for the JTMS
Doyle 119X31 gives a formal interpretation of the JTMS. Given a set of nodes :Y. he defines 
the set of SL- and CP-justifications as
SZ-(iV) = Pw(!V)x/M!AOxiy;
CP(£Y) = SU*0 x K
and the domain ‘DCH) = SL(!\) u  CP(<*0, otherwise written as it.
The semantics of the JTMS as presented by Doyle is not as clear as it might be, given 
the classification outlined in §3.3. This is because the domain i t  is not only the syntactic 
language, but also forms the basis of the semantic structures C. However, once the class of
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semantic structures has been defined to be the set of admissible states, the interpretation of 
each element of the language is easy.
The truth values consist of the set {in, out( and given an admissible state 5 c  f  where S 
C D (and more besides - S  £  D is a necessary but not sufficient condition for membership of 
CI, the interpretation function / is defined by:
i(S, d) = in iff d e S
= out otherwise
The difficult part of the semantics is in constructing the class of semantic structures for 
a given domain 'D. A state S  is defined to be a subset of © and the class of semantic 
structures is defined by restricting the set of states according to a secondary interpretation 
function I. This is done by having each component, i.e. d e  ®, act "as a restriction on the 
states in which it may admissibly occur". Individual nodes place no restriction on the states 
in which they may occur and /(n) =C, unless the node represents a contradiction which can 
occur in no state thus /(n) = 0 .  In this context we can (must) read n e 5 as "n is believed in 
5”.
Justifications place more complex restrictions on states. Given the view of CP- 
justifications as meta-reasoning, 1 will only consider the interpretation of SL-justifications. 
So for d = A|n,Bout— »slc- Ad) = | 5 c ® I A s; 5 £  (JAB —» c e S ). In other words / 
removes those states in which the antecedents of a justification are satisfied but the 
consequent is not satisfied.
It is harder to give an intuitive reading for d e S  than for nodes. It could be read as "d 
is currently believed (valid) in 5" i.e. is in and actually supports c. However, a better reading 
(given the way interpretations are constructed) would be "d exists in 5" i.e. it expresses a 
relationship between the values of c and the antecedents of d (but may not actually be 
supporting d in the current state).
Admissible states (denoted by the set 5a ) are those sets of components that are self- 
satisfying i.e. each component is sanctioned by the interpretation of the other components. 
Formally,
9 4
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¿ a = I S  C ® IS  e n  /(d) }
de.S
According to Doyle, the basic action of the JTMS is modelled by having a set of nodes 
and justifications S, which may or may not be an admissible state, and extending S to find an 
admissible extension E. The starting state S is a set of nodes and dependencies that are 
believed to be true, i.e. are in. The admissible extensions AExts(S) of S are those admissible 
states containing S (so S is also included in the semantic structures that interpret it!) that are 
finitely grounded (i.e. have no circular supporting structures). These states have no extra 
justifications added and any additional nodes must be supported by nodes and dependencies 
in S and/or other nodes which have been added through a series of expansions that do not 
add circular arguments.
It is possible to construct a (partial) mapping from Doyle’s description of the JTMS to 
the IDN version. At the language or object level, the initial state S maps to a dependency 
network <N,D> with the SL-justifications in S mapping to equivalent SL-dependencies in D, 
and the nodes in S mapping to assertional dependencies in D. In this situation, the 
dependencies in S are equivalent to a network and the set of nodes to a set of premises 
represented by assertional dependencies:
S s <  i j  nodes(A) , D u |  — >sLn I n e N ) > 
d€ D
where N = { n e S i n e  £Y. | and D = ( d e S I d e SL($0 )
At the semantic level, Doyle’s interpretations of a network, i.e. the admissible extensions 
AExts(S) should map to the admissible valuations KA(<N,D>). However, because the JTMS 
excludes self-supporting cycles (i.e. the interpretations are grounded) but the JTMS-IDN 
does not, we have AExts(S) c  V'A(<N,I)>). It is necessary to restrict the set of admissible 
valuations in some way so that AExts(S) c  V04(<N,D>).
Although taking minimal admissible valuations produces the right restrictions for 
monotonic cycles, in general it is not possible simply to equate admissible extensions with 
minimal admissible valuations. Although finite-groundcdness implies minimality, the 
converse is not true.
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For example, given the dependencies
D  =  { » o u t----->SLa - b o u t----->S L b , a ;n -----»SL.b, b in ----->SLa }.
the interpretation
V = {(a, in) (b, in)}
is the minimal (and only) admissible valuation but it is not finitely grounded.
What can be said is that the admissible valuations of the JTMS-IDN do correspond to 
the notion of locally grounded extensions of a network. Given the following:
I)efn a state E is locally grounded in S iff 
Vx. x e  E = * x e  S v
3r = Aln Bout— >sLx-(r e E a A c E a B o E = 0 ). 
and the fact that E is admissible iff
Vr = Ain BnU|— >slx- r e  E a A c E a B o E = 0 —> x e  E 
then if S is a set of justifications then a locally grounded admissible extension of S is a state 
S' = S u E  s.t.
Vx. xe E <-> 3r = Ajn Bl)Ut— »slx- r. e  S a A c E a B o E = 0 .
In other words, the nodes that are in the extension (admissible valuation V) are exactly those 
that have a valid justification in E: (VN(n,V)= ^»(d^V) = in for some i).
In order to get a correspondence between minimality and groundedness it is necessary 
to consider stable set semantics (Elkan 1990] where V e VA(<N,D>) is finitely grounded iff 
it is the minimal admissible valuation of <N,I>v> where 
Dv = { Aln— >SLc I 3d 'e D. d ' = AlnB„ul— >SlC
a Vae A. V(a) = in a Vbe B. V(b) = out ).
Whether self-satisfying cycles should be allowed is at this time a moot point7. The 
important point is that semantically speaking, the interpretation of networks in the JTMS- 
IDN is different to those in the original JTMS. One possible solution to this is to modify the
Given the discussion in $4.2.1 about the psychological plausibility of circular justifications, c.g. "I believe 
I* because I believe P". it seems for some applications finite groundedness is too strong a condition.
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interpretation mechanism for cycles so that there is built-in indication of groundedness. This 
approach will be outlined later in §4.2.6, but for the moment we must be satisfied with 
agreement between the "real" JTMS and the 1DN version on the interpretation of acyclic 
networks.
3.4.3 The ATMS as an II)N
For the basic ATMS-IDN we have the following.
• The set of node names X  = including a distinguished node n^ used to represent 
contradictions.
• The set of possible dependencies, all of a single type arbitrarily called support 
dependencies or s-type for short8
® = ( A+W,n x ^ — >sc M  CiY, ce X )  £  Pw(X) x {nx } x X  
and the set of assertional (a-type) dependencies:
I)a = ( — \  n i n e  X, prop(n) = A, v = {A ) £  Vfor A e A )
• The set of values 'U = Pw(Pw{A)) for some distinguished set of assumptions A with {) 
corresponding to the nil value.
• The set of summation functions S  = { SN, SsD, S*+Ve, S*_ve) u  { S® I v = { A ( e ^ |
SN( 0 ) = ( I
5n(v! ,..., v„) = reduce( Vj)
iell.nl
Ssu(v ,, v2) = remove(\\ ,V2)
■Si+veCvi ..... v„) = reduce^ { v = t^xj I xi .... xn e v, x ... x v„) } )
isi
5.A-vc(v) = V
' The structure of the dependencies have been syntactically altered for vtirious reasons discussed ¡liter these
definitions.
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SvD(0 )= {v )
where the functions remove and reduce are defined as follows
reduce{\) = (e, e v I V er  ej <£ e, } where the label v = { ei en ) with each 
e, £ 4  being a particular context or set of assumptions.
remove( \ \ , \ 2 ) = {e; e vj I V fj e V2, fj <L ej l
reduce removes all those environments of v that are subsumed by some other 
environment thus producing a set of minimal environments.
remove removes those environments of Vi that are supersets of environments in vj. 
Given the construction of the dependency, vj will be the no-goods or contradictory sets 
of assumptions, so the application of the function removes all contradictory 
environments from v j.
As noted above (in the footnote below!), the structure of the dependencies in the ATMS-IDN 
are somewhat different to those in the ATMS, but this does not change the semantics nor the 
operation of the system.
The change in dependency structure is made so that the ATMS-IDN conforms to the 
idea of local computation of values. A new antecedent is included in all s-type dependencies 
to convey the no-goods, i.e. the environments contained in the label of the contradiction node 
nx, each of which must not be contained in any environment of another node’s label. This 
makes the s-type ATMS dependency equivalent to a restricted JTMS SL-dependency. It is 
restricted in that the only allowed negative antecedent, i.e. nodes that can place restrictions 
on what must be disbelieved, is the contradiction node n-0.
Another difference between the ATMS and the ATMS-IDN is the inclusion of 
assertional dependencies in the ATMS-IDN. In the ATMS, assertional dependencies do not 
exist as they do with the JTMS. Nodes are simply designated as assumptions and given a 
corresponding label. The assumption nodes, representing statements like "assume the sky is 
blue", are then used to justify assumed nodes representing the actual assumed datum, "the 
xky is blue". In general, the assumption nodes may be justified by other nodes |de Kleer
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1986a, pl47] but de Kleer avoids doing this in the paper because of the controversy involved 
[ibid, p i42], but advocates the use of assumption/assumed node pairs. This then corresponds 
to the input model of unsupported valuations over root nodes in §3.3.3.3.
Even having chosen to use assertional dependencies, the use of assertional 
dependencies to model de Kleer’s use of assumptions represents a restriction compared to 
the class of assertional dependencies as originally envisaged in §3.3.1. They only exist for 
values containing a single environment of one assumption. Furthermore, they should only be 
attached to the nodes that represent the asserted assumption in the network. Thus, if 
A = "assume the sky is blue" and node(A) = n-11 say, then — woul d be the only 
assertional dependency of type {A), i.e. supporting the value (A). Therefore, having chosen 
our assumptions JA, thus defining our values V  and assertional dependencies Da , a-type 
dependencies should not be treated as assertional dependencies for the sake of constructing 
extensions of a network, and E(<N,D>) = {<N,D>}. This gives a new set of network 
dependencies I) ' = I) u  I)„ and assertional dependencies !)„' = 0 .  There is another way of 
interpreting assertional dependencies which 1 shall return to below and which justifies the 
use of the full set of assertional dependencies.
3.4.3.1 Semantics for the ATMS
In the JTMS the intuitive reading or semantics of the values V  is clear and absolute. 
V(n) = in means that the proposition prop(n) associated with n is believed and V(n) = out 
means that it is not believed. Valuations are truth assignments over a network.
For the ATMS the values are not absolute but relative to a particular network and do 
not give a simple truth assignment to propositions. When designing a specific ATMS-IDN 
network the designer must specify the distinguished set of assumptions JA and the a-type 
dependency associated with that assumption. This gives the assumed nodes a fixed value and 
the belief or truth of other propositions or nodes is defined relative to them. So the values 
correspond to a set of possible worlds indexed by A where each possible world consists of a 
different interpretation of the same set of nodes.
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Having constructed a valuation consisting of a set of consistent possible worlds, that 
valuation can then be used to create a particular truth assignment corresponding to a single 
possible world. This is done by picking a set of assumptions M corresponding to a particular 
model and checking each node to see if it is true in that particular world. This is the 
secondary interpretation phase described in §2 .1.2.
Although the summation functions above would seem to correspond with the informal 
algorithm given by de Kleer [1986a, p50-152], comparing the possible admissible valuations 
over cycles it can be seen that the ATMS-IDN does not produce the results sanctioned by the 
formal semantics [Reiter and de Kleer 1987, ECAI-TMS workshop]. In particular, given 
I)= (a — >b, b— >a[ one should get a valuation V = {(a {}) (b (})} but any valuation 
V' = {(a L) (b L)) will be admissible for the ATMS-IDN. To remove this anomaly it is 
sufficient to choose the minimal admissible valuation9.
The choice of minimal admissible valuation for the correct interpretation of ATMS 
networks introduces another problem: the derivation and recording of contradictions. The 
process of dealing with contradictions has two parts. First contradictions are generated by 
supporting -L with some dependency A — » _L. The resulting label of J_ are the no-good or 
inconsistent environments. Secondly, the no-goods are removed from each nodes label, thus 
preventing them from being derived under contradictory circumstances. However, this may 
result in the no-good being removed from J_.
For example, consider I) = ( —»(( a | ) a. a— >b, b— >-L}. If V is an admissible valuation 
then V(a) = {(A |}, V(b) = remove(( (A )), V(±)) and V(_L) = V(b). I.e. b’s label is [ (A |) 
with any inconsistent environments removed, while the inconsistent environments are 
exactly those environments of b that are consistent - (A ) is no-good iff it is not no-good. It is 
only when an environment first appears in the justification supporting ±  that this loop is 
avoided.
There are several solutions to the problem of recording contradictions: either allow a 
self-supporting justification of no-goods and let admissible valuations be non-minimal over
1 This works for the ATMS and not the JTMS because of the tnonotonic nature of the cycles which means 
that minimality implies groundedness.
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_L; or use justifications to directly record contradictions. E.g. if | A B C) is determined to be 
no-good, say from d—fcl and V(d) = ({A B C )), then add { ABC}  — > 1. to the network. 
This problem shows the difficulty of trying to treat a meta-level concept (e.g. contradictions) 
within the object framework. In both cases it is difficult to maintain the origin of the 
contradiction but remove its affect from the network.
It is obvious why the second is desired (maintaining a contradiction-free labelling is the 
purpose of the ATMS) but the first is equally necessary if changes to network are to be 
allowed. Not only may contradictions be explicitly removed by removing dependencies 
supporting -L, but they may also be removed implicitly by removing some of the other 
intermediate dependencies linking the assumptions to J.. Given it is not possible to maintain 
constant support for no-goods it becomes necessary to explicitly check the validity of no­
goods after the removal of any dependencies. For this reason the removal of justifications 
can be computationally expensive10.
What is harder to capture is the notion of entailment. As described above, I)a = 0  and 
so £(<N,I)>) = {<N,D>}. Given there is only a single admissible valuation for any ATMS- 
IDN network, the following theorem results:
Thm T Rl=<NiD> a  iff T = 0  and a  e ( (n, v) I ne N, v = V(n), V e TA(<N,I)>))
Proof Easy
We have returned to the problem of §3.3.1 of only having a single extension which we 
overcame by introducing assertional dependencies and which has now (unsurprisingly) 
reappeared when l)a = 0 .
111 Dc Kleer suggests not actually removing justifications hut adding tut extra antecedent assumption to each 
dependency to represent its validity. To retract the dependency this assumption is simply removed from the 
problem solving context. However, given the complexity of calculating labels is exponential in the size of en­
vironments |Provan 1990| this will quickly lead to a combinatorial explosion given a network of some depth 
and interconnectedness.
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3.43.2 Assumptions and Assertional Dependencies
The initial restriction of Da to the empty set was based on the premise that assertional 
dependencies in the ATMS-IDN represented specific assumptions, and should only be 
attached to those nodes that represented those assumptions within the network, and that it 
would be nonsensical to attach them elsewhere. To justify some node m, other than 
n = node{A), with — »a de Kleer intimates that it would be better to use n+ve— >sm.
I would argue that a case could be made for extending Da. The set of assumptions A 
has no external semantic content. They are merely arbitrary devices for tracing derivations of 
nodes. Though de Kleer would have us use the same token for a node (or proposition 
attached to a node) and a semantic value, there is no need for this connection. One can 
simply define the meaning of an assumption e A as the conjunction over the propositions 
related to the nodes to which it is attached. For example, if the dependency — >\ were 
attached to nodes n and m with respective propositions jc and y , the assumption A would 
read 7t and y  are true.
The argument that no-goods are defined by particular sets of assumptions and thus 
would change their meaning if assumptions were arbitrarily assigned meaning does not hold 
water. The inconsistency represented by a no-good should be between the nodes in the 
network and therefore defined by the nodes’ current labels, and not directly defined through 
assumptions. For example, to say n contradicts m, the dependency 
(n, m)+V(.— >snx should be added to the network - in this way a record of the contradiction is 
kept in the network. If the intersection of the labels of n and m were declared no-good by 
some reasoning or procedure outside of the network interpretation there would be no record 
in the structure of the network, defeating the purpose of a foundations approach to belief 
revision.
So. given A e A has no particular semantic import but is defined relative to the nodes to 
which —>,A| is attached, we can let
Da = ( — >v n I n € 7i, v = {A ) for A e A ).
('iven that assumptions represent tags for tracing derivations it is still useful to restrict 
assertional dependency types to singleton values.
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The extensions of a network £(<N,I)>) = { <N,I)^jD > D c l ) a ) represent different 
views of a given theory. The assumptions ¡\ -  {cons(d) I d e  D) designate the starting points 
of the variable area of the theory represented by the network. Any node not containing an 
assumption in its set of ancestors will either always be true or always be false depending on 
whether its label is {{}} or {}.
By changing where the assumptions are attached in the network, we get a different 
focus on the theory. In other words, rather than judging belief in a node relative to one set of 
assumptions, belief is now relative to a second set.
This change in focus can represent a simplification, ignoring part of the theory. For 
example, given the network
<N,D> = < {n,m,l}, {n,m — >s 1} > 
and a set of assumptions represented by
D= {— >A n, — >B mj
then V(l) = {{A. B) 1 for V e VA(<N,I)^jD>) -1 is believed if A and B are believed. If the 
set of assumptions is changed:
D = I - > c D
then V(l) = {{C}) - 1 is believed only if C is believed. The second interpretation of the 
network is simpler in that it has ignored n and m and concentrated on the network at and
below 1.
By replacing {— >a n< — >b m l by {— >c n> —*C m) the level of focus has remained 
the same, i.e. nodes below n and m would be variable with regard to C, but the granularity 
has decreased - the assumption C represents the conjunction of A and B.
Similarly, if we add an assumption where there was an empty label this corresponds to a 
more detailed theory (with a wider area of variability) and we are increasing the granularity 
at which things are interpreted. There are more distinct possible worlds to choose from when 
selecting just a single interpretation within which to work.
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Having re-defined Da, each network is now capable of supporting a variety of models 
as it is possible to extend the network by the addition of a number of assertional 
dependencies. The problems that arise by having a single interpretation of a network are 
alleviated.
3.4.4 The LTMS as an IDN
To model the LTMS we have to introduce a few changes that alter the form of the system, 
though not the semantics. Firstly, though the LTMS is three-valued, the easiest way to 
record contradictions is to have an additional fourth value. Secondly, in the LTMS 
propositional formulae are converted to a set of constraints which under certain 
circumstances are used to derive .values for nodes. These constraints are further converted to 
a set of dependencies as outlined below.
For the basic LTMS-IDN we have the following.
• The set of node names :a£
• The set of dependencies which are of two types, those providing positive support and 
those providing negative support,
'D = { A,,B|— I A, B £  ce iy", v e {t, f } ) £  FvcfiV) x Pw(5\0 x !A£ 
and the set of assertional dependencies 
0Ja = { — >v a I a e X, v e {t, f) | £  ©
• The set of values V  = [t, f , n, c} with t corresponding to "believed to be true" and /  
corresponding to "believed to be false", c corresponding to "contradictory" or believed 
to be both true and false, and n corresponding to "no belief either way" equivalent to the 
nil value stipulated by the definition.
• The set of summation functions S = |SN, 5,u, SA, StA, Sfu, SAt, SAf )
though I will write SA for SA and SA, and SA for SAf and SAf as the functions are the
same.
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SN(0 ) = n
5n(vj vn) = n iff Vi e [l,n], \ x= n
SN(vi ,..., vn) = t iff 3i e [l,n], = t and Vi e [l,n], V;
SN(vj .... vn) = / i f f  3i e [l,n], \ \ = f  and Vi e [l,n], \ x * t
SN(vi .... vn) = c iff 3i,j e [ 1 ,n], \ \=  t and vj = /
■S,D(v i,v2) = n iff V] = / or v2 = /
5,d(vi ,V2) = t iff vi = t and v2 = t
Sp(vi ,v2) = n iff V] = /o r  v2 = /
SP(vi ,v2) = / i f f v ,  = t and v2 = t
S,A(V[ vn) = n iff 3i e [l,n], v; * t
5,a(vi ,..., vn) = t iff Vi e [l,n], Vj = t
5fA(v! vn) = « i f f 3 i e  [l,n], vj 
SfA(v! ,...,vn) = /iff  V ie [l,n], Vj = /
As with the JTMS-IDN I will not consider backtracking at this point as it represents a 
meta-level activity. However, it is worth noting that McAUester allows the extension in the 
type of assertional dependencies allowed so that rather than simply having premises that are 
positively supported, one can differentiate between the strengths or degree of belief in the 
assertions. This enables the backtracking algorithm to retract weaker assumptions before 
stronger ones.
3.4.4.1 Semantics for the LTMS
Semantically the LTMS is a restricted JTMS and the former can be transformed into the 
latter as follows. Each proposition p in the LTMS is represented by two in the JTMS, say t(p) 
corresponding to "p is true" and f(p) to "p is false" and values in the LTMS can be mapped to 
valuations over these two nodes. Given nnde(p) = n, node(t(p)) = m and node(f(p)) = 1,
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V(n) = n = V(m) = out and V(l) = out 
V(n) = t = V(m) = in and V(l) = out 
V(n) = f=  V(m) = out and V(l) = in 
V(n) = c = V(m) = in and V(l) = in
Dependencies in the LTMS can be correspondingly translated into the JTMS:
At,Bf— »,c = A 'in— >sLt(c) and At,Bf— *fC = A'in— >Si.f(e) 
where A, = {aj an }, Bt = {bi b„} 
and A't = {t(a i) .....t(an) , f ( b ! ) f ( b „ ) }
It is now possible to see why the LTMS is a restriction of the JTMS, no nodes will appear in 
the outlist Bout of any dependency. This means that the LTMS is not capable of non­
monotonic reasoning through the use of explicit references to missing information.
3.4.4.2 Propositions, Constraints and Dependencies
Given the LTMS is effectively a restriction on the JTMS, the most interesting aspect of it is 
the coding of propositions as constraints in the LTMS which are then turned into 
dependencies in the LTMS-IDN.
McAllester translates the standard connective into constraints on the values assigned to 
propositions in compound formulae or correlations between their values. This can be done by 
taking the definition of what a literal proposition means and turning it into conjunctive 
normal form. Thus the proposition "a and b" should be equivalent to the logical formula
aAb. Thus:
"a and b" <-> aAb = a a  b —» "a and b" s  "a and b" v  —<a v  —ib
= "a and b" —» a = (—Ta and b" v  a)
= "a and b" —» b = (-V’a and b" v  b)
which McAllester translates into a set of constraints in which at least one node/value pair 
must be satisfied in all states of the LTMS.
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(("a and b '\ t) ("a",/) ("b",/))
(("a and b",/) ("a", ())
(("a and b" ,/) ("b", t))
The basic action of the LTMS is to derive values for propositions having nil values when that 
assignment is the only possible way of satisfying an existing constraint. Thus in the example 
above, if the value of "a and b" = / ,  the value of "a" = t and the value of "b" = nil then the 
LTMS would assign the value/ to "b" in order to satisfy the first constraint.
In general each disjunctive constraint can be translated into a set of implications to 
capture this process of assignment, and these implications can in turn be represented by 
dependencies. Given a constraint with a set of positive formulae P = |p i ,..., pn), i.e. 
formulae that satisfy the constraint if true, and a set of negative formulae Q = {qi qm }, 
i.e. formulae that satisfy the constraint if false, then
((Pi. 0 .... (pn. t) (qi, 0  (qm> 0) s
{ Qt.P'f — »t Pi IP ’ = P \( P i} , ie  [ 1 ,n]} u  
l O '.-Pf—>f qj I Q '= Q \{ q j} , je  [l,m]J
For example
(("a and b", t) ("a",/) ("b",/)) =
("a and b"f,"a",—>f"b", "a and b"f,"b"t— >f"a", "aV 'b" ,—», ”a and b " 
(("a andb",f) ("a", /)) ■ ("a and b",— >t"a", "a"f— >f "a and b")
(("a and b" ,/) ("b", t)) = {"a and b",— >,"b", "b"f— >f "a and b" |
I define and(\, y, z) to be a function that returns exactly this set of dependencies with every 
occurrence of "a and b", "a" and "b" replaced by x, y, and z respectively.
We can use this method to derive patterns of dependencies to model the structure of
propositions that can be expressed in terms of subformulae and the connectives a , v , —i and
-*■ This can be done in any IDN that has a dependency type indicative of positive support 
(confirming evidence), and that has (or allows) nodes for a proposition and its negation. 
More importantly, we can show that the semantics of a set of dependencies encoding a 
logical connective corresponds to the semantics of that connective. E.g.
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Thm V {<N,D>, V} e C s.t. and{n, m, 1) c  D,
V(n) = t iff V(m) = t and V(l) = t.
3.4.5 Contradictions
TMSs are mechanisms to handle contradictions, but until this point there has been little 
mention of them in the reconstruction of the J-, A-, and L- TMSs. Before looking at the 
different ways to represent them, I want to consider how they occur and what happens when 
they do occur in normal logical theories, and in problem solving.
Formally, a contradiction is a proposition of the form "a v —ia" though informally, it 
can be used, say in the context of a problem solver or some theory, to mean it is not possible 
that two particular propositions are true at the same time (Collins Dictionary], The second 
case is an abstraction of the first though ultimately it leads to the first case. For example, a  
may contradict y given a  —» |3 and (3 —> —>y.
Similarly, there are two uses for contradictions which are closely related. The first is to 
exclude interpretations of a set of facts or theories that would derive a contradiction. So 
given the example above, one would not consider models of the theory (a  —> (3 and (3 —» —«y) 
in which a  and y were both true. Alternatively, if one were trying to construct a theory to 
model a particular set of known situations, the derivation of an inconsistency should lead to 
the abandonment of (parts of) the theory. More specifically, one uses contradictions to 
construct or prove theorems using reductio ad absurdum. Here the derivation of a 
contradiction is used to prove the negation of one of the axioms used in the proof” .
This distinction is reflected in the way the various TMSs represent and deal with 
contradictions. The ATMS uses them to exclude particular interpretations by labelling 
assumption sets as no-good and preventing these sets from being simultaneously believed. 
Both the J- and L-TMSs use dependency directed backtracking to retract, either 
automatically or via the user, one of the assumptions underlying the contradiction. Again, the 
LTMS uses a strict definition of a contradiction, being the simultaneous labelling of a node
ii Ol course this method of proof is not acceptable to ¡til e.g. intuitionist logicians and mathematicians.
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as both f(rue) and /false), whereas the JTMS uses the broader definition whereby any node 
can be designated a contradiction node, that contradiction occurring when the node is 
labelled in.
The way the three TMSs are implemented as IDNs demonstrates the various ways and 
levels at which contradictions can be defined. The JTMS-IDN operates both at the language 
level and the meta-level. Particular nodes are designated contradictions, which are different 
from normal nodes in that DDB is invoked when they are believed, thus giving a procedural 
semantics to contradictions which can also be viewed as meta-level objects as they change 
the underlying structure of the network. The LTMS-IDN operates at the interpretation level 
by having a particular value to represent contradictions, this value being assignable to any 
node. The ATMS similarly works at this level not through explicit reference, but by the 
removal of particular interpretations.
3.5 Gardenfors’ Postulates, the JTMS and IDNs
In Chapter 1 I presented Gardenfors’ postulates for belief revision and took issue with the 
coherence approach to belief revision that they seemed to support. In Chapter 2 I argued that 
TMSs provided the kind of functionality desirable for belief revision devices without 
reference to Gardenfors’ belief revision postulates (GBRP). Gardenfors [1988, p33-35] also 
considers Doyle’s TMS as a belief revision system but fails to analyse how the JTMS relates 
to GBRP. In this section I shall define what constitutes a belief state for an IDN in general 
and show how the JTMS fails to satisfy some of GBRP in particular, and what conditions are 
necessary for an IDN to satisfy GBRP.
As shall be argued in §5.0.1, admissible valuations are analogous to closed consistent 
interpretations of a theory represented by a given network. Therefore the set of belief states 
can simply be identified with the set of semantic structures:
C= ( {<N,I)>, V ) I N c :A£,I>CC, V e  PA(<N,I)>) ).
Gardenfors also requires a subsumption test or ordering for belief states (e.g 
K+3, K+5, K+6, K_2, K_5) which for simple belief states is the subset ordering. Given an 
ordering Son T'an ordering on C is defined with <<N,I)>, V> £  <<N',D'>, V'> iff <N,I)>
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q  <N',D'> and VneN. V(n) < V'(n). It should be noted that in order to capture the spirit of 
GBRP the ordering on V  should be a reflection of the degree of truth or belief in a 
proposition. Thus for the JTMS in < out, while for the ATMS 
{E, E J S I F ,  .... Fm}iffVE,3Fj .F jC E i).
The admissible valuation V s  VA(<N,D>) is a reflection of the structure of the theory 
represented by <N,D>, and also reflects the fact that changes in V can only be produced by 
changes in <N,I)>. Therefore epistemic inputs can only be made in terms of changes to the 
network except in the case of ambiguous networks. In the case of ambiguous networks, the 
construction of admissible valuations is governed by some policy determining which out of a 
possible set of admissible valuations should be chosen. This in turn defines a selection 
function, Sei.Pw(C)— >C (cf [Gardenfors 1988, p77]) on belief states so that a single state is 
selected from a set of possible states. Given a belief state 
K = <<N,D> , V> the expansion of K by dependency d is defined by 
Kj = Sel ( { « N ,D  u  {d}>, V'> I V ' e VA(<N,D u  {d }>)} )
Given this definition of expansion the postulates can be tested.
(K+l) Kj is a belief set:
JTMS - Kj is not necessarily a belief set - if TA(<N,I) u  [d|>) = 0  then 
<N,I) u  [d}> is uninterpretable. The classic example is an odd loop:
K = < < [a, b}, |a„ut— >SL.b) >. {(a, out) (b, in)) >, d -  b ln— >SLa 
VA( < [a, b |, [a,)Ut— *SLb, bin— >sLa| > )  = 0
IDN - This is guaranteed only if there are no uninterpretable networks, e.g. the 
ATMS.
<K+2) d € KJ:
JTMS/IDN - satisfied
<K+3) K c  KJ:
JTMS - This is a monotonicity condition on dependencies and given the JTMS 
contains non-monotonic justifications this is obviously false. E.g. for 
K = <<N,I)>, V> with <N,I)> = < (a, b[, {a,>ul— >sL.b) >. V = {(a, out) (b, in)),
KJ = « N ',I ) '> , V'> where <N \I)'>  = < [a, b ) , [— >sLa. a,)Ut— >st.b| > and
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(K+4)
(K+5)
( K + 6 )
V ' = {(a, in) (b, out)) so K £K j .
IDN - in general this condition holds only where every summation function is
monotonic. Therefore a monotonic JTMS satisfies this postulate but the ATMS
does not as an increase in the number of no-goods (through the addition of a new 
dependency) potentially decreases the node labels as supersets of the no-good are 
removed, 
a  e K => K£ = K:
JTMS/IDN - satisfied, as long as Kj is a belief state.
K c  H => K£ C H^;
JTMS - This is another monotonicity constraint and as before it fails for a non­
monotonic JTMS: if
K = < < {a, b), 0  >, {(a, out), (b, out)} >
H = < < (a, b), {— >sl3} >, ((a, in), (b, out)) >
d  =  a out— >SL&
then
Kj = < < (a, b), {aout— »SL.b} >, {(a, out), (b, in)) >
Hj = < < {a, b), {— >SLa, aoUt— >SLb) >. {(a, in), (b,out)) >
and K £  H but H+
IDN - Although the update does not have to be monotonic in order to satisfy K+5, 
i.e. Kj could be less than K, it does have to be order preserving i.e. Kj is less than
K* is minimal:
JTMS - this is satisfied by the JTMS but not by the JTMS-IDN unless it operates a 
policy of selecting minimal interpretations over cycles.
IDN - As with the JTMS-IDN, K+6 is satisfied iff the selection function picks 
minimal admissible valuations given a set of admissible valuations. If an IDN is 
guaranteed to produce a single admissible valuation for any network then the 
selection function is unnecessary and K+6 is again satisfied.
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Contractions are performed by retracting justifications, either under the control of the 
user or automatic revision procedures. As with expansions, there may be more than one 
admissible valuation of the contracted network and a selection function is necessary to 
determine what the contracted belief state is.
(K~1) KJ is a belief set:
JTMS - this is not guaranteed as the removal of a dependency may result in an 
uninterpretable network: K = < < (a), {— >sLa- «W— >sLa l >. Ka> "01 >, 
d = — »sLa and VA(< (a), (a ^ ,— >SLa> > )  = 0
IDN - as before, the only way this can be guaranteed is if there are no 
uninterpretable networks.
(K-2) K Jc K :
JTMS - this is parallel to the monotonic expansion postulate K+3 and is also 
unsatisfied by the JTMS:
K = < < {a, b}, {— >sLa. aout— >SLb} >, {(a, in) (b, out)) >
d = — >SLa
KJ = <<{a, b ) , (aou,— >SLb| >, {(a, out) (b, /«)}>
KJ ^K .
IDN - similarly, K~2 is satisfied only if all the summation functions concerned are 
monotonic.
(K~3) a ^ K = > K ^  = K:
JTMS/IDN - satisfied 
(K“4) / - a  ^  a  i  K^ [:
JTMS/IDN - no dependency is tautological (i.e. in every network in every belief 
state) and the postulate is guaranteed to hold as long as KJ is a well defined belief 
state.
(K'5) a e K ^ K c f g J :
JTMS/IDN - this succeeds iff there are no ambiguous networks or the addition of a 
dependency is governed by a selection function S et that deterministically produces
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a single belief state for any given network.
E.g. if K4(<N,D>k ) = {V,, V2}, V/4(<N,D>|q ) = {W,, W2) then 
<<N,D>Ki, W ,>J = Se/(Vlt V2) must equal Si?/(V!, V2) = « N ,D > Ki, W2>J
(K '6) |-  a  P => = Kp:
JTMS/IDN - there is no notion of logical equivalence for dependencies and so it is 
not possible to evaluate this criteria.
In addition to the postulates considered above, the principle of positive recoverability 
(PR), i.e. (Kj)J, was highlighted in Chapter 1 as a desirable property of belief revision 
systems. However, as with K_5, an IDN in general and a TMS in particular will only satisfy 
PR if the selection function Sel determines the result of the contraction deterministically 
from the set of possible belief states. I.e. for every set V)4(<N,D>) there is a preferred 
admissible valuation. This appears to be quite a pessimistic result but less strict than, for 
example, defining a total order of preferred belief states.
In general if the summation functions are all monotonic, every network is interpretable 
and ambiguous networks are consistently interpreted in the same way, then an IDN will 
satisfy Gardenfors’ belief revision postulates at the network level, i.e. when the desired 
changes or epistemic inputs to a belief state are specified in terms of changes to the 
dependency network.
However, the user may be more interested in getting the network to reflect certain 
values and in making changes at the valuation level. The obvious way to translate assertions 
of values for nodes into changes in a dependency network is to add the appropriate 
assertional dependency:
<<N,I)>, V>(+n,v) = «no d es,I) ', V'> 
where V ' e  V/4(<N',D'>), D ' = D u  (— \ n |
In the case of wanting to assert a value for nodes that previously had a nil value this is 
guaranteed success and if the IDN obeys K+ 1-6 at the dependency level then K+1-6 will be 
obeyed at the valuation level. If a node has a value V(n) = V| * nil then the addition of an 
assertional dependency — >Vj n may be insufficient to get V'(n) = v212. In this case it may
L It the set of values 'U is ordered and the node summation function is a maximising function then it is
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be necessary to revise the network by retracting existing support and then asserting a new 
value.
This is a reflection of the fact that support for a proposition is summed over all of the 
possible sources of support, and the assertion —>v, is not treated preferentially in assigning n 
a value. If an absolute assertion is needed, i.e. despite all other evidence or support n has 
value V2, then this ability must be built-in via the interpretation structure c'F', S >. This must 
be done with caution for if assertions are allowed to override existing evidence without 
actually revising the network in any other way there is a danger that counter-intuitive results 
will be produced.
For example, imagine an admissible interpretation of an IDN based on ATMS values 
where a node has a label {{A B) {C }}. Also imagine the user knows (either through 
observation or experience) that node should have a value ({D }), given the possible worlds 
represented by (A B), (C } and {D }. This discrepancy between the admissible value and the 
user’s perceived value indicates a mismatch between the structure of the dependency 
network and the user’s expectation. It would be more productive if that mismatch were 
addressed directly by changing either the assumptions, or the structure of the network, rather 
than compensating (through absolute assertions) for the mismatch. This means that the root 
cause of the mismatch is tackled, possibly rectifying other unobserved mismatches, rather 
than covered up.
Retraction of support is only possible by removing supporting dependencies from the 
network, be this done under user control or through automatic procedures. If the value to be 
retracted is specified by the user either directly or is indirectly a part of a revision then a set 
of dependencies to be retracted will be specified by a backtracking procedure. Having 
removed these dependencies in a manner transparent to the user so that the required value is 
retracted, adding an assertional dependency to reassert that value will in most cases result in 
a different belief. Even if the low-level retraction of dependencies obey K~l-6 there is no 
guarantee the high-level retraction of values will obey the postulates. In particular K~5 will 
not be satisfied unless retraction is the inverse of assertion.
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For example, take the following network and admissible valuation which as a pair 
constitute a belief state: <N,D>
V = ((a, in) (b, in) (c, in) (d, in))
Let <<N,D>, V>(-dln) = <<N',D>, V'>:
<N',D'>
Figure 3.5 (b)
V' = {(a, out) (b, out) (c, in) (d, out))
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Let («N ,D >, V>(-d,m))(+d,m) = « N " ,D "> , V">: 
<N",D">
V" = {(a, out) (b, out) (c, in) (d, in)) * V
Obviously, given V " * V, K~5 is not satisfied. However, looking at the dual property of 
positive recoverability, consider a (successful) assertion of a value v for n (i.e. n had a nil 
value prior to the expansion) through the addition of an assertional dependency —>vn- In 
order to successfully retract v this dependency must be removed and if the postulates for 
expansions and contractions are satisfied at the network level then positive recoverability 
will be satisfied.
In conclusion, in order to satisfy the Gaidenfors’ postulates at a network level an 
ordering must be defined on 1’ and the summation functions must be monotonic. 
Additionally, each network must be interpretable and have a single preferred admissible 
valuation if ambiguous. This guarantees satisfaction of all postulates as well as positive 
recoverability. However, satisfying all postulates at the network level does not mean that 
additions and retractions at the valuation level will also satisfy the postulates. In particular, 
unless retractions and expansions by the same value produce identical sets of dependencies 
to subtract and add to the network then K- 5 will not be satisfied. This is the result that was 
argued for in Chapter 1 when weighing the pros and cons of a foundations approach versus a 
inherence approach to belief revision.
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In Chapter 1 I introduce the notion of non-monotonic logics and in Chapter 2 I review TMSs 
as devices for implementing non-monotonic reasoning. In the light of the reconstruction of 
TMSs as IDNs and the definitions of entailment, I now want to look at the monotonicity, or 
otherwise of the resulting systems. Before doing this, I want to look at the sources of non­
monotonic behaviour.
To recap, 94(a) is defined to be the set of models of a, i.e. those semantic structures 
satisfying a , 94(a) = { S e C I S |= a  | where S |= a  if /(a, S) = true. A system is non­
monotonic (described in model theoretic terms) if 3 a , (3, y s.t. a  |= p but a , y /= P 
i.e. 94(a ) £  5tf(P) but 94(a, y) £  94($).
There are two potential sources of non-mononicity. The first is that models satisfying a  
and y together (94(a, y)) are not those that satisfy both a  and y individually. 
I.e. 94(a, y) * 94(a) o  5W(P) or more generally 94(a, y) c£ 94(a). So introducing y does more 
than just add a restriction on the models satisfying a , as is the case in monotonic logics. An 
example of this is Shoham’s work on preferences [Shoham 1988] where the models 
preferentially satisfying a  and y may not be a subset of those models preferentially satisfying 
just a.
Alternatively, the selection of models satisfying a  might not be independent of the 
interpretation of other propositions, i.e. 94(a) = /[!W(yi) ,..., 94(yn)]. An example of this is 
in non-monotonic logics that depend on fixed points. In NML-I | McDermott and Doyle,
19X0] a non-monotonic model of A is defined as a pair <V, S> where V is an interpretation 
of S s.t. Vp e S, V(p) = 1 [i.e. V is a (monotonic) model of S], and
S = Thm(A u  ASa(S)) where ASa(S) = {Mq I —>q i  S ] \Thm(A).
So 9f(a) is dependent on all of A, where A is some given theory.
Given standard IDN entailment over a network <N,D>, 94(a) = V e VA(<N',IV>) s.t. 
<N',I)'> e  £(<N,I)>) and i(a) = true. As M(a, y) c  94(a), and 9f(a) is independent of the 
interpretation of p, depending only on <N',I)'>, |=,r)N is a monotonic operation. This is 
highlighted by considering some theorems and non-theorems. If nin,m,,U|— >sl* were to be 
viewed as a non-monotonic inference of 1 from —>m conditioned on n then one would expect
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the following theorems
nThm nin,moUt— >Sl1. (n, in) |=n,N (1, in) and
nThm nin,moUt— >SL.l. (n ,»'«). (m. in) jS=,r)N (1, in)
However, this is not the case - consider an interpretation of the antecedents of the theorem 
where the dependency — >sLm >s added to the network - the antecedents for the first 
(non-)theorem are satisfied, yet the consequent is false.
In order to get a valid relationship between n and 1, given n,n,m<iut— >sl1 it is necessary 
to strengthen the antecedents of the theorem: 
nThm n ^ m ^ ,—>SL1, (n, in), (m, out) |=„)N (1, in).
This demonstrates the point that the non-monotonicity in an interpretation must come from 
some assumption about the default value of nodes as out. It is not possible to have the non­
monotonicity as a product of the entailment relationship.
3.7 Conclusion
Of the work contained in this thesis, the first two sections (§3.1, §3.2, and §3.3) expound and 
detail the core idea contained in the thesis: that each node should be assigned a level of belief 
that corresponds to the explicit support for that node. §3.1 articulates the semantics of 
support in an informal way and motivates the need for a formal semantics; §3.2 provides the 
basic definition of an 1DN in terms of a network structure with an interpretation mechanism.
Section 3.3 is more speculative and examines notions of entailment in an IDN in an 
attempt to show how the individual dependencies can be thought to represent entailments in 
a model theoretic sense. This section also explores some of the implications of, or reasons 
behind, certain approaches taken in the design of IDNs.
The remainder of the chapter looks backwards. §3.4 shows how the TMSs presented in 
Chapter 3 can be reinterpreted as IDNs, with certain provisos on the functionality replicated 
and added conditions on the admissible valuations so that they conform to the semantics 
(informal or otherwise) of the existing systems.
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Section 3.5 shows how Gardenfors’ postulates for belief revision (GBPR) can be 
applied at two different levels when talking of IDNs. At the network level there are strict 
conditions that must be met for the addition and retraction of dependencies to satisfy GPBR. 
Even if this is guaranteed this is insufficient for the IDN to satisfy GBPR at the interpretation 
level. At this level the changes of interest are in the valuation of a particular network and are 
brought about by changes to the network. Unless retractions and assertions map uniformly to 
changes in the dependency structure then GBPR will not be satisfied.
Finally §3.6 examines one of the surprising consequences o f IDNs: that non-monotonic 
inference, expressed in model theoretic terms, is not possible within the IDN framework. It is 
not possible to prove a relationship between two or more propositions, and have that 
relationship disproved by the addition of more evidence. However it is possible to prove 
relationships (i.e. one of support) between propositions, given that relationship includes 
explicit reference to missing or unknown information.
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Chapter 4: Construction of Valuations
The aim of Chapter 3 has been to lay the foundations for what follows in Chapter 4. In 
Chapter 3 I defined an Interpreted Dependency Network as a network of dependencies with a 
set of functions prescribing what valuations should be constructed. This interpretation 
mechanism forms the basis of a declarative semantics, based on admissible valuations, which 
is used to define several notions of entailment. This in turns supports the idea of networks as 
background theories with individual dependencies capturing particular inferences or 
entailments. Finally I show that existing TMSs can be reconstructed as equivalent (or near 
equivalent) IDNs.
All the discussion of semantics takes for granted the existence of the set of admissible 
valuations of a network, VA(<N,D>), without reference to how the valuations are 
constructed. This work will form the main body of this chapter. In particular in §4.1 I look at 
the construction of valuations for acyclic networks and in §4.2 for cyclic networks. In §4.3 I 
look at how different modes of reasoning can be interpreted as different ways of 
manipulating a network and its set of admissible valuations.
Before actually looking at the construction of admissible valuations I want to further 
examine why they are important. In particular 1 want to relate their properties to those of 
belief sets as outlined by Gardenfors [1988].
4.0.1 Admissible Valuations
As outlined in §1.2, Gardenfors defines a belief set to be a set of propositions that is closed 
under some inference scheme and consistent. Expansion, contraction and revision functions 
are defined as operations on belief sets, mapping one belief set to another given some 
epistemic input.
Admissible valuations are analogous to belief sets in the context of IDNs, being both 
closed and consistent. Viewing dependencies as inferences, when the value of the consequent 
does not correspond to that supported by the values of the antecedents, then we can view the 
dependency as a valid inference whose conclusion has yet to be asserted. Such valuations are 
not admissible because V(n) * VN(n ,V). For example, given two valuations V| and V2 
representing two belief sets before and after an inference is made:
1 2 0
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knowledge before (V]) inference knowledge after (V2)
a, a -» b a, a —> b |= b a, a —> b, b
(a. in) , (b, out) (a, in) , a — »sL.b I=<nj>» (b> in) (a, in) , (b, in)
V] (b) = out * in = ^ ( n ,  Vj) - Vi is therefore not an admissible valuation. This 
demonstrates how admissible valuations can be viewed as a closed set of inferences.
Similarly, admissible valuations can be viewed as consistent. They are internally 
consistent in that they do not violate the summation functions and can be viewed as obeying 
a set of truth functional composition rules. Additionally, given some external criteria for 
consistency, admissible valuations should not be labelled as inconsistent, be it by having a 
JTMS contradiction node valued as in or by having an ATMS no-good contained in an 
environment of some node’s label.
4.0.2 Theory Questions
Given the identification of admissible valuations both as interpretations of a set of 
information (represented by assertional dependencies) supported by a particular theory and 
as rational belief states, finding the admissible valuations is, as stated before, one of the main 
processes to be investigated in this thesis. There are other questions I wish to address that 
correspond to other modes of reasoning. Below I shall frame these questions both in relation 
to IDNs and give an intuitive reading of the problem. Where appropriate I will also refer to 
the belief revision criteria or operations as outlined by Gardenfors.
(.'Insure
01 Find the admissible valuations of a network,
= Given a set of propositions T find its transitive closure £, i.e. E s T  s.t. Cn(E) = £
= Given a background theory ( <N,I)> or T ) find its consistent closed interpretations.
Expansions
02 Given a set of dependencies D c ® ,  and a set of admissible valuations find
W (<N ,D uD >)
= Given a set of consistent closed interpretations of a given theory find the set of 
similar interpretations of an extended theory and/or set of observations.
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Contractions
Q3 Given a set of dependencies D g ® , and a set of admissible valuations KA(<N,D>), find 
TA(<N,D\D>)
= Given a set of consistent closed interpretations of a given theory find the set of 
similar interpretations of a contracted theory and/or set of observations.
Explanations
Q4 Given Vp, find Va e V/4(<N,D>) s.t. I VanV p I is maximal 
= find I j T  s.t. Cn(E) = Z and IE n  I is maximal
= Given a set of facts ( Vp or <t>), find the interpretation of the theory that is closest to 
or accords best with that set of facts.
Q5 Given Vp find the minimal D c ® a s.t. Vp e TA(<N,I) u  D>)
= Given a set of facts ( Vp or <J>) find the smallest set of additional assumptions (D or 
A) that has to be made to support that set of facts.
Of these questions: the first is addressed in §5.1 and §5.2 - the interpretation of acyclic 
and cyclic networks; the second, third and fourth are addressed in §4.3.1 - the forward 
propagation of changes; and the last two are covered in §4.3.2 - query or goal-driven
processing.
In general, we may not want or need all of the possible admissible valuations but may want 
to work within and maintain just one1. By restricting ourselves to single elements of 
K4(<N,D>), expansion (+) and contraction (-) operations can be defined so that they take a 
network, one of its admissible valuations and a set of dependencies to be added or deleted 
and return a new network and a single admissible valuation. As network/valuation pairs form 
the class of semantics structures we can think of these operations as being defined on 
C x Pw('D) — > c with
1 Even if that valuation has a possible worlds semantics and therefore represents more than one possible in­
terpretation at the sem;intic level.
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(<N,I)>, V)£ = (<N,I) u  D>, V') where V ' e KA(<N,D u  D>)
(<N,D>, V)5 = (<N,D \ D>, V') where V' e UA(<N,D \ D>)
If <N,D> is implied by the context it can be omitted from the equation so that (<N,D>, V)p 
becomes Vjjj. The following properties (introduced in §1.2.3.1) can then be defined:
Defn A valuation V is positively recoverable w.r.t a set of dependencies D (and a given 
network <N,D>) iff (Vj})5 = V.
Defn A valuation V is negatively recoverable w.r.t a set of dependencies D (and a given 
network <N,D>) iff (V5)d = V. 
and the following questions are interesting:
Q7 Under what conditions does ((£„)^) = E
= Given the interpretation of a theory, which is then extended by some premises, when 
does the removal of those premises return the interpretation to its original state?
QX Under what conditions does ((£„)<*) = £
= Given the interpretation of a theory, which has some information retracted, does the 
subsequent réintroduction of that information return the interpretation to its original 
state?
Gardenfors claims that this relationship should be valid for non-probabilistic belief revision, 
though I claim (see §1.2.3.1) that for all relevant or causal systems this cannot and should 
not hold.
The question about positive vs negative recoverability has already been dealt with in 
§3.5 and is only included here for completeness. If a  is a dependency, then positive and 
negative recoverability will only hold if all networks have a single admissible valuation, or 
failing that a selection function that always returns the same admissible valuation. If a  is a 
desired change in a node’s value, e.g. a  ■ "make n in", then positive and negative 
recoverability will only hold if the changes in the network needed to assert the appropriate 
value are the same as those needed to retract that value. Although this is easily managed for 
positive recoverability, the same is not true for negative recoverability.
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4.1 Interpretation of Acyclic Networks
The distinction between networks that allow cycles and those that do not is an obvious one 
to make. I make this distinction because the interpretation of the former is easier while the 
latter are much harder to interpret. This distinction can be made in a wide variety of 
knowledge representations, including some not explicitly defined in terms of networks. 
Having made this distinction, many of these representations expressly forbid cyclic 
networks, for much the same reasons that this distinction is made in IDNs, namely efficiency. 
Examples of such representations include:
• Stratified Databases [Apt and Pugin, 1987], a form of deductive database intended for 
non-monotonic reasoning that does not allow for recursion through negation;
• Knowledge Based Systems, e.g. through the avoidance of circular rules sets in ART 
[Nguyen 1987];
• Bayesian Networks [Pearl 1988] used for representing statistical causal models;
• Reason Maintenance Systems [Falkenhainer 1987] based on Dempster-Schafer belief 
revision; and
• Inheritance systems, e.g. frame-based systems.
In particular, Touretzky [1986] states
"All inheritance systems with which I am familiar require the inheritance graph to be 
IS-A acyclic"
citing reasons of computational tractability and semantic clarity, i.e. cycles lack a clear 
semantics. He claims generality for his system because he does not require networks to be 
acyclic, yet most of his "major theorems" (his term) depend on this, e.g. Thms 2.7, 2.11, 
2.13, 2.14. and corollary 2.9 [p209-210].
In the rest of this section I shall give an algorithm for calculating admissible valuations 
of acyclic dependency networks, and prove that it terminates having produced all possible 
correct answers, i.e. that the algorithm is sound and complete. Before actually doing this, I 
need to formally define "acyclic dependency networks".
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Defn pars{n) = ants(d) - the parent nodes of n
deD(n)
anci(n) = {x I 3 p, s.t. x e parsp(n) ( - the ancestors of n 
Defn A network <N,I)> is cyclic iff 3 n e N s.t. n e a/ics(n) 
otherwise a network is acyclic.
Defn For n,m e N n precedes m , n < m, iff n e ancs(m)
Alternatively n is said to be upstream of m, and in is downstream of n.
Given two sets of nodes N and M, N < M iff Vn e M, m e M, n < m 
Lem A network is cyclic iff 3 n,m s.t. n < m and m < n For an acyclic network, V n,m 
exactly one of the following holds:
(i) n < m
(ii) m < n
(iii) neither n < m nor m < n
4.1.1 Algorithm
The algorithm in this section basically works by doing a breadth-first calculation of values 
for nodes. The algorithm works by keeping for each node n e N a record in the array NP of 
the number of parents of n that have not had their values calculated. When all the parent’s 
values have been calculated, i.e. NP[n] = 0, then n has its value calculated using the 
appropriate summation functions applied to the values of the antecedents of n dependencies. 
These values are found in V which is used to store nodes’ values as they are calculated and is 
the resulting admissible valuation produced by the algorithm2. The consequents of n then 
have their NP reduced by 1. The nodes whose values are to be calculated in each iteration 
are stored in TC and during that iteration, the TC for the next iteration are stored in TCN.
The algorithm takes a network <N,I)> and a partial valuation VO. The partial valuation 
is used when calculating admissible valuations for acyclic components of a cyclic network
Noiice that V is only a partial valuation when calculating all but the last node but this has no effect on the 
calculation as all the necessary information is present. In any case. V can he converted into a total valuation 
simply by adding a nil value for all nodes whose values have yet to be calculated.
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and represents some previously derived values for root nodes of an acyclic component. For 
totally acyclic networks this is irrelevant.
Fiiitl-Acyclic-VAs(<N,D>, VO)
TC = 0  
for n e N do 
begin
NP[n] = Ipari(n) I
If NP[n] = 0 then TC = TC u  {n }
end
for (n, v) e VO do 
begin 
VIn] = v 
NP[n] = -1 
for m e consign) do 
begin
NP[m] = NP[m] - 1 
If NP[m] = 0 then TC = TC u  (m) 
end 
end
while TC / 0 d u  
begin 
TCN = 0  
for n e TC do 
begin
V = V u |  (n, V^fn ,V)) } 
for m e cons(n) do 
begin
NP|m] = NP[m| - 1
If NP|m| = 0 then TCN = TCN u
end
end
TC = TCN 
end
return {V>
{initialise}
{no. of parents to be evaluated)
{nodes to be calculated next)
{set up initial valuation VO)
{for each consequent...}
{reduce no. of parents to be evaluated) 
{set nodes to recalculate)
{main loop)
{for each node to be calculated ...)
{calculate value)
{for each consequent...)
{reduce no. of parents to be evaluated) 
{m ) {set nodes to recalculate)
In calculating the complexity I have assumed that pars and cons have already been 
calculated, either when the network was first constructed, or as and when new dependencies 
have been added, so that finding pars(n) or cons(n) are simple table look-ups. Each union 
operation is guaranteed to involve unique elements, i.e. there is no chance of repetition, so 
we can assume this is also a linear time operation.
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The initialisation process is of order N = IN L The number of iterations of the main loop 
is equal to the depth, i.e. the length of the longest path, of the network. This is irrelevant as 
we know the total number of operations without actually knowing when they are performed. 
To calculate V is N x [ 0( V^in, V) ) + 1], If the total number of parents of all nodes is
P= £  lparr(n)l
neN
then there are N + P subtractions from NP, and P tests for inclusion in TCN, and N resulting 
union operations. Finally there are 2D assignments each of the form TCN = 0  or TC = TCN. 
The dominant factor in all this complexity is the actual calculations of the values in V, giving 
an overall complexity of 0(NxM) where M = 0 ( V'N (n, V )).
Example
©
*
© © ©
V = {}
end of 
initialisation
NP = [0, 1, 1,2,0, 2]
Figure 4.1.1 (a) ©  ©
end of first 
iteration
© ©
Figure 4.1.1 (b)
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end of second 
iteration
Figure 4.1.1 (c)
(a) nil
Q> ©
V = {(a, nil) , (e, in ) , (b, in ) , 
(c, nil))
NP = [0,0. 0, 0 .0 ,0]
TC= {d, f}
V = {(a, nil) , (e, in ) , (b, in) , 
(c, n il) , (d. in ) , ( f , nil) }
NP = [0. 0, 0, 0, 0. 0]
TC = {}
4.1.2 Termination
Having given the algorithm, 1 want to establish three things: that the algorithm terminates 
and terminates at the right time; that the answer produced is correct, i.e. is an admissible 
valuation; and that the algorithm is complete, i.e. produces all the right answers. In the 
following, if X is a variable name then X* stands for the value of X at the start of iteration i.
To prove termination I need the following:
Defn A path p from n to m o f length l is a set of dependencies p = (dj ..... d[} s.t.
n € ants(di), m = c o /u (d |) , Vi, <Ym.v(d,) e  fl/ifi(d1+i) and Vi, com(d,) 4 ants(Af) for
j< i .
p is said to originate at n and terminate at in.
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Defn A node n is of depth d  iff I p I = d, where p is the longest path terminating at n 
Lem If node n is of depth k, then (i) Vm e pars(n), m is of depth k’ < k and 
(ii) 3p e pars(n) s.t. p is of depth k-1.
Proof (i) If 3m e pars(n) s.t. m is of depth > k, then there is a path p of length k’ > k 
terminating at m. As m e pars(n) 3 k e D(n) s.t. m 6 a/iis(d) and n = cons(d). 
So p’ = p u  {d} is of path terminating at n, of length k’+l > k, contradicting n being 
of depth k, so m must be of depth k’ < k.
(ii) If n is of depth d, let p be a path of length k terminating at n. If d  ^ is the last 
dependency in p with m = co/tifdk-i), then m e pars(n), the path p {dk | terminating 
at m is of length k-1, and m is of depth k-1.
□
I now prove the following result
Thm For a node n of depth k, V(n) is calculated at iteration k+1.
Proof By induction.
If k (the depth of n) = 0 then NP0[n] = 0 and V(n) will be calculated at the first 
iteration.
If k = i and we assume that all nodes of depth k’ < k are calculated at iteration k’+l 
then Vm e pars(n), given the depth of m < k (by corollary), V(m) has been 
calculated by the end of iteration k’+l < i+1.
So NPj+i [n| = 0 and V(n) is calculated no later than iteration i+1.
By corollary(ii) 3m e pars(n) s.t. depth of m is i-1.
Given the inductive hypothesis, V(m) is only calculated at iteration i so NP, fn| > 0 
and V(n) must be calculated at iteration i+1.
□
Given <N,I)> is finite then every node has a finite depth and the algorithm is guaranteed to 
terminate. Furthermore, as every node has a parent of depth one less than its own, TCj * 0  
for all i less than the maximum depth and the program only terminates when all nodes have 
had their values calculated.
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4.1.3 Soundness
Having proved that the algorithm terminates at the correct time we need to establish that the 
valuation produced is in fact admissible. From the above theorem (in §4.1.2) we know that 
the algorithm iteratively expands the valuation V until it is a complete valuation of <N,D>, 
i.e. V n e N V(n) is defined. We also know each node’s value is calculated only once - as n 
s TCN only once, as soon NP[n] becomes 0. This gives a series of partial valuations 
Vi c  V2 c  ,..., c  V,j where V(n) = Vj(n) = CN(n, V;_i) if n is of depth j. We can use this to 
prove the following theorem.
Thm The valuation V produced by the algorithm in §4.1.1 is an admissible valuation.
Proof If the algorithm is unsound then 3 n s.t. V(n) *  l/N(n, V).
Assume V(n) is calculated at iteration i so then V(n) = Vj(n) = ^ ( n ,  Vj_i).
If V(n) ^ V^fn, V) then Vlparj(n) * V j . ! ^ ) .
As values do not change once calculated, this can only happen if V(n) has not been 
calculated for some parent of n. But we know that all the parents of n are calculated 
before n.
So V,_,lpari(n) = V)parj(n) and therefore ^ ( n ,  V) = ^ ( n ,  V,_,) = Vj(n) = V(n) 
contradicting the assumption that the algorithm is unsound.
□
4.1.4 Completeness
Having shown that the algorithm terminates with a correct solution, i.e. it produces an 
admissible valuation, we want to show that it produces all possible correct solutions. This 
requires the following definitions and lemma.
Defn Given a function mapping one set of node names to another,/:N— >N', the image of a 
dependency d = A) ,..., Aq— >,c under /  is f [d ) = A'j ..... A'q— >t c where 
Vn e N, n e Aj <-»/(n) e A'j.
1 3 0
4.1.4 Completeness
Defn Given an isomorphism3/:N— >N', a dependency d is isomorphic to d ' under/ , written 
d =f d ', iff /id) = d'. Two sets of dependencies are isomorphic under / ,  
D =y D ' iff Vd e I), d e D <-> f(d) e D'.
Lemma (Isomorphic Parents)
Given networks <N,D> and <N',D'> and valuations Vi, V2 respectively, 
if D(n) =y D(m) for n s  N, m e N' and V p e pars(n), V] (p) = V2 (/ip)) 
then V'N(n,V,) = V'N(m,V2).
Proof As £>(n)=yD(m) then D(m) = {/(dj) /(d q)} for D(n) = {d{ dq )
where /(d i) = A,1 A'r for d ,= A ! Ar and A'j = {/iai) /(as))
for Aj = (a! .... as }.
As Vp e parson), V^p) = V2(/ip)) then Vak e Aj, V j(ak) = V2(/(ak)).
So VAj e dj, VA(Aj, V j)) = 5A(V, (a ,),..., V, (as))
= S,?A)(V2(/U i))..... V2(/(aq))) = KA(A'j,V2)) 
and Vd, e D(n), V°(di,V,) = Sd(Va(A1,V1) .... VA(Ap,V,))
= s d(v,a(a ' i ,v 2) .... va(a 'p,v 2)) = v Dm , ) y 2)
and therefore V^Cn, V,) = SN(VD(d !,V ,).... ^ ( d ^ V , ) )
= SN(V°(fid,),V 2) .... KD(«d)m,V2)) = ^ ( m .  V2).
□
Using this lemma the following theorem can be proved.
Ihm If<N,I)> is acyclic then I PA(<N,I)>) 1= 1.
Proof Assume that I V/A(<N,I)>) l> 1. Without loss of generality, 
let VA(<N,I)>) = { V,, V2 ) where V, * V2.
Let Nd = { n e N I Vi (n) * V2(n) ) and assume that Nd * 0 .
Given <N,D> is acyclic, 3 n e Nj s.t. parson) n  Nj = 0  **
i.e. Vm e par.v(n), V((m) = V2(m).
As V| and V2 are admissible, Vj(n) = ^ ( n ,  V |) and V2(n) = UN(n, V2).
Thus, by the Isomorphic Parent Lemma using the identity function as the 
Injection or 1-1 onto map]
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isomorphism, V^fn, = l^ fn , V2) and therefore V^n) = V2(n) and n ^ Nj 
contradicting **.
Therefore Nd is empty, V! = V2 and I VA(<N,D>)I = 1.
□
As our algorithm produces a correct answer, and it is the only answer, then the algorithm is 
complete. We also get the following, obvious and simple, corollaries which I shall discuss in 
further detail in §X.
Cor If <N,D> is unsatisfiable, i.e. I V'/4(<N,D>) I = 0, then <N,D> is cyclic.
Cor If <N,D> has multiple admissible valuations, i.e. I VA(<N,D>) I > 1 and is therefore 
ambiguous then <N,D> is cyclic.
4.1.5 Discussion
The above theorem, in §4.1.4, states that an acyclic network has just a single admissible 
valuation. This is an important result, above and beyond the fact that it proves the algorithm 
for interpreting acyclic networks is complete.
Given a particular network <N,D>, the extensions of that network 
£(<N,I)>) = (< N ,I ) |jD > ID c I )a,s.t. V n e N , |  D r»D (n)| < 1}
each have a unique interpretation so that there is an isomorphism between the assertions D of 
a given extension and the valuation that results. Thus the set of assertions that are added to a 
given background theory represented by <N,D> completely determines the interpretation of
that theory.
Additionally, the uniqueness of admissible valuations means any interpretation is both 
positively and negatively recoverable at the network level. If we mistakenly assert a 
proposition using d e I)a given some admissible valuation V, then the removal of d from 
<N.I) j^ D> given V’ will result in V again. Unfortunately, this useful result does not hold 
for cyclic networks as we shall see in the next section.
Finally, before going on to calculate admissible valuations for cyclic networks it is 
'niportant to look at the complexity of calculating acyclic valuations. In §4.1.1 it was shown
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to be of order O(NxM) where N = N and M is the complexity of calculating a single node’s 
value. For something like the JTMS-IDN which involves a set number of single operations 
over the antecedent set, M is merely linear in the number of antecedents and the overall 
complexity of system is less than 0(N 2) which is (as the consensus goes) significantly 
different than the NP-complexity proved for general TMSs networks [Elkan 1989] - i.e. for 
networks that are not restricted to having no cycles. For the ATMS-IDN this rises 
substantially. If an average dependency has n antecedents, each with lj environments in its 
label, then constructing the set of combined environments for the antecedents (i.e. the sets of 
assumptions that would satisfy all the antecedents) requires (in the worst case):
• 1' = 1] x ... X ln x set unions, each involving n environments;
• 1'! subset tests to produce 1" minimal environments; and 1" x m subset test to produce a 
set of consistent environments where m is the number of no-good (inconsistent) 
environments.
This complexity result at least in this area, vindicates the supposition made in §4.1 that 
cyclicity is a computationally expensive representation property. In the next section I hope to 
show just how expensive it actually is.
4.2 Interpretation of Cyclic Networks
Given the interpretation of acyclic networks is relatively easy, while the interpretation of 
cyclic networks is difficult (NP-complete), why would one want to allow cyclic networks? 
As mentioned in §4.1 many knowledge representation schemes freely do make this 
restriction because of the difficulties either of saying what cycles actually represent, or 
difficulties in actually reasoning with them.
In the next section I put forward some arguments for allowing cycles and give some intuitive 
ideas about the meaning of such cycles. In §4.2.2 an algorithm is presented that decomposes 
a cyclic network into a set of acyclic networks before interpreting them using the algorithm 
given in §4.1.1. Section 4.2.3 then goes on to look at the termination and complexity.
I inally in §4.2.4 I look at the soundness and completeness of the algorithm.
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4.2.1 Why Have Cycles?
There are at least three reasons for allowing cycles in patterns of inferences as represented by 
dependency networks, though they all reduce to a single argument. That is that cycles are 
naturally occurring phenomena and without them a representation technique lacks a certain 
expressive power.
There could be a direct correspondence between the value of two nodes. This could 
represent either an equality or equivalence as in V(a) = in iff V(b) = in and V(a) = out iff 
V(b) = out. Alternatively it could be a inverse relationship V(a) = in iff V(b) = out and V(a) 
= out iffV(b) = m.
Two separate lines of arguments could overlap to produce a cycle. For example, if 
Tweety is a bird and Tweety is a normal bird with respect to flying, then Tweety flies. 
Conversely and independent of the preceding statements, if Tweety flies and Tweety is a bird 
then Tweety is a normal bird with respect to flying.
Figure 4.2.1 (a)
Figure 4.2.1 (b)
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Finally there are situations where feedback occurs. A classic example being the case 
where an individual believes they are no good at a particular activity, this lack of belief in 
their ability leads to failure, and that failure reinforces the initial belief in their lack of 
ability. Structurally this is the same as the first example, but there is an added temporal 
dimension.
\
4.2.2 Algorithm
The algorithm for calculating admissible valuations for networks that include cycles has 
three distinct parts. The first task is to decompose the network into a partially ordered set of 
subnetworks (components) so that each subnetwork is either acyclic or strongly connected 
(i.e. for any two nodes n,m e  N there is a path from n to m in <N,D>). Strongly connected 
components are then converted to acyclic networks by generating a cutset and duplicating 
the nodes in it so that no cycles remain. Additionally, as values in a cycle can be self- 
supporting, the cut-points can be assigned arbitrary values and as long as they are equal to 
the resulting values of their doubles, those values will be supported and the valuation 
generated will be admissible. The arbitrary values for cut-points are produced by adding a set 
of assertional justifications, produced by the permute function, to the de-cycled component 
prior to interpretation.
Each component in turn is then interpreted using the algorithm presented in §4.1.1 with 
a check performed on each cyclic component to ensure that admissible valuations of the 
corresponding acyclic network are admissible valuations of the cyclic component. As each 
component is interpreted the resulting valuations are merged with the valuations from 
preceding components until a set of admissible valuations for the whole network has been
constructed.
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The basic algorithm for constructing admissible valuations is given below with the 
decomposition process explained in §4.2.2.1 and the interpretation of cycles explained in
§4.2.2.2 and §4.2.2.3.
Find-VAs(< N,D>)
VAs <— {0} initialise
Components, type <— Decompose-Network(<N,D>) 
for <N,Di^ j D> e  Components do 
begin
NVAs <— 0
if type(< N', I)'>) = "acyclic" 
then for V e VAs do
NVAs <— NVAs u  Find-Acyclic-VAs(N, 0 ,  V) 
else do
begin Start of
<N',D'>, C *— Decycle(<N ,D'>) Find-Cyclic-VAs
for I) e Permute(<N',D'>) do 
for V e VAs do 
begin
NVs <— F/wrf-Acyc/ic-VA.v(<N,I)^jD>, C, V) 
for NV e NVs do
If A d m is s ib le ^ ,  <N',D'>, C, V) 
then NVAs «— NVAs u  NV
end
end End of
if NVAs = 0  then return nil else VAs <— NVAs Find-Cyclic-VAs
end
return VAs
The code between "Start" and "End" of Find-Cyclic-VAs could have been defined as a 
separate procedure but has been kept in the main body of Find-VAs to improve readability 
and continuity. However, it is sometimes useful in what follows to use the term Find- 
Cyclic-VAs to refer to the procedure of de-cycling a cyclic component, permuting sets of 
assertional dependencies, interpreting the resulting acyclic network and checking the 
admissibility of the valuation.
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4.2.2.1 Decomposition of Networks
The purpose of the function Decompose is to take a network and return an order set of 
components corresponding to cyclic and acyclic components, along with a type specification 
for each component. The function works by first identifying all the strongly connected 
components and then ordering the components according to depth, aggregating single node 
components to form acyclic networks.
The generation of strongly connected components is a standard graph theory problem 
and can be solved using an already known algorithm, e.g. DFSSCC [Gibbons 1985, p 30]. 
This algorithm has complexity 0(max(INI, IDI)) for a network <N,D> and returns a list of 
component identifiers (this is an extension to DFSSCC but has no impact on complexity as it 
is merely linear processing of the output as it is generated). A function (indexed list 
structure) is set up to record which nodes are elements of which components: 
N(ci) = { n I CI(n) = ci) where ci = a component id; where Cl is an inverse function defined 
to label each node with the appropriate component id. Additionally, a component type label 
(T) is set to "a" (for cyclic) or "c" (cyclic) depending on whether a component has a single 
node with no loops to itself ("a") or not ("c").
Acyclic components are used as starting points for backward and forward depth-first 
searches (performed by the functions search-forward and search-backward) to identify all 
the nodes that can be aggregated to form a single acyclic component. Nodes in these 
components are then relabelled with the new acyclic component id taken from the starting 
acyclic components. As these searches are linear in nodes or edges and each edge and node 
is only used in a single search, this process will also be linear in the number of nodes.
Each component then has its antecedent (A(ci)) and consequent components (C(ci)) 
identified, along with the number of antecedent components that need to be ordered (TO) 
before a component itself can be ordered. This information is then used to identify the 
starting points for a breadth-first search and to control when a component’s order should be 
calculated. The breadth-first search is the same as the ordering algorithm for nodes in acyclic 
'aluation calculation and is therefore linear. This results in an overall linear time complexity.
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Decompose (<N,D>):
Component-ids IC, T, N <— DFSSCC(<N,D>) 
for ci e Component-ids where T(ci) = "a" and N(ci) * 0  do 
begin
search-forward(c\, ci) 
search-backward(ci, ci) 
end 
Q <—0
for ci e Component-ids do 
begin
TO(ci) <- 0 
for n e N(ci) do 
begin
for p e pars(n) do
if CI(p) d A(ci) then do 
begin
push CI(p) onto A(ci)
if TO(ci) = 0 then increment TO(ci) by 1
end
for p e chldip) do
if CI(p) d C(ci) then push CI(p) onto C(ci) 
end
if TO(ci) = 0 then push ci onto Q 
end
0 <- 0
while 0  * 0  do 
begin 
NQ<— 0  
for O e Q do
for cj e C(cj) do 
begin
TO(cj) = TO(cj) -1
if TO(cj) = 0 then push cj onto NQ
end
O f - O u Q  
Q<- NQ 
end
return O, T
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Search-fonvard(ci, aci):
for nci e C(ci) do 
begin
if T(nci) = "a" and N(nci) * 0  then 
begin
for n e N(nci) do CI(n) <— aci 
N(aci) *r- N(nci) u  N(aci)
N(nci) <— 0  
C(aci) <— C(aci) {nci}
Search-forward(nci, aci) 
end
if T(nci) = "c" then C(aci) «- C(aci) u  {nci} 
end 
return
Search-hackward(ci, aci):
for nci e A(ci) do 
begin
if T(nci) = "a" and N(nci) * 0  then 
begin
for n e N(nci) do CI(n) «— aci 
N(aci) <— N(nci) u  N(aci)
N(nci) <— 0
A(aci) <— A(aci) {nci)
Search-backward)nci, aci) 
end
if T(nci) = "c" then A(aci) <— A(aci) u  {nci} 
end 
return
It should be noted that the decomposition of the network and the de-cycling of components 
could be done together prior to calculating admissible valuations in contrast to the algorithm 
above. If the de-cycling is done prior to the calculating VAs then if the network is 
uninterpretable, i.e. some component has no admissible valuation, unnecessary work might 
** (l°ne However, if the de-cycling is done as a prelude to calculations it can be invoked 
only when necessary. For example, if an assertional dependency is added to the network then 
■he decomposition and de-cycling should not change (except for the addition of the new 
dependency) and it is not necessary to recalculate them.
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In the following sections the de-cycling, permutation and checking for admissible 
valuations will be explained.
4.2.2.2 Removing Cycles
In order to interpret a network <N,D> containing cycles, it is necessary to convert <N,I)> 
into an acyclic network <N',D'>. Given certain restrictions, admissible valuations of 
<N',D'> will be admissible valuations of <N,D>. This process is analogous to that of 
converting cyclic constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) into acyclic CSPs [R. Dechter and 
J. Pearl, 1987],
The removal of cycles is done by duplicating a single node n, henceforth called a cut- 
point, from each cycle and changing the dependencies attached to n, D(n), so that all the 
dependencies that were attached to n are attached to its double nn. Any admissible valuation 
V of <N',iy> that gives equivalent values for n and nn, i.e. V(n) = V(nn), will be an 
admissible valuation of <N,D> [see theorem in 4.2.3.1].
Finding cutsets, i.e. a set of cut-points4, in directed graphs is a well known problem in 
graph theory. Although the problem of finding a minimal cutset for any graph is known to be 
an NP-complete [Karp 1972], a linear time algorithm exists for finding minimal cutsets in 
reducible flow graphs [Shamir 1977].
A flow graph is a directed graph with a single root node, i.e. a node from which all 
other nodes are reachable. A reducible graph is one in which nodes can be successively 
merged together with a node being replaced by its single antecedent or parent. If there is 
more than one antecedent then the node cannot be merged, and if there are two nodes with 
multiple ancestors that form a cycle then the graph is not reducible. Another characterisation 
of non-reducible graphs is that there is more than one spanning tree of a network, i.e. the set 
°f edges traversed by a depth-first search are not guaranteed to be unique.
Cutsets are sometimes defined its sets of cut edges - i.e. the cycles are cut by removing edges rather than 
removing or duplicating nodes.
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This is the source of failure for polynomial algorithms attempting to find minimal 
cutsets, for although a cutset can be generated from any spanning tree in polynomial time 
(see below) it will not necessarily (in the logical sense) be minimal. Only if a single spanning 
tree exists is the cutset guaranteed to be minimal, and for arbitrary graphs of n nodes there 
can be up to nn_2 spanning trees (for a complete graph, due to Cayley [1857]).
The algorithm Decycle below is based on one presented in [Shamir 1977] for finding 
minimal cutsets in reducible networks. Decycle works by first traversing forward across all 
the dependencies in a network, treating each dependency d as a set of separate edges (a,c) 
where a e ants(d) and c = cons(d). Each edge is marked, M(a,c) = 1, as it is traversed, and 
can either be:
• a backward edge - if c has already been visited, V(c) = 1, and is above a on the same 
branch of the spanning tree, as represented by the stack B; or
• a dag edge - if c has not been visited or c is not on the same branch as a or is below a on 
the same branch (In which case (a, c) is respectively a tree, cross or forward edge - this 
distinction is however unnecessary).
If an edge (a, c) is labelled as backward then a is also labelled as the head of a backward link 
- H(c) <— 1. When a branch is being closed by popping a node n off the stack B, n is added 
to the current cutset C if it is an active head, where a head n is active given a cutset C if it is 
possible to trace a path forward over spanning edges from n to m avoiding C and (m, n) is a 
backward edge.
As each simple cycle (having only one node appearing twice) contains only one back 
edge it is only necessary to remove at most one edge per cycle. If a cycle has already been 
tut through the removal of some node (i.e. it is no longer active) then it is not necessary to 
remove the edge. Note - the third line of the algorithm chooses an arbitrary starting point for 
the depth-first search.
Having found a cutset, the cut-points are duplicated and the nodes that were previously 
attached to each cut point are transferred to the new duplicate node. So if d e D(n) then 
°w(d) is reset from nton ' .  This is denoted by adding d to D(n') and removing d from D(n). 
The network produced by making these modifications is returned along with the set of cut-
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points identified with their duplicate nodes.
Decycle(< N,D>)
M <- 0, V <- 0 
B <— 0 ,  C <— 0
for arbitrary n do push n onto B 
while B = do 
begin
a <— top(JZ)
if 3 c e cons(a). M(a,c) = 0 
then begin 
M(a,c) <— 1 
if V(c) = 0
then push c onto B 
else if c 6 B then H(c) <— 1 
V(c) <- 1 
end
else begin
if H(a) = 1 and Active^a, B, C, <N,D>) 
then push a into C 
pop B 
end 
end 
D< - 0  
for c e C do 
begin
c' = new node
0 ( 0  <— D(c) where D(c) = dependencies
0(c) <— 0  attached to c
push c ' into N and (c, 0  into D 
end
return <N,I)>, D
This algorithm has complexity 0(INI x IEI) where E is the number of distinct 
antecedent/consequent edges. This is because each head (of which there are potentially INI) 
must be checked to see if it is active which is done by traversing dag edges (of which there 
are potentially IEI), stopping if a cut-point is encountered). By clever labelling of nodes it is 
Possible to check for active heads in constant time, thereby producing a linear time algorithm 
f°r minimal cutsets for reducible graphs. However, as IDNs are not restricted to reducible 
graphs it is not possible to use a linear time algorithm to produce minimal cutsets. In this 
case, the minimality of cutsets is given up in favour of a linear time algorithm.
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ActiveX, B, C, <N, D>)
active <r- nil
S <— (a)
for a e S while active = nil do 
begin
T i— 0
for c e cons(a) while active = nil do 
if c = a
then active «— true 
else unless c e B or c e  C 
then push c into T
S<—T 
end
return active
Permute(V, N)
If N = 0  then return {()}
N' = ra//(N) 
n = heiul(N)
Ds = Permutei'U, N')
NDs = 0  
for v € V  do 
for D e Ds do
NDs = {— >vn kj D) u  NDs 
return NDs
4.2.2.3 Checking Admissibility
The basic task of checking that an admissible interpretation V of an acyclic network <N,I)> 
is admissible for the corresponding cyclic network is easy, given a set of node pairings D. 
The network is admissible iff for every pair of nodes (c, c') e D, V(c) = V(c').
However, it may be necessary to check other properties of admissible valuations for 
some other reason. For example, JTMS interpretations should not only be admissible, i.e. the 
salue of each node must be supported by the values of its antecedents, but also be grounded. 
This is equivalent to saying that a node’s value should not be self-supporting.
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4.2.3 Termination and Complexity
Termination is easy to prove. For a finite network there are a finite number of components 
that will be found by depth-first search. The upward and downward search to join acyclic 
components into larger acyclic components is also guaranteed to terminate as there as no 
cycles in the network of components and the search will eventually run out of components.
For each cyclic component the modified algorithm to find cutsets is also known to 
terminate, being based on depth-first search (on finite acyclic networks representing dag 
edges). The cutset produced will be finite and for a finite set of values, the number of 
possible starting valuations for the acyclic valuation construction function will also be finite. 
Finally, as shown in §4.1.2 the acyclic valuation construction is also guaranteed to terminate.
The complexity of the complete interpretation algorithm is also easy to calculate as this 
has already been done for most of the elements of the total algorithm.
The complexity of the depth-first search is of the order max(INI, IDI) which is the same 
for grouping the acyclic components and ordering them all. For a given cyclic component 
<N',D'>, the complexity of finding a cutset is 0(IN'l x  IDF) and the complexity of 
calculating an admissible valuation is 0(IN'l x 0 (1 ^ (n, V))) (for either a cyclic or acyclic 
component). However, the dominant factor in complexity is the number of admissible 
valuations that have to be calculated: for a cutset C^n'.d'» there are I T'l IC<N’,D,>I possible 
initial valuations. If there are no cyclic components or each one contains just a single cycle 
then the complexity is polynomial (given a polynomial order set of summation functions) - 
otherwise the complexity is exponential in the size of the cutsets.
42.4 Soundness and Completeness of Find-VAs
To prove the soundness and completeness of Find-VAs it must be shown that the admissible 
valuations of de-cycled (previously cyclic) components are admissible valuations of the 
corresponding cyclic components (i.e. the output of Find-Cyclic-VAs), and that the union of 
>he admissible valuations for each component is an admissible valuation of the whole 
network. To do this, I assume the correctness of Decompose, Decycle, and Permute (being 
either obvious or straight forward modifications to existing procedures) with the correctness
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of Find-Acyclic-VAs proved in §4.1.3 and §4.1.4.
4.2.4.1 Soundness and Completeness of Find-Cyclic-VAs
To prove that Find-VAs is sound it must be shown that admissible valuations of acyclic 
components (resulting from the cutting of cyclic components) are admissible valuations of 
the original components. To prove that Find-VAs is complete it must be shown that each 
admissible valuation of a cyclic component produces a unique valuation over a cutset of that 
component, as it is the initial valuation of the cutset that is used to calculate the valuation for 
the whole component.
Defn A gluing function g is a function mapping a set of nodes to a subset of those nodes, 
g:N'— >N, N 'cN s.t. Vn e N', g(n) = n.
If g(n) = g(m) for n * m then we say that n has been glued to m.
Defn <N',I)'> is a gluing of <N,D> iff 3 a gluing function g:N'— >N s.t.
Vd 6 D ,d e  D »  g(d) e N'.
Defn <N',I)'> is a cutting of <N,D> at n iff N ' = N u  {n '} where n 'd N and
D' = (D \D (n)) u  { A, .... Ap— », n ' I A, ......Ap—+, n 6 D }.
The function g:N'— >N is a gluing to recover <N,D> from <N,D(vjD>.
I hm If <N',I)'> is a cutting of <N,D> at c with gluing function 
g:N'— >N s.t. g"'(c) e {c, c'}
and V e  VA^N'.D'uD,,;») s.t. V(c) = V(c') where I)ac c  { — >v c I v e 'V }, 
then V IN e VA(<N,I)>).
Proof V n e N, n * c => D(n) = D(g~l (n)) so obviously D fn )^  i D(g~{(n)) and as 
V n e N ,  n # c = » V IN(n) = V(g~l (n)) and V IN (c) = V(c) = V(c’) then 
TN(n, V In ) = (^ (^ “’(n), V) by the Isomorphic Parents Lemma.
Given V is admissible (for <N',I)'>),
(n), V) = V0?_l(n)) = V IN(n) asj?-1(n) = n.
For n = c, £>(c) -  O(c') and KN(c, VIN)=  KN(c \ V) = V(c') = V(c) = V lN(c).
So Vn e N, VN(n, V IN) = V IN(n) and V lN is an admissible valuation of <N,I)>.
□
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Cor If <N',D'> is a cutting of <N,D> at a set of points C with a gluing function 
j?:N'— >N s.t. Vc e C, g"*(c)e {c, c'} and
V e s.t. V(c) = V(c') where c  { — >v c I c e C, v e V  ),
then V lN e VA(<N,D>).
Proof By repeated application of the theorem.
□
This corollary proves the soundness of Find-Cyclic-VAs.
Thm If C is a cut-set of <N,I)> then VVj, V2 € V/4(<N,D>),
V, = V2 <=> Vc e C, V, (c) = V2(c).
Proof
=> Trivially. V, = V2 =* Vn e N, V, (n) = V2(n) =* Vc e C, V! (c) = V2(c).
<= Let Nd = { n e N I Vj (n) * V2(n) }.
Given Vc e C, V] (c) = V2(c) then Nd n  C = 0  and Nd contains no cycles.
Therefore, assuming Nd *  0 ,  3 n e Nd s.t. pars(n) n  Nd = 0  **
i.e. Vm e pars(n), Vj (m) = V2(m).
As V] and V2 are admissible, V](n) = VN(n, Vj) and V2(n) = VN(n, V2).
Thus, by the Isomorphic Parent Lemma using the identity function as the 
isomorphism, PN(n, V |) = V^Oi, V2) and therefore Vj(n) = V2(n) and n 4 Nd 
contradicting **.
Therefore Nd is empty and V! = V2.
□
This proves the completeness of Find-Cyclic-VAs. Having cut <N,I)> to produce <N',D'>, 
each guess generated by Permute will produce an unique admissible valuation (using Find- 
Acyclic-VAs) of <N',I)'>. This valuation will also be an admissible valuation of <N,I)> if it 
ls consistent over the cut-points (which is checked by Admissible).
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4.2.4.2 Soundness and Completeness of Find-VAs (again)
Having proved that each procedure is sound and complete, 1 now show that the union of 
valuations of the components of a network results in an admissible valuation of that network. 
Defn A function g:N'j u N ' 2— >N is a composition function from  <N],Di> and <N2,D2> 
to <N,D> iff
i )  N', c N i ,  N'2 c N2
ii) g I is-, and g I js'2 are isomorphisms
iii) g is surjective [onto - covers N]
iv) If Gj = { n e Nj I 3m e N2, g(n) = j?(m) } and
G2 = { n e N2 I 3m e N ,, g(n) = g(m) }
then GiU[ u  itesc(n)] n  u  ancs(nJ = 0  
L n € G ,  J  L n e G ]  J
and u  tfcrc(nN n  G2U[ u  ancs(n)] = 0 .
L n e G 2 J  L n e G 2 J
Gi and G2 are called the joining sets of Ni and N2 respectively.
Defn Given a composition function g, <N,D> is a downstream composition o f <N2,D2> 
with <N ,,D ,>, written <N,D> = <N2,D2> +>g <Nj,Di> iff
Vn e N, if 3m e Nj, p e N2 s.t. g(m) = g(p) = n then D(n) =g Z5(m) otherwise 
D(n) - g D(g~l (n)).
Ihm Given <N,D> = <N2,D2> +>g <Nj ,D] > for composition function g:N'i u N '2— >N, 
and V, e K4(<N, ,1), >) and V2 e VA(<N2,D2>),
ifVns N '|,m e  N'2, g(n) = g(m) =3 V2(n) = V2(m) then V e  VA(<N,I)>) 
where V = { 0?(n), V ^ n jln e  N j ) u  [ 0?(n), V2(n)ln e N'2 }.
Proof Given the statement of the theorem,
Vn e N '|, V](n) = V0?(n)) and Vn e N '2, V2(n) = V(g(n)).
So, Vn e N, if 3m e N'j s.t. g(m) = n then V| (m) = V(n) and 
Vp e pars(m), p e N', ,5 g(p) e pars(n) and V! (p) = V(g(p)).
Given this, and as by definition D(m) =x D(g(m)), the Isomorphic Parents Lemma can
otherwise 3d e D(m) s.t. g(d) is undefined, D(n) ;irc not isomorphic to D(m), ¡ind g is not a composition
■unction.
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be applied, so V^fm, Vj) = ^ ( n ,  V) and given Vi is admissible,
V(n) = V](m) = V^fm, V,) = KN(n, V).
If i  n ' e N'i s.t. g(n ') = n then 3 m e N'2 s.t. g(m) = n [as g is onto].
So, repeating the argument as above [replacing V] by V2 and N', by N '2]
V(n) = V2(m) = V^On, V2) = KN(n, V) and Vn e N, V(n) = V ^n, V).
Therefore V is an admissible valuation of <N,D>.
□
This result proves the correctness and completeness of Find-VAs as follows.
Decompose produces an ordered set of components <Ni, I ) |> <N], Dj> s.t.
<N,D> = <Nj, Dj>+>S| +>Xl_, <N[, D]>. The valuations of <N,D> are produced
incrementally using the partial valuations of <N,D> that cover the first n components, VAn = 
(V] ,..., Vm). Each V; 1^ generates a set of assertions D„+i,i c  cDa that are added to 
«Nn+j, Dn+i> so that each admissible valuation Vj of <Nn+i, Dn+1uD„+[ i> agrees with V,
over [ u  N,[ n  Nn+1. So by the theorem V, u  V. is admissible over the first n+1
i e l l . n )
components and by induction the total valuations produced on termination are admissible for 
<N,I)>.
As Find-Acyclic-VAs and Find-Cyclic-VAs are known to be complete, then the resulting 
set of valuations
VAs = ( V, u  ... u  Vk I e VA(<Nj, D juD V t»).
D',_, = [ — >v n i n e  Nj n N j.,,  v = Vi_,(n) }, D'0 = 0  } 
is guaranteed to be complete.
T2.5 Odd I.oops and Uninterpretable Networks
A known problem with the JTMS is the existence of uninterpretable dependency networks. 
Such networks contain cycles that include an odd number of non-monotonic dependencies 
li e. dependencies having out-nodes) and have acquired the name of "odd loops"6. They are
This problem does not arise in non-monotonic ATMSs because the approach used does not involve non­
monotonic justifications. nor cycles in the network - for further details see $5.1.
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analogous to the Liar’s paradox, "This statement is false" or "P is true iff P is false". 
Correspondingly, a cycle containing an even number ( >0 ) of non-monotonic dependencies 
are called "even loops".
Given a network < {n }, {{n}out — >sl n ) >, if V(n) = out, then VN(n, V) = in and if 
V(n) = in, then KN(n, V) = out. No valuation of such a network is going to be admissible. 
When we cut the network to produce < {n, n'}, {{n}out — >sl n'} > the valuations produced 
do not give consistent results for n and n'.
By excluding networks that contain odd-loops one can make sure that all networks have 
at least one admissible valuation but Goodwin [1987] concludes that
"it is not natural to permit even loops and encourage the programmer to use them
deliberately to code arbitrary choices, but to forbid the use o f odd loops" 
for the use of even loops naturally leads to the creation of odd loops. The conclusion to be 
drawn from his work is that no non-monotonic dependencies should be allowed to occur in 
cycles.
This solution is not at all satisfactory from the point of view of the expressiveness of 
dependency networks - by Goodwin’s own admission both odd and even loops are naturally 
occurring or intuitive structures. This point is highlighted in §5.2 on default logic where 
cycles are again seen as naturally occurring phenomena.
Furthermore, the presence of odd loops in a network is insufficient to make a network 
uninterpretable. For example < [n], {(n(out— >sl n- — >sLn l >• As n has independent 
support, i.e. has a valid dependency other than the odd loop, the valuation 
V = {(n, in) I is admissible. Thus we can see that though a network may contain odd loops 
those loops may not prevent an admissible valuation from being constructed.
Odd loops are a problem for previous JTMS-style algorithms for two reasons: they may 
cause non-termination; or they introduce multiple solutions resulting in the random choice of 
just a single solution. By constructing admissible valuations through stratification, de-cycling 
and consistency checks on the resulting valuations, termination is guaranteed (and at the 
earliest possible time when no solutions exist) and multiple solutions obtained as required (or 
n°t as the case may be) with no restriction on the type of network allowed.
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Finally, IDNs are presented as a general tool or technique. As such, any 1DN system 
that is created may generate uninterpretable networks. However, it is not necessary to 
discover characteristic properties of such networks in advance. If any network is 
uninterpretable the algorithm presented will discover this. If this is the case then for every 
possible set of assertions added to the cut-points of the cycles, the resulting valuations will 
be inconsistent over some cut-point and its double, i.e. V(c) * V(cO. This demonstrates the 
flexibility of the IDN approach.
4.2.6 Moditications to the Interpretation of Cycles
The algorithm given above will calculate all possible admissible valuations of cycles. This 
may not be what is required. If cycles represent equivalences, then one might want to make a 
minimal commitment and guess nil values. This is the desired result in the J- and ATMSs 
where a self-supporting cycle is undesirable. For example, the network
< (a b c d}, {ain — >SLb, cin — >St.d, bin — >SLd, din — >sLb 1 > 
has valuations
Vi = ((a, out), (b, out), (c, out), (d, out) )
V2 = {(a, out), (b, out), (c, in), (d, in))
but only the first is grounded in the JTMS, i.e. has a non-circular set of dependencies 
supporting each value.
Different approaches may be more suitable in different cases. For the ATMS it is 
sufficient to choose minimal admissible valuations. This can be done by using a nil 
interpretation for all cut-nodes. The values assigned to the duplicate nodes can then be used 
as a second guess for the cut-nodes and the resulting admissible valuation of the acyclic 
component will also be admissible for the cyclic component.
In the case of the JTMS a node’s value is not self-supporting if it is nil, or if it is part of 
an even non-monotonic cycle. This can be tested with a modified ATMS-type algorithm. 
Uiven a valuation V of root nodes (those with no antecedents) a modified valuation V' is 
constructed where V'(n) = {{n }} if V(n) = in and V'(n) = out if V(n) = out. The summation
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function for +ve antecedents and for the node level (SN) is as for normal ATMS 
dependencies (see §3.4.3) with the following additions and changes:
• any outs in a label L can be discarded unless the whole label consists of outs, in which 
case L = out;
• any ins contained in an environment E can be discarded, unless all elements are ins, in 
which case E = in;
• if there is an environment E, equal to in in label L then L = in;
Using the following set of summation functions for SL-dependencies:
SL
Sin (V l Vn )  = out i f f  B i.V i = out
= S£+Ve(v'i v 'n) otherwise 
where v'j = {{}} if vj = in, v', = v, otherwise
SL
S„ut(V[ vn) = in iff Vi.V* = out 
= out otherwise 
A (V, , V2) = out iff V2 = out
= in iff {) e vi and \ 2  = in 
= vi otherwise
each duplicate node d ' in the acyclic component will end up with one of the following
values:
in representing a grounded value in; 
out representing a grounded value out; or 
an ATMS type label L.
In the last case, d ' has a grounded value of in iff there is an environment E e L where all the 
nodes in E have a grounded value of in. This can be checked by recursively substituting in 
for cut-nodes whose duplicate nodes have a value in, bearing in mind the equivalence rules 
above. If a point arises where no more substitutions can be made and there are still ATMS 
labels assigned to nodes then the valuation is not grounded, 
l or example, consider the partial admissible valuation of a cut acyclic component:
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V(a') = in, V(b') = in, V(cO = {(a) (b d ) }, V(d') = {{c}}
Substituting in for a, V(c') = | {/«}} = (in ( = in. Recursively substituting in for c, V(d') = in 
and the admissible valuation V(a) = V(b) = V(c) = V(d) = in is grounded.
If V(c') did not contain {a) then in could be substituted for b giving 
V(c') = {{a} [in d}} = {{a }{d }}. However, no more substitutions can be made and therefore 
the admissible valuation is not grounded.
The need for a special purpose approach is even more appropriate when the set of 
values being dealt with is infinite, e.g. probabilities or certainty factors are real numbers in 
the range [0,1], In such cases it is impossible to enumerate all possible guesses and 
admissible valuations. Even if the values were restricted to a certain precision so that the set 
of values becomes finite, i.e. 2 decimal places in the range [0, 1] gives 100 values, the 
computational cost of enumerating all such guesses and finding all admissible valuations 
would be computationally intractable without this approach.
In some cases the admissible valuations of cycles cannot be created using summation 
functions (e.g. for probabilistic TMSs fFalkenhainer 1987]). In such cases special purpose 
algorithms may be needed, or alternatively the cycle can be treated as a single node thus 
allowing an approximation to an admissible valuation to be calculated.
4.3 Methods of Reasoning
As stated in Chapter 1 this thesis is concerned with the process of changing one’s view or 
interpretation of the world with respect to a given theory about the world. Whereas logic is 
primarily concerned with theoremhood or deriving relationships between propositions as 
embodied by queries in logic programming, IDNs are concerned with establishing 
consequences of a set of axioms - i.e. what follows or can be derived in a given situation. 
Above and beyond that, IDNs are concerned with the changing status of information as those 
axioms, premises or assumptions change.
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 have been concerned with the interpretation of networks without 
reference to any existing valuation, something that is required if IDNs are to be viewed as 
declarative knowledge representations divorced from programs that interpret them. This
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process is akin to constructing an interpretation of a given theory and was the first of the 
theory questions on the list in §4.0.2 to be addressed. The following section looks at other 
ways of interacting with such a theory, given an existing interpretation.
4.3.1 Data-Driven Processing - Propagating Changes
Many reasoning tasks are incremental in nature and involve a dialogue between a system and 
the user of that system. In general, assumptions may have been made that are revoked at a 
later date, more information may have been asserted or previous information may become 
outdated. It is the need to maintain an up-to-date interpretation of information that led to the 
development of TMSs and it is this idea that forms the basis of IDNs.
If a system works in a changing environment or produces changes to its environment 
(i.e. information cannot just be accumulated and then have its status or "validity" remain 
unchanged) then the value attached to each datum must be continually supported by evidence 
to support that value. In classical logic for example, the emphasis is on deriving implicit 
information from explicit axioms but is less concerned with what happens when the explicit 
axioms change.
This can be clearly seen in the relationship between non-monotonic logics and TMSs. 
Take McDermott and Doyle’s logic |1980| that uses a modal operator M to denote 
consistency where Mp is true iff —.p is not true. Consider the classic bird example consisting 
of the theory where all birds fly unless it has been proved otherwise, and all penguins are 
birds and all penguins don’t fly.
T = ( Vx b(x) a  Mf(x) —> f(x), Vx p(x) —> b(x),
Vx p(x) ->-,f(x)}
Given Tweety is a bird, i.e. a set of facts S = {b(t)}, then the logic can be used to 
construct a minimal fixed point, TH(SuT), representing the non-monotonic theorems that 
includes the "assumption" that it is consistent that Tweety flies Mf(t), and proposition that 
Tweety can in fact fly, f(t). If S is expanded to include the fact that Tweety is a penguin. S ' 
~ (bit), p(t)(, then TH(S'uT) contains neither Mf(t) nor f(t) due to the presence of —if(t) in 
■he (monotonic) theorems of S 'uT.
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So the logic tells us what propositions are or are not theorems given some set of 
axioms, but does nothing to tell us how to derive a new fixed point from an old one. For this 
we need a mechanism like a TMS or an IDN to record derivations and update the validity or 
truth value of propositions as the validity of its derivation changes.
In previous sections the construction of interpretations was examined - in this section 
the process of updating interpretations given changes in the underlying network is examined.
There are four ways of characterising changes to a (IDN) dependency network: 
additions or deletions of normal or assertional dependencies. Changes to assertional 
dependencies indicate changes to the known or asserted facts or beliefs, while changes to 
normal dependencies indicate a change in the structure of an underlying theory. The 
distinction between changes in assertions and changes in normal dependencies is important 
for the latter may lead to changes in the decomposition of the network while the former is 
guaranteed to leave the decomposition intact.
It is the computational expense of calculating cutsets for cyclic components, along with 
the cost of constructing valuations from guesses of cut-point values, that dominates the 
complexity of finding valuations of cyclic networks. Therefore, changes to the network that 
leave the cutsets unchanged result in updates of at least half the cost of those that do not. 
Assertional updates fall into this category and it is only the addition or deletion of 
dependencies that adds new links between different components that necessitate the 
recalculation of the decomposition, and only those that add new cycles that necessitate the 
calculation of new cutsets. This only occurs when a dependency is added that links a 
previously downstream component to an upstream one.
Given a recalculation of the decomposition and cutsets as necessary, the actual 
interpretation must be updated. There are two obvious ways to approach this. The first is to 
recalculate admissible valuations of the subnetwork consisting of all the descendents of the 
node whose attached dependencies have changed. The second is to only recalculate the 
values of nodes where it is known that at least one antecedent node’s value has changed.
The first is a simple approach, known to be exponential in the number of cut-points and 
’he size of any cycles, and linear in the size of acyclic components. However, values do not
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have to be calculated at each node as no change may have occurred in the parent nodes’ 
values. When calculating V ' from V, if V'(n) = V(n) for all n e ants(m) then V'(m) = V(m). 
This approach is guaranteed to be correct by the gluing theorem (4.2.4.1). The second is 
attractive in offering a chance to reduce the complexity, but must be approached in the 
correct way for otherwise the worst case complexity can be increased by introducing the 
opportunity to do unnecessary recalculations.
4.3.1.1 Incremental Updates
The easiest way to incrementally update a valuation of an acyclic network is to maintain a 
list of nodes or an agenda7 where one of that node’s antecedent’s value has changed and 
only recalculate values for nodes on this list. Having taken a node from the front of the 
agenda and recalculated the value, if the value is different from the previous value then the 
consequents of the node should be placed on the agenda. When the agenda is empty then 
there are no more values to recalculate and all the necessary values have been recalculated to 
produce a new admissible valuation. However, it is important that the agenda is ordered in 
the correct way. For example, consider the network below and the addition of — to a-
If the updating is done in a depth-first manner with new nodes added to the front of the 
agenda we could get the following:
7 to use the Al flavoured synonym of queue
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valuation
a b c d agenda
out out in out a
in out in out b c
in in in out d c
in in in in c
in in out in d
in in out out _
The unnecessary changing of d from out to in and back to out could cause a ripple of 
unnecessary changes to propagate throughout the descendents of d (if any exist). Similarly, 
networks exist that produce similar behaviour when using breadth-first recalculation. It is 
only by ordering the recalculations according to the depth of the nodes that this problem is 
avoided, thus making sure that in the example, the value for b is calculated before that of d.
The updating of cycles is not as efficient compared to acyclic networks, as the normal 
cycle of guessing, construction and checking valuations must be carried out. However, the 
previous valuation provides a good initial guess so that if updating terminates half-way down 
the acyclic dual then the resulting valuation is admissible. This then gives us a useful 
heuristic for calculating admissible valuations for cycles. If a guess results in an inconsistent 
match between cut-nodes then use the resulting valuation as the new guess, if it has not been 
used before. This suggests another way of constructing admissible valuations for acyclic- 
networks. Rather than recording when all a node’s antecedents have been calculated, and 
then calculating the node’s value, all the nodes could be ordered according to their depths 
and then be calculated in that order.
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algorithm
label nodes with depths (or update labelling)
initialise agenda
loop: until empty agenda
remove first node from agenda
recalculate value of node
compare old and new values
if values different add consequents and reorder agenda
This method compares with those of Doyle [1979] and Goodwin [1987] which also 
determine the set of nodes, the disturbance set, whose values might change, and only 
recalculate values for those nodes. Their methods rely on supporting justifications and 
supporting nodes. These are the dependencies and nodes that currently support the node’s 
value and only if their values change will that of the supported node change. So when an 
addition or deletion is made to a node’s set of attached dependencies, D(n), the affected 
consequents are those consequents of the node which have n as a supporting node and the 
disturbance list is just the transitive closure of the affected consequences.
The method presented here is different in two respects: it does not use the concept of 
supporting nodes and justifications; and it calculates the disturbance set iteratively in the 
course of creating the new valuation. The first means that it is (potentially) less efficient for 
summation functions where not all of the attached dependencies are needed to support a 
particular node. This results in unnecessary calculations being done when the changed 
antecedents don’t belong to the supporting nodes. However this may lead to nodes being 
included in the disturbance set when alternative supporting justifications exist and their 
values will not actually change1*. This coupled with the fact that the disturbance set is not 
calculated iteratively in the JTMS means that many nodes will be included in the disturbance 
set when they should not have been.
* Note that although the values may not actually change it is necessary to update the supporting nodes and
justifications.
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The construction or updating of admissible valuations are essentially data-driven operations 
in that values calculated for upstream or antecedent nodes are used to calculate values for 
downstream nodes or consequents. There is a range of behaviour that occurs in AI systems 
that is the opposite: processing starts at some consequent and proceeds backwards attempting 
to find or allocate values to antecedents. Examples of this backtracking behaviour include 
abduction in logic, backward chaining expert systems, and contradiction resolution in TMSs, 
be it explicit as in the JTMS’s dependency directed backtracking or implicit in the case of 
the ATMS’s "no-goods".
In this section I shall look at some existing work in explanation and backtracking and 
attempt to show how backtracking algorithms can vary and what information is needed to 
implement such algorithms. This will facilitate the design of backtracking algorithms but in 
itself this section cannot give specific algorithms to solve specific problems.
Abductive reasoning is characterised by the following type of reasoning: a  —> p, P |= a. 
This is unsound in classical logic but has an intuitive appeal in the everyday world. This 
approach to reasoning has been much studied in AI or more specifically, non-monotonic 
reasoning. In particular Reiter and de Kleer 11987) present a method for providing minimal 
explanations for propositional clauses (consisting of a disjunction of ground literals) while 
Poole |1989] looks at explanations for observations in a default system and the different 
results produced by minimising the number of assumptions, abnormalities and/or 
implications.
Forward chaining expert systems work by matching facts in the working memory with 
the antecedents or left hand side of rules, as modelled by the addition of assertion 
dependencies and updating valuations in IDNs (see Chapter 6 for more details). Backward 
chaining systems match goals or queries with the right hand side of rules, and then use the 
!eft hand side of such rules as new subgoals. Processing proceeds until either subgoals match 
with known facts or designated subgoals, or facts are reached where questions are asked to 
obtain such information.
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Finally, in contradiction resolution, when a contradiction is detected, the source(s) of 
that contradiction must be identified so that the derivation of the contradictory information is 
blocked. In the JTMS this is done by explicitly traversing up the network to find non­
monotonic links that support the contradiction, while in the ATMS the graph is not actually 
traversed as each node’s label records the assumptions underlying its derivation, but these 
nodes should form the starting points for the removal of no-good environments from each 
node’s label.
As the examples show, most backtracking algorithms could or should be followed by a 
period of forward processing. Having obtained a possible explanation or set of propositions 
supporting observed phenomena, the explanation should be asserted to see what other 
consequences follow, highlighting further information that could confirm or disconfirm the 
hypothetical explanation. So if Tweety is a non-flying bird then Tweety is an abnormal bird 
with respect to (the general property of) flying9. Looking for possible sources of 
confirmation of this (independent of Tweety’s inability to fly) might generate the possible 
explanations that Tweety is a penguin and/or Tweety has a broken wing and/or Tweety’s feet 
are set in concrete! Asserting that Tweety is a penguin leads to support for Tweety having 
flippers and if this generates a contradiction at a later date then the assumption of Tweety 
being a penguin will be revoked.
In the JTMS, having found a possible culprit responsible for a contradiction, that 
assumption is retracted, and the valuation updated to see if the contradiction is removed. 
Failure to achieve this results in another culprit being selected. The persistence of 
contradictions after backtracking is the result of three factors: the recording of only one of 
possibly many supporting justifications means that valid but previously hidden justifications 
nay still support a contradiction: the process of checking that culprits are actually 
responsible for the contradiction is an approximate one10; but more seriously, the removal of
This statement of abnormality is with respect to a certain property and relies on the fact that the property in 
question is a property that applies to the larger class. E.g. birds fly. Tweety is a bird that doesn't fly. so Tweety 
is abnormal w.r.t. the class of birds that do fly, i.e. w.r.t to flying. It is not a statement that Tweety is abnormal 
bwause he flies (for he doesn’t!).
Both these are implementation issues and can be resolved by adopting the IDN approach of "summing 
support".
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a culprit assumption may make previously invalid justifications valid. This problem can only 
be addressed by looking at entailment relations rather than working (i.e. backtracking) within 
a particular interpretation, although more sophisticated backtracking algorithms can remove 
some such cases.
4.3.2.1 Explanations and Backtracking
In terms of IDNs, backtracking corresponds to having a network <N,D> (theory) with an 
admissible valuation V (consistent interpretation) and a partial valuation V0 over some set of 
nodes (observations or desired goals) and looking for a set of assertional dependencies D £  
I), (an explanation) s.t. 3 V ' e VA(<N,D^jD>) and Vq C V'. In addition, conditions 
relating V to V' may have an impact on which D and V ' are chosen if there are multiple 
solutions. For example, a minimal D might be desired, or a minimal difference between V 
and V' preferred.
Jackson [1989] and Poole [1989] both give criteria for preferring one explanation to 
another. They both include minimality with explanation Ei preferred to Ej if E] c  E2 where 
an explanation for Jackson is just some set of clauses whilst for Poole an explanation is a set 
of ground instances of some set of designated formulae or hypotheses.
Additionally Jackson does not allow trivial explanations where some observations are 
entailed directly by the explanation itself. I.e. the explanation of P with regard to the theory 
la -> P) as (3 or alternatively [y, y —» P) is trivial - one must use some of the information in 
the theory to derive the observation.
This problem is avoided by Poole by choosing explanations from a set of hypotheses, 
though if the observation o to be explained were one of those hypotheses, then (o) would be 
n perfectly correct explanation. Poole adds an extra criteria: that of choosing the least 
presumptive explanations, where Ej is less presumptive than E2 if, given theory T,
t ^ E 2 |«E ,.
We can view these criteria as pointers on where and how to add D to <N,I)> to explain 
vo- If we look at the subnetwork <N',I)'> supporting the nodes O c N i n  Vo, then the first 
'minimality) merely prevents the spread of the explanation unnecessarily across <N',I)'>
l f i ( )
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while the rest point to the level at which the explanation should be pitched. The triviality 
condition says that the dependencies in D should not be attached directly to O while 
presumption says that they should be attached as near as possible.
Poole explicitly rules out the possibility of choosing explanations based on the number 
of assumptions though his reason11 is unclear. Given William of Occam’s famous maxim 
this would seem to be an excellent criterion to use. In another guise, Occam’s razor supports 
the principle of having the explanation as close to the observation as possible, for if T u  
E2 |= Ei then Thms(T u  E2) 2  Thms(J u  Ei) (given a monotonic entailment) and a choice 
of E2 over Ei would be adding unnecessarily to the derived information. However, there are 
reasons for choosing to add D at a higher level, further away from O. If root nodes represent 
physical events while their descendents are concepts or inferred information then 
explanations at a higher level in the network provide more concrete explanations. 
Alternatively, in a data-driven application when more information is required to progress 
towards a solution, backtracking to a higher level will produce more information.
The choice of when to backtrack and where to backtrack to is a complex decision to 
which I believe no simple rule can be applied. Consider the network:
------ ----------  Figure 4.3.2.1 (a)
11 He states that "such comparators have too many problems of slight changes to the representation of the 
problem domain giving different answers" but his example, i.e. "it is not reasonable to always prefer one rare 
disease over two common diseases" introduces a whole new dimension, e.g. probabilities, into the discussion 
without clarifying his previous statement.
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Given a desire to support c and f, should backtracking stop at (b, d) (the closest explanation, 
minimal disturbance) or at (a) (minimal explanation) or at {h, i } (highest level)?
4.3.2.2 Finding Support
Having decided the criteria for determining at what level backtracking should stop, it is 
necessary to determine which dependencies and nodes should be backtracked over before 
reaching the desired level. For example, if the backtracking were an attempt to find which 
nodes were supporting an in value for a JTMS-IDN, then the backtracking should be over 
dependencies with in values. If the backtracking were an attempt to find a set of nodes to be 
asserted so as to change a node’s value from out to in then it would be necessary to backtrack 
over dependencies with out values.
In order to guide the backtracking it is necessary to know:
• what consequent value is desired or currently supported; and
• what antecedent values are supporting the consequent (or are needed to support the 
desired consequent value).
In order to do the latter it is necessary to have some model of how a particular dependency 
works (i.e. have a model of the summation functions) so as to drive the dependency 
backward. For example, for a JTMS-IDN node to have the value in it is necessary that one or 
more dependency has the value in. An SL-dependency only has a value in iff all in-nodes are 
in and all out-nodes are out.
Constructing the inverse of a dependency’s summation functions introduces one of the 
main sources of problems in backtracking. A dependency’s value is a function of the values 
of the antecedents but this function is typically many-to-one. This means the inverse is not a 
well defined function and any number of valuations for the antecedents may produce the 
required value. This means that there are many different possible explanations, or possible 
rets of supporting nodes. Managing this is one of the main problems for any backtracking
algorithm.
162
4.3.2.3 Entailment Relations
4.3.2.3 Entailment Relations
In query-driven processing, a simple traverse of the graph can provide information about 
approximate support relations. Though this may be sufficient to direct the gathering of 
information in the problem domain, this is not sufficient in the case of direct queries or 
counterfactual reasoning of the form "does T entail A?" or "if V(n) = v would V(m) = w?". In 
the same way that logic develops syntactic entailment |— via a proof theory so as to eliminate 
the need to consider semantic entailment at the model theory level, so I would like to relate 
the entailment defined in Chapter 3 to the structure of a network.
Unfortunately this is not possible for general IDN systems. Given a set dependencies 
£)(n) = dj ,.., dp and valuation V s.t. V^fd, V) = v, unless SN is fixed for V, i.e.
V w e  V  5 n (v , .....vr)=SN(v, ......vr,w)
then the addition of the assertional dependency — >wn would invalidate V I p |= (n,v)12, 
where P is the set of parents of n.
This does not prevent us developing the relationship between |= and — > in certain 
systems. Such a class of systems are those on whose values ‘Uan order 2 can be defined. This 
enables us to define an ordered entailment s|= where T s |= A iff any model satisfying T 
satisfies A to the required degree or more so. Thus the interpretation function / for a 
node/value pair is changed from that in §4.2.2.1 to 
l)efn /( {<N,D>, V),(n, v)) = "true" iff V(n) £ v
= "false" otherwise
Ordered entailment is defined as before using this new definition for / and produces the same 
results except in those entailments that use node/value pairs. In particular, writing 3/(<N,l)>) 
for the admissible valuations of <N,D> and its extensions £(<N,D>), i.e.
M(<N,I)>)={ V I 3 (<N',I)'>, V[ e C. e £(<N,I>>)}
= VA(<N',I)'>)
<N',D'»eE(<N,D>)
we get the following corollary:
assuming it is consistent to add — >w
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Cor For T = { (n^ v O .... (np, vp) }, A = { (mj, Wi) (m*,, wq) },
r s |= A iff V V e M(<N,D>). (Vie [l,p], VOh) = \,)=> (Vje [l,q], V(mj) > wj)
However, the definition of ordered entailment is too weak to guarantee a correspondence 
between dependencies and entailment. If both negative and positive support are allowed it is 
not possible to have (n, v) s |= (m, w) purely on the basis of a dependency linking n and m - it 
may be possible to add negative assertional dependencies that lower the supported value of 
m, thus negating the right hand side of the theorem.
In general it is difficult to provide a general notion of entailment (based on the semantic 
structures outlined in §3.3) that means that a  entails P iff there is a certain type of 
dependency (or set of dependencies) linking a  and p. It may be possible to do this on an IDN 
by IDN basis for those that avoid certain properties, i.e. allowing dependencies to decrease 
support or having more than two values, without using any notion of ordered entailment.
4.3.2.4 Implementing the JTMS as an IDN
In §3.4.2 the JTMS was considered as an IDN but only one of the three basic JTMS 
procedures (Truth Maintenance) was covered in that section. Finding supporting nodes for 
contradictions (through dependency directed backtracking) and the interpretation of CP- 
justifications were both put off on the grounds that they are meta-level inference procedures.
In this last section these types (backtracking and checking entailment relationships) of 
algorithm have been described in general terms without reference to how those algorithms 
could be implemented for a JTMS. In this section I would like to sketch the network 
conditions that determine: which nodes should be considered as culprits for a contradiction; 
and under what conditions a CP-justification is valid.
A node n is a culprit (or underlying assumption) of a contradiction (given an 
interpretation V) if it is in, and changing its value to out would remove one source of support
for a contradiction. This is the case iff there is a path of dependencies {di .... dm ) s.t.:
(Cl) Vi.l/°(dj, V) = in;
( C 2 ) a e  ont.v+ ( d |) ;
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(C3) Vicm. coni(di) e ants+ (dj+i); and 
(C4) corti(dm) = n;
where ants+ are the positive SL-antecedents.
The entailment relationship between the a;s and the contradiction c is embodied by the 
CP-justification
Ccons ,..., ak }in—hyp {hi . . . . .  b[ }nut-hyp ^cpd
This justification is valid (has a value in) iff there is a set of dependencies 
D = ( d j .... dm ) s.t.:
(CPI) Va,. 3 {d 'i d 'm) £  D satisfying C2-C4 above (substituting aj for a and c for n);
(CP2) Vbj. 3 {d'i d 'm} £  D satisfying C3 and C4 above and where bj e  anfi_(di) and
corty(di) e a«r.v+(d2); and
(CP3) Vd,. Vaeanri(di). (a = aj or a = bj) or (3dj. coni(dj) = a) or
(W e  Vi4(<N,D>). (a e a/tii+(dj) => V(a) = in) a  (a e anf.v-(dj) => V(a) = out)).
In other words, the CP-justification is valid iff for all in-hypotheses there is a path of SL- 
dependencies linked through the in-nodes, and for the out-hypotheses there is a path of SL- 
dependencies similarly linked (barring the first dependency where the out-hypothesis is an 
out-node). Furthermore, all the antecedents for the set of dependencies D must either be a 
hypothesis of the CP-justification, the consequent of one of the dependencies in D, or must 
have a constant value over all possible interpretations of the network.
These criteria can be used to specify procedures to perform DDB and to check the 
validity of CP-justifications. The procedures can either be explicitly called after the 
construction of admissible valuations as necessary (e.g. if a contradiction node is in) or by 
the use of consumers (see §6.5.1).
4-4 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter has been to look at how the information contained in an IDN could 
** used. Various interactions are proposed in §4.0.2 and of these the construction of an 
interpretation of the network (representing a closure of possible inferences) is the most
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important. The main contribution of this chapter is to give an algorithm for constructing the 
admissible valuations of both acyclic (§4.1) and cyclic (§4.2) IDN networks. The rest of the 
interactions proposed in §4.0.2 are covered in §4.3: incremental changes to the network 
structure are covered in §4.3.1 while the generation of explanations and tracing support for 
values are covered in §4.3.2.
Much of the work in the last two sections can only be described in general outlines, 
through sketching possible approaches or algorithms. This is necessary due to the complexity 
of the problems and the wide range of possible IDNs that any general algorithm would have 
to cover. In order to implement such reasoning for specific IDN systems it would be 
necessary to fill in the specific detail. The IDN framework provides a vocabulary for 
describing the problems but is too general to allow for detailed solutions.
1 6 6

Chapter 5: Applications
In preceding chapters an analysis of existing approaches to belief revision based on Truth 
Maintenance Systems has been used to motivate a general framework for managing a 
justification-based approach to belief revision. In this chapter some existing knowledge 
representation paradigms will be couched in terms of Interpreted Dependency Networks, 
thus providing an insight into their operation and semantics and giving rise to new methods 
of interaction.
These examples provide a justification for an IDN-based approach to belief revision, 
showing the scope of existing representations and problems that can be formulated as IDNs. 
Many of the examples also contain a contribution towards solving or understanding the 
original problem and/or domain.
5.1 Non-Monotonic ATMSs
In §2.1.2 it was shown how the ATMS could be used to encode non-monotonic justifications 
of the form "If rt is believed and tp is not believed then believe p". Both de Kleer [1986b] 
and Dressier [1987] resort to adding extra constructs outside the normal label propagation 
algorithm. In this section I propose a scheme whereby non-monotonic justifications can be 
handled within a normal ATMS label propagation scheme. It is only necessary to change the 
set of labels allowed and alter the summation functions responsible for the calculation of 
labels.
The resulting non-monotonic ATMS (NATMS) has the benefits of being more 
expressive than a standard ATMS and more efficient than existing extended ATMSs 
(EATMS) by keeping a small no-good database and eliminating the need for an intermediate 
phase of environment expansion in order to generate a context from an environment. This 
highlights the flexibility of IDNs in two different ways. First, the IDN framework allows for 
the easy specification of TMSs. Second, by changing the interpretation mechanism it is 
possible to switch easily from JTMS to ATMS-style Truth Maintenance over the same 
dependency network.
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This approach to NATMSs was inspired by the original multiple context TMS | Martins and 
Shapiro 1983] in which contradictions were not stored separately as no-goods but were 
represented as restrictions on the derivation of nodes. Given a justification nout— >SLm, m 
should be in any context in which n is not derived. So given a label for n, 
V(n) = {Ei Er ), if an environment E doesn’t contain any E, as a complete subset then n 
should not be in E’s context whereas m should be in that context. If V(n) = {{A B } (C )} for 
example, then if {AC} or {B C ) are not in E then m should be in the context of E.
To capture this intuition the set of assumptions ¡A that are defined for a particular 
ATMS-IDN are augmented (J3+) to include negated assumptions of the form —.A for A e A:
{ —l AIAe  ¡A}.
As with a normal ATMS the values assigned to nodes are sets of sets of assumptions: 
V= Pw(Pw(A+)). Each environment can be split into normal and negated assumptions, 
E = E+uE~. Given a particular environment E, a node is in E’s context iff for some 
E, e V(n), E * c E  and ->E n  E~ = 0  where —iE = {—>A I A e E}.
As with the standard ATMS each node should be labelled with the minimal consistent 
environments capable of deriving that node. As before, Ej is subsumed by E) iff 
Ei C Ej. l.e. Ei is more general than E2 if it places fewer restrictions on the set of 
assumptions needed to derive it, be they positive (e.g. A must be in the current context) or 
negative (e.g. —>A must be in which means that A must not be in). Any label environment 
that is subsumed by another environment is removed from a node’s label as are any 
environments that are subsumed by a no-good. Additionally, if an environment contains an 
assumption and its negation, where —1(—iA) = A, then that environment is also removed.
Given a standard support list justification VinWOU|—»slz the labels of the out-nodes B 
are processed at the antecedent stage to generate a set of negated environments to be 
combined at the dependency level with the unchanged in-node labels.
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SA” (v! ,..., vp) = {negate(\i).....negate(yp)} = ( -.E I E e combine( {E[ ..... Eq } ) }
where the v, ’s are the values assigned to the nodes in V,
negated Et ,..., Eq}) = { { ->xi .... ->xq } I (x, ..... xq) e  E, x ... x Eq J
and -i{a,..., z) = {—ia,..., —iz}
5A"“ (w, ..... wp) = u  (w ,) where the Wj’s are the values assigned to the nodes in V 
i . p
SD(vi, V2) = remove{reduce{combine(\\ u  V2)), no—goods) 
where remove and reduce are as previously defined in §3.3.3 and combine is defined as
follows:
combine( {Lj ,..., Lr ) ) = { (Ej Er } I (Ej ..... E,) e L| x ... x Lr (
When describing the normal ATMS as an IDN the no-goods were passed to each 
dependency via a non-monotonic link, ±out which were then explicitly passed to SD. In this 
case this link could be retained but in order to reduce the number of negated assumptions that 
would otherwise be created, the no-goods are implicitly passed to each dependency as shown 
in the definition of SD.
5.1.2 Example
Consider a problem solver that gathers evidence for three disjoint propositions 7t, y  and 
p where n = "the train is on time", \|/ = "the train is approximately five minutes late" and p = 
"the train is more than five minutes late". These propositions in turn provide support for 7t' = 
"the train will arrive on time", y '  = "the train will arrive five minutes late" and p ' = "the train 
will be more than five minutes late". Additionally the problem solver wishes to order the 
possible arrival times so that 7t' is preferred over y '  which in turn is preferred over p '. I.e. if 
there is no other support for any of 7t, y  or p then 7t is believed, and if there is support for 
tnore than one of 7t, y  or p then n will be believed instead of y  and p and y  will be believed 
in preference to p.
This could be encoded by a set of dependencies rtin— »s l 11* Vin^mit— >s l V  • 
Pm I> ty  lout >SLp'. {it V P lout— »SlX -
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Figure 5.1.2 (a)
These dependencies could be interpreted as JTMS dependencies in which case for any 
admissible valuation V (assuming dependencies might be added to support it, vjr or p) the 
following (partial) valuations would be admissible.
It in out out out
V in/out in out out
p in/out in/out in out
It' in out out in
V' out in out out
p' out out in out
If NATMS labels are used instead, then assuming the set of no-goods is empty and that 
IA ... E) is some set of arbitrary assumptions, either of the following partial valuations might
be admissible:
V,
* H A ))
V H B ||
P U C }}
* '  { { A }{—iA -.B -t C| )
{ { B - i  A ) ) 
<{C-,B  —*A ) )
V2
( {AJ{E)}
<{B)}
( (CD)}
{ (A }(E ){  —iA —iE —«B —iC) 
{--»A —iE —iB —<D}}
U B  -iA —iE} ) 
U C D - . A  - iB  —,E) |
V'
P'
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Using resolution internally on the labels (another way to minimise the size and number of 
environments) these can be further reduced:
V', V'a
Jt UA)} {( A} {E }
V {( B}} I IB )}
p UC>) UCD}}
n ' {{A}{-iB —iC}} {(A}{E}{ —iB —iC} {—iB —iD
V' {(B —iA}} {{B -iA —iE}}
p' ( (C —iB —iA >} {{CD-.A —iB —iE}}
Compare this with the following extended ATMS (EATMS) encoding of the non-monotonic 
SL-dependencies which produces a set of monotonie SL-dependencies. Note - as all the 
dependencies are monotonie and all nodes are therefore in-nodes, the subscripts ¡n and sl 
have been omitted for clarity! In this encoding the node and the corresponding 
(out-) assumption Op is used to represent the (in-) assumption that all the nodes in the set T 
are out, while Ip represents the assumption that at least one of the nodes is in.
I" VP lout— >SlX =
Onyp HI > Inyp t^rtvp« Om|/p*m|<p >-L, K M^p, tg *ijtyp. P ^mi/p
Pmitt Vlout *SLP =
P On y  *P > Iny ^ n y  O m ^ny >-L, 7t > in y  V  *'nv
Vmltout— >SLV '■
V On >\g , In >in. Onin >-L, 7t >in
Additionally, in order to get the in- and out-assumptions for each set of out-nodes (i.e. Ip and 
° r  for T e {{71 \g p } ( 7t \g ) {7t ) ( ) to interact properly it is necessary to add additional meta­
level operators choose(\IpOp )) and ignore(lr) for each T resulting in three choose 
constraints and three ignore constraints. This generates the following admissible valuation 
corresponding to V'i for the NATMS:
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it <(A}}
V {IB}}
p UC}}
Ir ( Hr >)
Or UOr )}
inyp { ( Impp H A H B H C }) 
ijty 111»iy HA}{B}}
in {{In HA}}
It' {(AHOnyp}}
V' {{BO,}}
P' U C O ^ } }
-i- {{Ompp Impp } {OnypA} {0,ypB} {0,ypC} {Omj,l,Vy}
{O^A} {O^B} {0,1,} {0„A}}
The number of no-goods generated is quite large and this is of particular interest given the 
desire to avoid a large set of no-goods as this increases the computational complexity 
I Dressier 1990],
Rather than having six nodes with four dependencies and an average environment size 
of 12/7 and an average label size of 7/6 which results from an NATMS, the standard EATMS 
results in 16 nodes, 16 dependencies, an average environment size of 7/5 and an average 
label size of 2. The average environment size and the average label size (excluding 1) have 
decreased but the network is more complex and there are more no-goods.
For the second NATMS valuation V '2, the EATMS gives the following admissible
v a l u a t i o n :
it { { A } { E } }
V { { B } }
P { { C D } )
Ir IHrM
O r { { O r }}
•nyp 11 Imj/p ) { A
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i*v {UnvHA}{E}{B}} 
in { Un H A}{E)}
* ' {{AHEHO^p) )
V' {IB On }}
P- u c D o ^ n
-1- { { Oypyp inyp I {O^ypA} {OyjypE} { Oyjyp B ) {O^ypCD} { Orny Ijx\p I
{O ^ A }  { O ^ E }  (O ^ B )  {OnIn } {OnA) (OnE ) }
For the EATMS the average size of environment remains approximately 4/3 with a label 
size, on average, 5/2. This compares with 7/3 and 10/6 for the non-resolution-reduced and 
5/3 and 2 for the resolution-reduced NATMS. The size and number of EATMS environments 
will rise less quickly than for the NATMS with the trade-off being the increase in the number 
of no-goods. Conversely the NATMS does not produce any no-goods but has bigger 
increases in the size and number of environments, given an increase in the size and number 
of environments in the out-nodes’ labels.
As an aside, it should be noted that it is possible to order three assumptions A, B and C 
at the meta-level quite easily with three chooses and two ignores and five no-goods:
choosei (A I bc )) choose{\ IBC Obc )) choose( { Obc BC}) ignored IBC) ignore(C)
no-good({IBC Obc 1) no-good{| IBC A )) no-good{(Obc B )) no-good{(Obc C() no-good({ B C|).
A is preferred to IBc and only if A is no-good or inconsistent is IBc chosen in preference to 
0 BC resulting in B being chosen ahead of C, unless of course B is itself contradictory. 
However, this encoding works at the meta-level, i.e. at the level of constraints on the 
assumptions and not on the nodes themselves. It is impossible in the EATMS to place a 
preference ordering on three nodes in the object level network purely through using choose, 
ignore and no-good constraints.
5.1.3 Interpretation C onstruction
The title of this section is somewhat of a misnomer: given an admissible valuation that 
assigns each node a label, one task that the problem solver may request is the construction of 
•he context corresponding to a given problem solving environment E. In the basic ATMS this
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simply requires a subsumption test for each node to see if one of the environments in its label 
is subsumed by E. In the EATMS it is necessary to construct a (potentially) expanded 
environment E ' that satisfies all the necessary meta-level constraints before carrying out the 
subsumption tests.
Using the first valuation from §5.1.2, if E = {C ) then the constraints will propose the 
preferred extension E ' = {C O^yp Ony On }. However, given {Onvp C) is a no-good it is 
necessary to substitute I^p  for Ow p . This gives the extended environment 
E' = {C InVp Ojjy On }, from which the following context results: {p p ' On Om(, I^yp i^yp ).
This compares with the NATMS where the environment E = {C} generates the context 
|p p'} through the standard subsumption test.
Using E = {AC} the meta-level constraint satisfaction process for an EATMS is even 
more involved. Each preferred choice of O^yp over I„Vp, Orty over I„y and On over In leads 
to a contradiction as each of {O^yp A}, {O^y A} and |O n A} are no-goods. This leads to 
E = | A C Iftyp Iny In } and a context {7C 7t P In in Inv imy Invp *rrvp
5.1.4 Conclusion
Having outlined the NATMS it is possible to see the benefits outlined in §5.1. The NATMS 
is more expressive than a standard ATMS in allowing non-monotonic justifications. This in 
turn allows for more complex interactions between nodes to be captured. Despite the 
ATMS’s emphasis on making choices it is not possible to define orders on the choice of 
assumptions to be used.
By introducing meta-level constraints (choose and ignore) on how contexts should be 
constructed from environments it becomes possible in an EATMS to introduce non­
monotonic justifications. It is also possible to order choices on assumptions purely through 
using these constraints, although it is not possible to directly define choices between ordinary 
nodes in this way. However, as seen above, the coding scheme for non-monotonic 
Justifications is cumbersome, needing a large number of extra nodes, dependencies and 
assumptions. This approach is also less elegant for it is necessary to introduce a secondary 
uonstraint satisfaction phase between specifying a problem solving environment and
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constructing its context.
The NATMS avoids these problems: non-monotonic SL-justifications can be directly 
represented in the network, there is no need for extra network or meta-level constructs to be 
added; interpretation of the network is done at the network level through standard 
propagation algorithms and subsumption tests; and there is no need for a meta-level 
constraint satisfaction process.
On the efficiency side, it is hard to judge whether an IDN-based NATMS is more 
efficient than the EATMS encoding of non-monotonic dependencies. As shown in §5.1.2 
there is a trade-off between size of labels and the number of no-goods and without further 
detailed experiments on networks of varying connectedness, there is no straight forward way 
to see which, if either, would be the dominant factor.
Finally, by directly representing SL-dependencies in the network it is possible to 
provide J- and ATMS-style Truth Maintenance over the same network by changing the 
interpretation structure <S, 4V  In this way we can see different styles of truth maintenance 
as providing different semantics for the same network. The JTMS interpretation is of 
standard propositional form with simple assignments of truth or falsity while the ATMS is in 
a many-worlds style with assignments giving an indication as to the worlds in which a given 
proposition is true.
5.1.5 Multiple In terpretations (again)
One obvious problem that is encountered with extended or non-monotonic ATMSs is that of 
non-monotonic cycles. In a JTMS even cycles give multiple admissible valuations while odd 
cycles can result in none. Given there is a (partial) mapping between JTMS and ATMS 
interpretations1 it should be no surprise that it is possible to get no or multiple admissible 
valuations with the NATMS. Given an odd loop aou,— ►sLa it is only possible to generate an 
admissible valuation if there is some other dependency d attached to a and VD(d, V) = {(().  
Given an even loop aou,— and bout— >SLa multiple interpretations arise. If there is no
1 V is an admissible JTMS valuation iff V ' is an admissible ATMS valuation where V(n) = in <-* V'(n) = 
Ulland V(n) = out <-> V'(n) ■  ().
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support for either a or b in a particular context then in one admissible valuation a will be in 
the context while in the other valuation b would be in the context.
Example
Consider the following NATMS network with its possible admissible valuations: 
D = {aou,—»SL*», bout— {A>)a, — >{(B))b )
Vj(a) = {{A }{—iB})» Vj(b) = ( {B})
V2(a) = {{A}},V2(a)-<{^A}{B}>.
Environment
U
Î A )
(B)
{A B)
Contexti (using V() 
(a)
(a)
{b}
lab )
Context2 (using V2)
{b }
la)
lb}
(ab )
This is one area where it might appear that EATMS scores over the NATMS. The 
corresponding EATMS expansion of the non-monotonic dependencies gives the following 
acyclic network with just a single admissible valuation.
Figure 5.1.5 (a)
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choose({Oa Ia}) 
choose([Oh IbJ) 
ignored Ia }) 
ignored lb |)
V(Oa) = ({Oa )l 
V(Ia) = {{Ia}}
V(ia) = {{Ia } (Ob}}
V(Ob) = UOb ))
V(Ib) = {{Ib}}
V(ib) = {{Ib H Ob}}
V(a) = ( (Ob }}
V(b) = {{Oa }}
V(_L) = {{Oa lb ) (Ob Ia } ( Ob Oa}}
Given any problem solving environment E the choose/ignore constraints will attempt to 
force the inclusion of one or both of Oa and Ob in the extended environment E '. As the 
inclusion of both is contradictory, two extensions result: E'j = |O a Ibl and E'2 = {Ob Ia). 
Depending on which one of E 'j or E'2 is picked, a context is generated that contains b or a 
respectively. So although the problem of multiple admissible valuations is avoided, the 
problem of multiple contexts remains. In this situation either the user has direct control over 
which extension is picked or an arbitrary choice must be made by the system2.
Another problem that the EATMS solves, enabling the construction of an admissible 
valuation, is that of non-monotonic cycles. The expansion of non-monotonic dependencies 
in an odd loop will generate a stabilising assumption, allowing the cycle to be interpreted. In 
other words, given an odd loop a()Ut— >sLa the EATMS will assume there is independent 
support for a. This means a will be included in any context, and the odd cycle does not occur. 
The expansion of a,,ut— >sLa and its admissible valuation (see below) demonstrate this.
'  This arhitnuy choice is exactly one of the reasons cited against the JTMS. However this problem will in- 
'ariahly ;tnse when a system includes non-monotonic justifications. If non-monotonic cycles are allowed, mul- 
hple interpretations will follow unless an arbitrary (system) choice is made.
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Example
choose({ Oa Ia}) 
ignored h ) )
V (0,) = {fO .))
V ( a ) = l |0 , ) l  
V(Ia) = {{Ia}}
V(ia) = {{Ia}{Oa} )
V(-L) = {{Oa}}
Given Oa is contradictory, any problem solver environment is forced to include Ia, thus a 
will be in all contexts. Here the EATMS is forcing "a" to be in to avoid what would 
otherwise be a "contradiction" or unsatisfiable "cycle" (there is no actual cycle in the 
network itself). Because the translation scheme actually removes the dependency between 
nodes in any non-monotonic cycle it is possible to generate a single admissible valuation of 
the network, even in the case of even non-monotonic cycles where one might expect multiple 
possible interpretations.
So it can be seen that at least some of the problems of the NATMS are shared with 
existing EATMSs. One problem that is unique to the NATMS is the number and size of 
environments created by non-monotonic antecedents. Some further work should be done on 
investigating the possibility of abbreviating environments so that an environment 
IA] A2A3) might be replaced by {A123}, so a non-monotonic link would generate an 
environment {—iA 123 I rather than the environments { —iA j }, {—1A2 ) and {—1A3 ).
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5.2 Default Reasoning
There is a very close connection between default reasoning and Truth Maintenance Systems. 
Indeed, the JTMS [Doyle 1979] can be thought of as an implementation mechanism for 
NML-I [McDermott and Doyle 1980]. Additionally, as mentioned in §1.2.2, there are strong 
associations between NML-I and autoepistemic logic (AE) [Moore 1983] and it has been 
demonstrated [Konolige 1986] that autoepistemic logic and Reiter’s [1980] default logic 
(DL) are of equivalent power and expressiveness.
In general a default rule (in DL, see 1.2.2) of the form a: MP / y is equivalent to an 
autoepistemic implication L a  a  —iL—1(3 —> y which in turn is equivalent to —iM—>a a  M(3 —* y 
(taking M in NML as the dual of L whereby M = —iL—i). These translations are somewhat 
counter-intuitive. One would expect an intuitive reading of the Reiter default to be "if a  is 
true and it is consistent to assume p then y  is true". Yet the intuitive reading of the 
corresponding NML-I implication is "if - ia  is inconsistent and it is consistent to assume P 
then y is true". The truth condition on a  has become somewhat distorted in form even if it is 
equivalent in content.
The intuitive reading of the autoepistemic implication ("if a  is believed (known) and 
->P is not believed (known) then y is true") is at first glance even more counter-intuitive: why 
should a  not have to be true but be believed to be true? The answer comes from the 
semantics of the default. Take the standard flying bird and the default that says normally (or 
normal) birds fly. This can be interpreted as saying only those birds explicitly stated not to 
fly don’t actually fly. To be able to say a bird flies because it is not explicitly stated not to fly 
relies on the fact that not only is the object in question a bird, it is actually known or believed 
to be a bird. However this point becomes secondary when the defaults considered are of the 
form Mp / y.
Morris |1987] explicitly links defaults and Truth Maintenance in proposing the use of 
the JTMS as a default reasoning device. This is a departure from the normal problem 
solver/JTMS interaction whereby the TMS does actually instantiate "default" rules but only 
in the creation of assumptions to guide the search process and control dependency directed 
backtracking. By coding defaults as dependencies Morris claims that the problem of
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anomalous extensions can be cured. Consider the following problem (a non-temporal version 
of the Yale Shooting Stick problem devised by Morris): normal animals (nA) can’t fly, 
winged animals (W) are abnormal animals (abA) (where abnormal = not normal) with 
respect to the property of not flying (i.e. winged animals can normally fly which does not fit 
the animal norm of not flying), all birds (B) are animals and normal birds (nB) have wings. 
Does Tweety the bird fly? Translating this into (Reiter’s) default logic produces the 
following implications3:
A a  nA —» —iF  
W —> abA 
B —> A 
B a  nB —» W
The default rules or assumptions capture the intuition that things are "normally" normal! I.e. 
if it is consistent to assume normality (there is no evidence of abnormality) then assume 
normality:
:MnA/nA (RA) :M nB/nB (RB)
In default logic (be it Reiter’s as illustrated above, or Moore’s or McDermott and Doyle’s) 
adding the fact that Tweety is a bird produces two extensions. In the first RB (or the 
equivalent) is used to assume the normality of Tweety as a bird which in turn implies Tweety 
has wings and is therefore an abnormal animal w.r.t. flying and the system is agnostic as to 
whether Tweety flies or not - as Tweety is an abnormal animal RA cannot be applied. In the 
second RA is used to assume normality of Tweety as an animal implying that Tweety cannot 
fly. As a side effect, Tweety’s normality implies (contra-positively) that Tweety doesn’t have 
wings and is therefore an abnormal bird with respect to having (or not having) wings.
The default theory can be converted into dependencies (in the spirit of Morris) by 
converting each implication into a monotonic dependency with each proposition represented
This axiomatisation omits some obvious implications, e.g. W -» F. However, this does not affect Morris' 
example which centres around which defaults hike precedence, and whether or not multiple interpretations :ire
Possible.
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by a node4; the default rules are represented as non-monotonic justifications so that if abA is 
out (abA «-» -inA) then n is in.
{A , nA)in— >sl- ,F 
{W U — >SLabA 
( B U — »sl A 
{B , nB)in— »slW 
{abA}OUI— >sLnA 
{abB}out— >sLnB
This network, being acyclic, gives rise to a single admissible valuation and lo and behold the 
intuitive answer (that Tweety the bird does not necessarily not fly) is supported in this 
valuation.
4 The scheme represented here is a propositional case, but as shown in §5.2.4 there are a variety of tech­
niques for converting propositional representations into predicate representations.
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This example works for the following reason: the semantics of the TMS puts an implicit 
ordering on the abnormality assumptions and the one way nature of support makes it 
impossible for the justifications to be used in a contra-positive way. A more realistic set of 
dependencies to model the set of assumptions would include the contra-positives of the 
implications, in particular:
{B , -iW}jn— >SLabB
(nA)in—
This is not motivated by the desire to follow the default logic reasoning but by intuitive 
notions of "normal" birds and animals and their lack, or otherwise, of wings.
The addition of these two dependencies creates a cycle (a necessary condition for 
multiple interpretations in deterministic IDNs - see §4.1.4) and two admissible valuations 
exist for this network.
nodes A w B —iF aA aB nA
Vi in in in out in out out
V2 in out in in out in in
Figure 5.2 (b) 182
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The problem of unwanted extra interpretations has reappeared.
Given the position of this thesis, i.e. that dependencies are not just records of inferences 
but can actually be used to make inferences, it is hardly surprising that by being selective 
about the set of inferences used to capture certain knowledge one can achieve the desired 
results.
In standard first order or propositional logic the inferences that can be made from a 
given set of propositions are given by the inference rules which in turn (certainly in the case 
of natural deduction systems [Lemmon 1965]) are derived from the (intuitive/truth 
functional) semantics of the connectives. Proof theoretic default or non-monotonic logics are 
also trying to capture the intuitive notion of defaults by adding logical machinery that allows 
or generates the intuitive inferences from standard constructs. One cannot be arbitrary in the 
choice of logical construct, changing the forms on an ad hoc basis to achieve the desired 
results.
In the following section I shall present a systematic representation of defaults that 
captures a particular set of intuitions about defaults that gives plausible results (in terms of 
the inferences made - even when considering sets of defaults) and an easy way of specifying 
interactions between defaults.
5.2.1 The Structure of Defaults
Consider some of the forms used in the literature on default or non-monotonic logics: birds 
fly by default; normally birds fly; normal (prototypical) birds fly; typically birds fly. There 
are different possible interpretations of very similar forms - is the default expressing the fact 
that the consequent holds for the majority of objects satisfying the antecedent, or for the 
normative examples satisfying the antecedent, or for some specified set of "normal" 
individuals? I take the approach that the latter should be the normal reading of a default - any 
bird that is believed to be normal (with respect to flying) will fly.
This "normality" check is not a simple (!) appeal to the ability to consistently assert the 
desired conclusion - which in this case would correspond to the fact "Tweety flying" being 
consistent with him being a bird and an animal and anything that can be derived from these
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facts. The default is a strict (material) implication and any bird that doesn’t fly cannot 
simultaneously be normal. The default implication comes in assuming that unless there is 
evidence of abnormality then normality can be assumed. If a bird is known not to fly then it 
is obviously abnormal w.r.t flying and the normality assumption cannot be made and 
therefore the inference that it can fly does not go through.
This set of inferences corresponds to the following set of justifications5 for a default 
rule of the form "Aj An normally implies B":
IAj An, ng A }jn— >s l B
a B ^ o u t — >s l " b A
{Ai  An,->BJin— >sL->nBA
If one considers the TMS as storing beliefs (that are held by some abstract or actual agent) 
about the world then the antecedents have the same strength as those in an Auto-Epistemic 
(AE) default rule - they only have to be believed to be true (instead of being true - a —» La 
but not necessarily vice versa). The consequent however is only a belief about the world not 
an actual statement of fact and in this sense is weaker than the AE consequent. This however 
accords with most people’s intuitions about defaults: given agents in the world are not 
omniscient nor ideally introspective, people may have false beliefs and the conclusions (of 
default rules) are not statements of fact. If I believe that Tweety is a normal bird then I 
believe that Tweety can fly. To actually know that Tweety can fly requires that I actually 
know Tweety is a normal bird, which in turn requires absolute certainty in the soundness of 
my belief that Tweety is not a normal bird and that if he were abnormal then I would know 
about it.
The contra-positive form {A| .... An, —iB)in— >s l ~ 'BrA is not motivated by a desire to
reintroduce multiple extensions in Morris’ example (although it does do this) but because it 
is natural to allow contra-positive reasoning. This particular form was chosen because it is 
valid and the other forms (e.g. (A2 An, bnA, —>BJ¡n— >sl- ,a i ) are counter-intuitive. To
This representation is an extension or development from the use of abnormality predicates that first ap­
peared in connection with circumscription |McCarthy I9K()|.
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say that if something doesn’t fly but is a normal bird (with respect to flying) then it can’t 
actually be a bird seems slightly nonsensical - being a normal (or abnormal) bird in the first 
place pre-supposes that the individual in question actually is a bird to start with6.
5.2.2 Interacting Defaults
The case of Tweety the winged not non-flying animal is one particular example of 
interacting defaults (see for example [Reiter and Criscuolo 1987]). When more than one 
default is present in a given theory they may interact in counter-intuitive ways or not interact 
at all. How defaults interact has less to do with the way defaults are linked but more with 
intuitive notions of what inferences should follow.
Consider the Nixon diamond: normal Quakers (nQ) are doves (D), normal Republicans 
(nR) are hawks (H - the opposite or negation of being a dove), is Dick (the Republican 
Quaker) a dove or a hawk (or neither or both)? Leaving aside the fact that any bird is also an 
animal, the Nixon diamond has the same form as Tweety the bird: normal birds fly, normal 
animals don’t fly, does Tweety the bird (who is also an animal) fly? The intuitive responses 
to the Nixon diamond would be to either remain agnostic about whether Dick were a hawk or 
say that either result could hold (though not simultaneously), or arbitrarily pick either one of 
the two. This is not the case when considering whether Tweety can fly where the intuitive 
answer is that he can of course fly.
h Giordano and Manclli 11990| lake the opposite tack ;ind use the negation of the consequent to infer that a 
ni'nn;il antecedent (i.e. :tn antecedent other than the norm;dity node or assumption in the JTMS sense of the 
word) must he false. What is interesting about their approach is that their three-valued interpretations and two 
way use of dependencies results in a system very much like the LTMS [McAllester 197k). It would be intetvst- 
lng to investigate whether the addition of a (weak) non-monotonic negation operator (rather thiin the strict nega- 
hon that is used) would result in semantically and functionally isomorphic systems.
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{A ^A Jin— ►sl- 'F  {abA}ou,— >sLnA — »sla
{B,nB}in— >slF {abB)out— S^LnB — >SLB
{R.nRJi,,— >s l H {abR}out— >Sl.nR — »slR
IQ > nQ)in— >slD |ab Q )0U,— >sLnQ — >slQ
/  \
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►Given the same network above captures the basic information about the defaults in both 
examples, the interaction between the defaults cannot be a matter of basic form - the 
interactions themselves must be explicitly supplied and represented as extra dependencies. A 
system should not be expected to distinguish the different semantics of the two examples by 
magic!
Given the set of dependencies used to represent defaults, the interactions between 
defaults can be captured by dependencies attached to abnormality propositions (nodes). In 
the above examples the Nixon diamond doesn’t warrant any more dependencies. This is in 
contrast to Tweety: birds are abnormal animals w.r.t not flying and the inclusion of this 
information by adding {B}in— >sLabA will remove the anomalous valuation7.
5.2.2 Interacting Defaults
As an aside, it is interesting to note that if contra-positive forms were not used then a 
contradiction would be generated. If invoked, dependency directed backtracking (DDB) 
would find nA and nB were the assumptions (in the JTMS sense where an assumption is a 
node supported by a non-inonotonic dependency) underlying this contradiction. The obvious 
assumption to revoke would be nA and this would be done by justifying aA. The explicit 
inclusion of (nB}in— >sLabA is capturing this process without explicitly needing to invoke 
IM)B. The stronger antecedent (that birds, not just normal birds, are abnormal animals w.r.t
This could he viewed as preferring the more specific default as proposed by Poole 1198 1, hut the whole 
Point is thai this doesn't necessarily have to be the case. As normality and abnormality .tre explicitly represent* 
ed. many different ways of linking classes to default behaviours can be used.
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flying) is used in order to construct a hierarchy of abnormalities. Penguins should not be 
normal animals w.r.t flying for this would imply that they don’t fly through virtue of being an 
animal. Penguins don’t fly because they are penguins and are as such abnormal birds w.r.t. 
flying, as well as being abnormal animals w.r.t. flying. In some sense, the contra-positive 
dependencies are negating the need for DDB - for DDB would add exactly this kind of 
dependency.
The initial presentation ignored the dependency between birds being animals. It might 
be claimed that the reason flying is preferred over non-flying is precisely because of this 
inference [e.g. Loui 1987]. The fact that birds are a subset of animals means that the 
normality of an animal in not flying should be over ridden by the normality of birds flying. In 
general this would suggest that whenever X implies Y and X is normally Z and Y is normally 
-iZ, then a normal X should imply abnormality of Y, w.r.t. Z. This type of reasoning is hard 
to implement for it is necessary to have a contradiction between X and Y over Z before 
adding X implies abnormal (w.r.t. Z) Y8. If the inferences between X, Y and Z are not 
obvious and are the product of long chains of inferences then it is difficult to determine when 
a contradiction can be averted by adding the necessary dependencies linking types and 
super-types.
Another difficulty with interacting defaults is that the interactions between defaults 
cannot be uniformly generated by dependencies between the propositions in the defaults. A 
good example of this comes in considering the composition of two defaults: A normally 
implies B and B normally implies C. Without any additional information, asserting A will 
lead to the derivation of C. However, A may have some other explicit relationship with C. In 
particular it may be the case that A normally implies C (directly, without any information 
relating to B), or A doesn’t normally imply C or an even stronger condition, A normally 
implies -,C .9
It should he noted thru in Poole’s scheme, the expensive work of determining which defaults get overrid­
den only gets done when a contradiction actually occurs. It is not necessary to look for contnidiclions ahead of 
hme. In this case, information about relationships between defaults is not actually stored as part of the 
knowledge being captured hut is more a heuristic to he used in resolving contradictions as and when they arise
The case of A not normally being - C  is irrelevtint to this case as there is nothing to suppose that A normal­
ly ‘mPlics -C .  In any case the representation of A not normally implying —iC would be handled analogously to 
A not normally implying C.
188
5.2.2 Interacting Defaults
If A normally implies C [Reiter and Criscuolo 1987, Eg 2.13 p274] then this default is
coded in the normal fashion so that A’s that are not B’s (because the A’s are abnormal w.r.t.
B)are still C’s: (A , ncA}^— >SLC, [A ,->C)in— >SLabc A, {abc A)out— >SLicA-
If A’s are not normally C’s then transitivity must be blocked. In Default Logic this must
be done by modifying the actual default rule to explicitly exclude A’s that are B’s from
being C’s [Reiter and Cruiscuolo 1987, Eg 2.14):
B : MA . B: M(-.A a  C)
C C
This has the following disadvantages:
a) defaults are not modular and the same default "B’s are normally C ’s" can end up being 
represented by two different default rules, having been embedded in two different 
theories, to take account of different interacting defaults in the two different cases;
b) the addition of interacting defaults means changes to existing rules must be made and 
no default is guaranteed to be stable and retain its original semantics; and
c) as defaults are modified, in order to accommodate other conflicting defaults, they 
become ever more complex.
Using an IDN representation the transitivity is blocked by adding A,n— >abcB as A’s 
cannot be normal B’s w.r.t. C if A’s are not C’s. Any other default that can be used to derive 
C from A must also be blocked by asserting Ain— >abcX where X is the property that by 
default sanctions C.
If A’s are normally —iC’s then a standard default representation should be added. This 
(normally) results in two possible admissible valuations as no priority is given to the default 
A normally implies -iC" over the defaults "A normally implies B" and "B normally implies 
( • To explicitly force a preference for -iC over C the implicit inference that "A normally 
implies -iC" entails "A doesn’t normally imply C" has to be made and represented as above. 
This removes one of the admissible valuations leaving V(C) = out and V(—iC) = in.
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5.2.3 Conclusion
One result of examining the link between Default Logic (DL) and TMSs is the conclusion 
that TMSs, simply by virtue of their functionality, do not solve the problem of multiple 
extensions. The JTMS (and IDNs in general) provide an expressive representation for 
capturing inferences, including default inferences, but this must be done in some principled 
way to accurately reflect intuitions. Morris [1987] does not do this in the case of his 
"solution" to the problem of anomalous extensions.
It is particularly important in the case of multiple defaults that intuitions about how they 
interact should be explicitly represented in a dependency network. There appears to be no 
way that these intuitions can be automatically generated, for example by simply considering 
orders on defaults or dependencies across defaults.
It should be noted that although the IDN representation scores in modularity and 
compositionality10 over the DL representation given by Reiter and Criscuolo [1987], (where 
the default logic rules grow in size and complexity with each new interaction that occurs) in 
principle DL could be used to capture the IDN representation of defaults. E.g. if A normally 
implies B, the contra-positive
: MngA
a Anp A —>B is equivalent to ------ -—
n f j A
This observation highlights the main conclusions of this section: IDNs (in the form of the 
JTMS-IDN) are capable of representing default inferences11 but this does not solve the 
multiple interpretation problem. What counts is the actual inferences represented. The 
representation of defaults in this section provides for a modular way of capturing 
relationships between defaults, and moves the default inference away from assuming that 
particular inferences are defaults e.g that birds fly by default, to assuming by default that 
things are normal.
10 lwi> of the major advantages cited for some Al representations e.g. in Woods' (1983) idea of "notational
efficacy”
11 It is not necessiiry to introduce novel three-vtdued interpretations and propagation schemes IGiordano tuid 
Miuielli 1990| to achieve this.
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What the IDN representation does do is highlight the natural occurence of cycles in 
default reasoning. These cycles are not only responsible for the occurence of multiple 
extensions both in the IDN representation (being a necessary but not sufficient condition) and 
in DL (through the choice of different application orders for default rules) but have an 
adverse affect on the computational complexity resulting in the cost of constructing 
admissible valuations becoming exponential in the worst case.
Finally, although Morris’s solution to the multiple extension problem does not work he 
does highlight the need for a declarative semantics and temporally independent interpretation 
mechanism for the JTMS. This is yet another problem that the IDNs go some way towards 
solving.
5.2.4 Individuals and Universally Quantified Rules
In the preceding discussion, default inferences have been represented as dependencies 
between nodes where each node represents some proposition. There has been some subtle 
disingenuity with the translation of defaults to nodes and dependencies. "Birds normally fly" 
is translated into "normal birds fly" which is represented by a dependency {B , nB lin— >SLf. 
Clearly "B” could be thought of as the property of being a bird and "nB" as being a normal 
bird so the dependency represents a default inference about properties. If this is the case 
then how are inferences about individual birds to be made?
Asserting Tweety is a bird should lead to the conclusion that Tweety can fly. Claiming 
B" and "f" are the propositions "Tweety is a bird" and "Tweety can fly" leads to problems 
when considering Felix the finch. New nodes "B'", "nB'" and "f'" with dependency 
IB , nB' ) in— would then be needed to make the default inference that Felix can fly. 
Really the default "birds normally fly" should be translated into a universally quantified 
sentence "Vx. B(x) a  nB(x) —» f(x)" or an open formula "B(x) a  nB(x) —» f(x)" (as with 
open defaults [Reiter 1980|) which act as schema for particular inference rules given 
appropriate instantiations of variables.
How universally quantified sentences are to be dealt with is a question that arises for 
many IDN-based systems. For example, this topic comes up again in §5.3 when dealing with
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Rule-Based Systems. This subject will be covered here purely for the sake of convenience 
and continuity with the representation and examples discussed in the rest of §5.2.
In general there appears to be two ways of approaching this problem - i.e. the process of 
instantiating universal formulae and reasoning with them. The first is to have an interface 
between IDN and user whereby queries or assertions capable of unifying with part of an open 
default are instantiated as instances of those rules. Thus assertions such as "B(Tweety)" or 
"B(Felix)" combined with the default rule12 (B(x), nB(x)}jn=>f(x) produce dependencies 
{B(Tweety), nB(Tweety))in— >f(Tweety) and (B(Felix), nB(Felix)}in— >f(Felix).
This approach requires a interface capable of storing, unifying and instantiating the 
dependency schemata. The schemata would not form part of the dependency network but 
would act as a mechanism for "packing" an expanded, potentially infinite, network consisting 
of all possible instantiated versions of a given schema. The drawback with this approach is 
that the schema is not represented in the network and without instantiating particular 
instances of dependencies it is impossible to look at the relationship between nodes. 
Therefore any user interaction must be capable of initiating instantiation. If an assertion is 
made that unifies with a dependency schema it must be instantiated as a query about the
The double arrow = >  is used to represent dependency schemata as opposed to the single arrow — > 
which represents actual dependencies within a network.
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status of a proposition or the relationship between two or more propositions. For example if 
it is known that all individuals are red unless otherwise indicated, {not-red(x)}out=>red(x), 
querying the status of "red(fox)" should instantiate the dependency thus supporting a value in 
for red(fox). One possible way of implementing this would be by using consumers (see 
Chapter 6).
The second (alternative) approach to representing quantified expressions is to represent 
the open default as a dependency between open formulae and incorporate the binding of 
variables in the interpretation mechanism. Rather than assign values from {in, out), nodes 
are assigned a list of pairs: V=  Pw( { (i, v) I i e 7, v e {in, out) ) ) where / is a set of names 
of individuals. If Tweety and Felix are both birds but Tom (the cat) is not, the node B(x) 
should have the value V(B(x)) = {(tw, in) (b, in) (tm, out)). The names in 7 act as an index 
for calculating admissible valuations for each individual: it is as if the dependency network 
were recreated for each individual without the need to actually perform the replication.
(tm in)}
When a network is purely propositional or is taken to refer to a single individual, the 
assertional dependency — >sLn is sufficient to assert that n is true. When dealing with 
networks with individuals it is necessary to include information about which individual some 
assertion applies to. This is done through assertional dependencies d of the form — >,m
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where i e I. The value of the d is simply an individual/value pair:
VD(d, V) = {(i, in)}.
The summation of the indexed values at all levels is done by grouping the values for each 
individual and then applying the standard JTMS summation function. For example, at the 
node level this is done by the summation function SN
S'N(v( vp) = {(i, v) I i e /, v = SN(v'i v'q) for v ' e Vj}
where Vj = { w I 3j.(i, w) e v j}
where SN is the JTMS node summation function.
Using this approach each node will be labelled with a set of pairs such that each 
individual i e /  will be in exactly one pair. This approach works well if the predicates apply 
to a large number of the set of individuals, otherwise the equivalent of a large number of 
unnecessary nodes and dependencies would be added. Consider a set of inferences about 
animals, birds and their respective abilities to fly. Imagine the addition of rules that say that 
helicopters fly, are capable of carrying people and large cargoes, are used for air-sea rescue 
and anti-tank warfare, are noisy etc. One would not want to label all the nodes related by 
these dependencies as being out for all the individuals that are birds but not helicopters, 
purely on the grounds that birds, like helicopters, fly.
Applying the closed world assumption would mean that if (i, in) i  V(n) then (i, out) 
would have been in if the network were instantiated for i. The question is then how and 
when to apply the closed world assumption to generate non-monotonic inferences. This is 
done at the antecedent level so that individual antecedents not satisfying the dependency (i.e. 
an in-node is out or an out-node is in) are not even recorded as (i, out):
S’,n(v\  vp) = {(i, in) I Vj e [1, p], (i, in) e vj }
When calculating the individuals satisfying the out-node conditions only those that are 
recorded as in are taken to fail:
,SL . .
s  mit(v....... vp) = {(l, in) 13j e [1, p}. (i, in) e vj }
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This eliminates all pairs of the form (i, out) from the construction of interpretations.13
In this approach to dealing with variables, although the default schema is represented in 
the network thus enabling operations to be performed on the network without the need for 
instantiating particular instances of the default, e.g. looking for support for nodes or checking 
entailment relations, the information about individuals and the properties they possess are 
hidden in the dependencies and the valuations. If the fact that Tweety is a bird is asserted by 
a justification — >TweetyB(x), then to assert that Tweety being a bird entails Tweety is my 
favourite bird (an expression applying to a single individual) it is necessary to restrict the set 
of birds (represented by individual/value pairs in the interpretation) to just Tweety.
This motivates a desire to be able to mix propositional and quantified representations 
within a single network. In order to do this, there is a need to have nodes n and m 
representing "Bird(Tweety)" and "Bird(x)" and have a mechanism for linking the values of 
the two so that V(n) = v iff (n, v) e V(m). There isn’t space in the thesis to detail this 
mechanism but there would be no problem in constructing such a link.
5.5 Rule-Based Expert Systems and II)Ns
Rule-based expert systems are the epitome of AI success in terms of the number and scope of 
systems and their commercial success. They are based on the simple premise that knowledge 
can be easily and accurately formalised and represented by a collection of IF-THEN (IT) 
rules. That is, rules of inference that sanction the assertion of the consequent of the rule if the 
antecedent conditions are satisfied. Examples from renowned systems include:
"IF the gramstain is gramnegative and the morphology of the organism is rod and 
aerobicity is anaerobic THEN there is suggestive evidence that the identity of the 
organism is bacteroides." [Shortliffe 1974, Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984];
1 In this panicuhir case given (i, out) never occurs, the pair (i, in) could simply be represented by the value 
<• However this technique of indexing (i.e. using simple individutUs rather than individual/value pairs) is limit­
ed to those IDNs with two values. The more genercd technique may be applied to any IDN to mttintain multiple 
simultaneous valuations.
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"IF plagioclase has been altered to albite or minor sericite and plagioclase has not been 
altered to major epidote THEN the lateration of plagioclase is indicative of the barren- 
core zone." [Duda et al 1979];
"IF the most current active component is assigning a power supply and a UNIBUS 
adaptor has been put in the cabinet and the position it occupies in the cabinet (its nexus) 
is known and there is space available in the cabinet for a power supply for that nexus 
and there is an available power supply and there is no H7101 regulator available THEN 
add an H7101 regulator to the order." (McDermott 1980],
It cannot be claimed that IDNs are a general framework for capturing AI belief revision 
mechanisms if they cannot be used to capture the rules of belief revision represented by 
RBSs. Unfortunately, as I show in the following section, IDNs cannot do this without a 
substantial modification to the RBS philosophy and methodology.
The representation of RBSs as IDNs represents an advance, and is not the poor result 
that it might seem, for I show (in §5.3.2) that in order to produce disciplined and consistent 
belief revision in an RBS it is necessary to use a defeasible RBS. It is this concept of 
defeasibility that is at odds with existing RBS behaviour and it is this concept that allows 
RBSs to be presented as IDNs.
In §5.3.3 I outline the properties of defeasible RBSs, pointing out similarities with 
existing work, and in §5.3.4 I show how IDNs can be used to create such systems. §5.3.5 
outlines the benefits of such an approach while §5.3.6 sketches some extensions. Finally 
§5.3.7 shows how uncertainty measures, one of the main justifications for using RBSs, can 
be integrated into IDN-based RBSs.
5.3.1 Rules and Dependencies
IF-THEN (IT) rules are not logical implications to be used in conjunction with an inference 
rule such as Modus Ponens (A, A—» B |-  B), nor are they rules for the syntactic manipulation 
of symbols. They are "real" rules of inference (in the sense used by Israel [1980]) that are 
involved in the revision of belief and have been constructed from an expert’s knowledge 
about what constitutes rational or coherent or useful judgements in a particular situation.
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One of the things that distinguishes IT rules from logical implications is that they can 
only be driven in one way: satisfying the antecedent can lead to a belief in the conclusion but 
a lack of belief in the conclusion (or a belief in the negation of the conclusion) cannot be 
used to derive the negation of the antecedent condition. In this respect they are similar to 
dependencies in an IDN whereby support is one way and changes propagate forward14. 
Where IT rules and dependencies do differ is in the manner of their execution.
The standard OPS5 architecture for a simple RBS is a knowledge base consisting of 
information (facts, goals, assumptions etc) held in short term working memory (WM) and a 
set of rules (RB) held in long term memory combined with an inference engine. The system 
is driven by a match-resolve-execute cycle:
match rules whose antecedent condition is satisfied by the information in WM are 
stored as the conflict set15
resolve a rule(s) is selected from CS as the next rule to execute on the basis of some 
heuristic or control strategy (e.g. | McDermott and Forgy 1978J) 
execute the rule chosen by the conflict resolution strategy is executed with its consequent 
being added to WM
After a rule has been fired there is no connection between the antecedents and the consequent 
and although subsequent changes to WM may mean the antecedents are no longer satisfied, 
the status of the conclusion remains unaltered. This persistence of information is a product 
of the philosophy of RBSs producing solutions through search: the information in WM at 
any time is a particular problem solving state and the rules that apply in that state are the 
operators for moving to new states. As such the RBS is using a coherence approach to belief 
revision - it does not matter how information has come to be in WM (excepting information 
used in making control decisions) as long as the problem solving state is consistent.
11 Obviously rules can be used in the opposite direction given goal-directed behaviour or backward chain­
ing- However backward chaining docs not lead to the assertion of facts but is a way of collecting inlonnalion or 
constructing chains of inference that when driven in a forwtird direction will generate the desired conclusion.
'' Rules may be added to an existing conflict set - a single structure may be used to store the conflict set. in 
which ease this structure is updated rather th:ui created during each iteration (e.g. the join network for RETE 
algorithms).
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5.3.2 Non-Monotonic and Defeasible Inference
A consistency approach to belief revision in RBSs based on a "fire and forget" policy has two 
drawbacks. First, in domains where information is changing (e.g. the Ventilator 
Management system [Fagin et al 1979]), rules have to be continually re-run to update the
external i.e. non-rule-driven events) are not commutative with rule firing. Adding the same 
information to working memory at different times can produce different results.
If information is given to the system in a phased manner (i.e. interspersed with the 
firing of rules) the result may differ from that produced when all the information is presented 
before any rules fire. For example, consider the rules:
(R1) If a and b THEN delete a 
(R2) IF a THEN add b
(R3) IF a and b THEN add c
If the initial WMo = {a} and the conflict resolution fires each rule in turn as they are 
satisfied, then R2 fires producing WM = (a, b), causing R3 to fire followed by R l:
resulting in WMj = {b, c). The subsequent phased addition of {b } to WMj produces no 
change to the final result |b , c}. Yet executing the rule-base on WM'q = {a, b) (i.e. changing 
the timing of adding b) would result in Rl firing to produce a final state WM', = lb).
conclusions and check their validity . This causes a problem when updates (produced by
R2 R3 Rl
WM0 WM, WM2 w m 3
Figure 5.3.2 (a)
16 This is not strictly true of all such systems. SOAR5 [Newell 1990] contains a TMS and does actually 
maintain dependencies between various working memory elements.
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Secondly, it is impossible to represent and use rules of the form "if A and B then C" 
where B is a condition that is not instantaneous but has some temporal duration, e.g. "if the 
alarm has gone off and there is no evidence of a malfunction or another trigger event then 
there has been a burglary". In this rule, the conclusion is valid if the antecedents are valid at 
the time the rule fires, but remains valid only for as long as the lack of evidence persists.
It may seem that this type of rule is captured by non-monotonic logics and that some 
non-monotonic capability should be added to an RBS to perform this kind of inference. 
However, this claim should be examined closely with reference to what exactly constitutes 
non-monotonicity and with regard to the notion of "defeasibility".
In general, non-monotonic inference is defined to be a logical system (with some 
consequence relation |—) in which the addition of information prevents the derivation of other 
formulae which would have otherwise been derivable, i.e.
T I- a  but T u  'F t-  a
Non-monotonic inferences are often characterised as tentative conclusions withdrawn in the 
face of contradictory evidence. Typically (!,7) they are given a reading of
"IF et] ot„ are true and Pi .... pm are consistent THEN y" **
where P, is consistent if there is no evidence of —iPj.
It has been stated that defeasibility is the property that conclusions are tentative, are 
"capable of being defeated" (Ginsberg 19871, and can be withdrawn given new and/or better 
information. It seems unclear from the literature whether defeasibility actually applies to the 
inference rule or to the conclusion that is inferred. I would argue that it makes little sense to 
say that the inference rule is sound (i.e. produces valid conclusions and is not defeasible) 
when the conclusion has been defeated or retracted. In other words, I believe defeasibility to 
he a property of the inference rule rather than of the conclusion.
To see this, imagine we were to say that a rule "If X then Y" is not defeasible, i.e. is not 
a tentative rule, but produces defeasible (tentative) conclusions. If we had some reason to
17 For the uninitiated, this is a joke!!
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disregard the tentative conclusion Y, we cannot do it simply by removing Y. If we were to do 
this, there is no reason that the rule could not be reapplied thus rederiving Y. The only ways 
to prevent this are: not let the rule be reapplied; invalidate or defeat the antecedent (X) of the 
rule; or remove or invalidate the rule itself. All these courses of action involve the rule itself. 
It is not possible to tell from a proposition itself, in isolation, whether or not it is defeasible.
Taking defeasibility to be a property of inference rules, the non-monotonic inference 
(**) above is defeasible, i.e. can be undone, in that the derivation of -i(3j prevents the 
derivation of y. The defeasibility arises because the notion of consistency has a temporal 
duration - the rule does not require (ij to be consistent with the information derived at the 
time the inference is made, but after all possible inferences have been made.
The terms "defeasible" and "non-monotonic" are not synonymous for it is possible that 
non-monotonic inferences are not defeasible and that monotonie inferences are defeasible. I 
claim that if expert systems are to be used to capture rules such as the one above, then the 
system used should be one based on defeasible inferences, rather than on non-monotonic 
reasoning. In the following section I shall show how a simple RBS can be non-monotonic 
but not defeasible, and show why such a system should not be used to capture the above rule. 
I will then show how existing non-monotonic RBSs capture this rule in virtue of their 
defeasibility rather than their non-monotonicity. Finally I shall demonstrate how IDNs 
perfectly capture the notion of defeasible inferences and can be used to implement a 
defeasible RBS.
5.3.3 Defeasible Propositional Rule-Based Systems
The simplest rule-based system is one based on a propositional language Lp. Rules L— >R 
consist of a left hand side (antecedent condition) L £  Lp and a right hand side (consequent 
actions) R c  I +, - )  X Lp. L represents the set of propositions that must be present in 
working memory (WM) for the rule to lire. When the rule is fired the actions in R are 
executed with the set of propositions R+ = { a  I (+, a ) e R ) being added to WM and the set 
R = I a  I (-, a ) g  R ) being removed from WM.
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A rule-based system that allows for the deletion of elements in W M can be considered 
non-monotonic. Consider the closure of a knowledge base K B  = R B  u  W M  to be the 
recursive application of all rules according to some conflict resolution strategy defined by a 
function resolve which takes a set of rules and returns a single rule to be fired. Assuming a 
static rule-base (this is only for brevity’s sake), the closure of K B  is equivalent to the closure 
of WM w.r.t. R B  which in turn is given by:
closeo(WM) = WM
t7o«'j(W M ) = (close^\(WM) u  R,^)\ Rf
for rj = L,— >Rj and rj = resolve({ rj 6 RB I Lj £  WM 1)
c te (W M ) = c/osi?n(W M ) s.t.
close n(W M ) = closen+ | (WM) and An<n. c t o m(W M ) = closem+\ (WM).
The closure of WM can be viewed as the set of consequences of WM with WM |— a  iff 
a  e close(WM). The definition of non-monotonicity then translates into the condition:
a  e close(WM) but 
a  4 closelWM') for WM c  WM'
Obviously, given a rule r = {a, b( — > {(—, a)) and working memory WM = (a) then 
WM |- a  but W M u ( b ) P a .
However, although a rule-based system allowing deletions (as outlined above) is non­
monotonic, if it is based on a "fire and forget" model of execution, it is not defeasible. 
Although a rule (R2) may remove propositions previously added by another rule (Rl) this 
deletion does not necessarily invalidate the original rule (Rl). It may be the case that the 
original evidence that led to Rl asserting the conclusion is still present and removing the 
conclusion without changing this evidence can lead to situations where contradictory rules 
are continually asserting and retracting the same piece of information in turn.
Despite the confusion over equating non-monotonicity with defeasability (e.g. Rich 
11983 pl78], and Schaefer et al 11986 p918| are guilty of this) the concept of defeasibility is 
applicable to monotonic rules as well as non-monotonic rules. Consider a rule of the form 
IF A and B THEN C (as in §5.3.1), where B is a condition with temporal duration that is 
lnvalidated by the removal of information (rather than the addition of information as is the
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case in §5.3.1 ). This rule is not non-monotonic for it is the removal rather than the addition 
of information which leads to the retraction of the conclusion. It is possible to have a 
retraction rule so that if B no longer holds then C is retracted but this introduces yet another 
problem: if C has been asserted by some other rule then the failure of B leading to the 
retraction of C would result in C being removed when in theory it should still be present.
The desire for defeasible and/or non-monotonic RBSs has led to the development of 
systems that have an augmented rule structure of the form "IF-THEN-AS.LONG.AS" 
[Schaefer et al 1986] and "IF-THEN-UNLESS" [Reinffank et al 1986]. By their nature, 
these systems have had to maintain dependency records between the AS.LONG.AS or 
UNLESS conditions and the THEN conclusions. This in turn generates a need to record other 
conclusions ultimately supported by the augmented rules. This has been done either through 
the explicit use of a TMS [Reinfrank et al 1986] or through TMS-like functionality [Schaefer 
et al]. It is interesting to note that the TMS provides defeasibility and it is only the use of the 
closed world assumption in defining negation, or some other non-monotonic operator, that 
makes defeasible inferences non-monotonic. "AS.LONG.AS" conditions capture 
defeasibility while it is the absence of information referred to in "UNLESS" conditions that 
makes such inferences non-monotonic.
As an aside, if a defeasible RBS is wanted and it is undesirable that evidence can be 
overwritten but should rather be invalidated or withdrawn, the obvious way to do this is with 
a system that does not allow deletions or negative support but provides only positive support. 
Negative support for a proposition, e.g. a  is false, should be translated into positive support 
for some other proposition e.g. —id is true, and some procedure used to resolve conflicts 
between the two where necessary.
In the rest of this section 1 shall examine some problems that arise in the interfacing of 
TMS and RBS. In particular I wish to examine how RBSs might be directly represented 
using dependency networks thus challenging the following:
"It is not clear exactly how the validity maintenance abilities of the human expert can 
be naturally expressed in terms of such [dependency] networks. It may be possible for 
the expert to indicate how the individual working-memory elements (nodes] in the
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network are dependent on each other. However, the implementation-level network is at 
a considerably lower level of representation than the ‘knowledge level’ expert 
production rules. It would be unsatisfactory to require the expert to think about the 
domain at both levels." [Schaefer et al 1986, p919]
I would claim that in the case of defeasible inferences the process of specifying rules is 
isomorphic to that of indicating dependencies.
5.3.4 KBSs and IDNs
In a simple propositional system a rule of the form "IF ct) a„ THEN P" can be 
represented by a monotonic SL-dependency [a] ,..., a n }in— >SlP- This rule is defeasible, by 
the nature of IDNs. When all the antecedents are in the rule will "fire" and the value assigned 
to the consequent will be //ilx. In this case the rule is valid and the antecedents are satisfied. 
If any a, is out then the rule does not "fire", i.e. the rule does not support p being in and 
unless another rule provides support then p will be out. In this case the rule is invalid and the 
antecedents are not satisfied.
A change in valuation that results in previously unsatisfied antecedents becoming 
satisfied or vice versa will lead to a corresponding change in value for the consequent if the 
value of that rule is sufficient to determine the value of the consequent (i.e. there are no other 
rules with the same consequent or all other rules that share this consequent are invalid).
Non-monotonic defeasible rules can be captured by a non-monotonic JTMS-IDN where 
lack of evidence is represented by non-monotonic links. E.g. the rule
"IF a i a n and tXn+i ,..., otn, are consistent THEN P" 
is represented by [a , .....a„ )in [00+, ,..., a ,,,) out *Sl P*
Propositional rules in this form can be captured by existing TMSs or TMS-RBS 
combinations, so other than expounding the difference between defeasible and non­
monotonic inferences, what does the study of IDNs add to existing work? A defeasible RBS
U This is of course a procedural notion of changes to an admissible valuation ;ind relies on an update algo- 
nihin that is sound and complete. Dcnotationally the consequent will be in in any admissible valuation in which 
a'l 'he antecedents are in.
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that relies on a stand-alone or separate TMS component, e.g. CAPRI [Reinfrank et al 1986, 
Freitag and Reinfrank 1987], suffers from three problems: duplication of information; the 
need to exchange information; and unwanted interactions caused by the exchange of 
information.
Taking the last problem first, consider the following set of rules [Reinfrank et al 1986
p27]:
(Rl) IF p UNLESS q THEN r 
(R2) IF p UNLESS r THEN q 
(R3) IF r THEN q
The RBS is responsible for checking the value of the antecedents stored in the TMS, and if a 
rule antecedent is satisfied then the rule is fired and an appropriate dependency added to the 
TMS which then updates its valuation. Given V(p) = in (by assertion — >slP) and a conflict 
resolution strategy that fires each valid rule in turn, Rl fires adding p,nqnu,— >SLr, giving a 
valuation V = {(p in) (q out) (r in) ) causing R3 to fire, adding rin— >sl9- This creates an odd 
loop and the TMS is unable to create an admissible valuation. If R2 were already 
represented in the network by pinrou,— >sl9 then it would be possible to "stabilise" the odd 
loop and construct an admissible valuation V ' = {(p in) (q in) (r out)) but because it is not 
possible to fire rules during the valuation construction phase stabilisation does not occur. In 
general the conflict resolution strategy and/or rule firing order that is employed by the RBS 
may not be reflected in the TM procedure used by the TMS.
The other two problems of duplication and transfer of information, being computational 
issues, are minor in comparison to the conceptual problem above. Firstly there is a 
duplication of the information in the rules and the dependency network. As rules fire, an 
image of the rule-base is built up in the TMS. Secondly when a rule fires the satisfiability 
check of the antecedents is mirrored by the TM process when dependencies are added to the 
rule base. Initially the checking at the TMS level is unnecessary while subsequently the 
checking at the RBS level is redundant, given the rule has already been instantiated in the 
TMS.
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All these problems point to a solution of moving execution or firing of rules from the 
RBS to the TMS. Rather than storing rules in an RBS this component can be discarded 
(although see §5.3.6 and §5.2.4 for a discussion on pattern matching and variables) and rules 
coded directly as dependencies. However, it should be stressed that this type of system can 
only be used to represent defeasible rules. For procedural "fire and forget" rules this type of 
system is inappropriate.
5.3.5 Benefits of an RBS-IDN System
The explicit representation of rules as dependencies within an RBS-IDN system means that 
the problems listed above can be resolved. In particular (non-monotonic) defeasible 
inferences with automatic, incremental updating can be implemented without duplicating 
information nor having the interaction between RBS and TMS produce undesirable results. 
This gives the capability to deal with changing information, both assertions and retractions, 
in a clear, systematic and efficient manner.
In addition to resolving problems with existing systems there are additional benefits of 
using an RBS-IDN. These fall into two main categories: those that come from the way a 
particular admissible valuation is constructed; and those that come from changing the 
interpretation structure itself, i.e. what constitutes an admissible valuation.
The basic method of constructing admissible valuations as outlined in Chapter 4 is 
based on a depth-first approach that contains the potential for a parallel model of execution. 
In any given iteration in the interpretation process, nodes at particular depth have their values 
calculated. As all nodes at the same depth cannot depend on each other, the rules supporting 
those nodes do not interact and can be fired simultaneously.
This approach is conservative in timing. The execution of a rule is delayed until all 
rules sharing the same consequent can have their antecedent conditions checked. E.g.
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In the first iteration, values for a and d are calculated and although the value for d„,— »slc 
can be calculated, the rule does not "fire" thus calculating a value for c, until a value has been 
calculated for b. By manipulating the queue of node values to calculate (TC), and by 
exploiting redundancy19 or assuming nil values for as yet uncalculated values, it is possible 
construct an interpretation in a more opportunistic manner corresponding to a depth-first 
approach.
Changing the order in which the admissible valuation (AV) is calculated through 
manipulating TC will not produce any different A Vs for an unambiguous network20. 
However it should be noted that although values produced by using redundancy are not 
subject to revision, those values produced using assumed nil values may be recalculated as 
other nodes are calculated, and can only be thought of as tentative conclusions. This is not 
necessarily a disadvantage for it enables a tentative partial solution to be constructed quickly. 
This technique can be extended so that arbitrary values are assumed in a depth-first 
construction. The assumed values can be collected and become conditional assumptions that 
must be discharged (as in natural deduction systems [Lemmon 1965]) before values
19 I.e. cases where a single dependency value is sufficient to determine a node's value e.g. if V(d) = in then 
v(c) = in for any admissible valuation V irrespective of V(b).
20 If a network is ambiguous, i.e. IV/A(<N,I)>)I > 1 and the disambiguation relies on some procedural no­
tion of how the interpretation is being constructed then different methods of construction may actually result in 
different AVs being produced.
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supported by them can be considered part of an AV.
Procedural notions of conflict resolution in an RBS that determine how rules interact 
and which may result in different WM states, must be captured by explicit dependencies 
between rules in an RBS-IDN. This is an added advantage, for by forcing these interactions 
to be stated explicitly, the control structure is brought to the fore (as advocated by Georgeff 
[1982]). Because of the defeasible nature of the rules this control structure can be built 
through the use of an additional "rule identifier" antecedent. Thus the rules
(R1) IF p UNLESS q THEN r
(R2) IF p UNLESS r THEN q
become dependencies (p R1 }inqout— >sLr and [p R2 (inrout— >SLq, where nodes R1 and R2 
respectively mean R 1 and R2 are executable or applicable in the current context. Asserting 
both rules are applicable, by adding — >slr 1 and — >Si_R2, results in an ambiguous network 
and some external disambiguation procedure is necessary to decide which rule should fire. 
By removing — >slr 2 and adding R lout— >R2, an ordering is placed on the rules so that R2 
is allowed to fire only if R 1 is not.
This kind of explicit approach to conflict resolution is open to the kind of criticism 
levelled against Rl/XCON [McDermott 1982]. That is, by mixing strategic or meta-level 
problem solving information (i.e. information saying when to use which rules) with object 
level rules, the knowledge base is no longer epistmeologically clean. In otherwords, the 
representation of some domain by facts, rules heuristics etc is diluted with information that is 
needed to make a particular system and/or representation scheme behave in a specific way. 
This information may be used to make the system chose one answer in preference to another, 
or to make the search more efficient but this information may have no use (or even worse, no 
validity) outside the particular system.
This criticism can be partly avoided by making the control information easily separable 
from the domain information. In the case of the IDN scheme proposed above, the use of 
rule-identifying antecedents means that although the control information is expressed in the 
same way as domain information (i.e. the system is mono-lingual - the meta-level and object 
level languages are the same), it is distinct. However, it should be noted that particular care
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must be taken in specifying contradictions in an IDN that uses dependency directed 
backtracking. If contradictions have no epistemological basis independent of the systems 
behaviour, i.e. they are only included to make the search behave in a particular manner, then 
the criticisms of Rl/XCON once again apply.
In addition to having multiple ways of driving the RBS-IDN forward, it is possible to 
use DDB to generate query-driven behaviour (see §4.3.2). If a certain set S of nodes 
represents solutions and another set A represents "askable" data (e.g. Mycins’ LABDATA 
(Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984, p 64]) then if no solution is currently supported then 
backtracking to nodes in A provides a way of focusing data gathering. Heuristics such as 
maximum discrimination (choose nodes that support the smallest and undermine the greatest 
number of solutions), maximum impact (a minimum number of additional nodes must be 
established for a solution to hold), and depth (closeness to original causes or askable data, 
length of reasoning chain), provide a way of choosing which questions to ask first. 
Similarly, if some quantitative measure of uncertainty is being used (see below) and no 
solution exceeds a certain minimum value then backtracking from the highest ranked 
solution may establish that solution with the required degree of certainty.
The interpretation structure (i.e. the actual values calculated and the summation 
functions used to do this) itself can also be changed easily enabling the same rule-base to be 
used for a variety of different tasks. In particular, given the static nature of an AV (i.e. rules 
that are fired support their consequents at all times) it is easy to implement a consistency 
checking or verification scheme. COVADIS |Rousset 1988] assigns ATMS-style labels to 
elements in a rule-base and uses these values to make modifications to the rule base. Given 
the inter-changability of J- and NATMS interpretation schemes (see §5.1) it is possible to 
check the consistency of a network within the same framework as it is executed, using the 
same data structures and without the need for external programs, or the need to simulate 
execution of the rule-base in every conceivable situation. The deterministic and declarative 
nature of rule firing also makes it possible to investigate entailment relationships between 
propositions and rules. For example, given
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{a bR lJi,,— >SLc 
{c R2)indout— >SLe 
If  R3)i„— »SLe 
lg  >SLd
it can be shown that there is no relationship between c and f but that g being out is a 
necessary condition for R2 to fire and that unless R3 is fired or e is asserted, if g is in then e 
will be out.
The static nature of the interpretation w.r.t. the network also means that explanations 
can be generated by examination of the network. It is not necessary to maintain a rule trace 
which, in the presense of non-monotonic rules, may be less than clear. For example, given 
rules
(R1) IF a  and P is unknown THEN add y
(R2) IF P THEN delete y
(R3) IF 8 THEN y
and a working memory WM = {a 8), then R1 fires adding y. A later assertion of P would fire 
R2 (or retract R 1 if the system were defeasible) leading to a retraction of y followed by a 
firing of R3 and a second addition of a. A rule trace would contain all this information which 
must be searched to find the relevant information.
As shown in §5.2 it is also possible, through the use of ATMS-type indexing (as 
happens with KEE-Worlds™) to maintain multiple simultaneous scenarios. Finally, as shown 
in the next section, it is possible to combine defeasible non-monotonic inferences with 
numerical measures of uncertainty in the context of RBSs.
5.3.6 Extensions to Propositional RBS-IDN
Propositional RBSs are powerful enough to capture enough information to perform useful 
problem solving tasks, though obviously propositional logic does not have the 
expressiveness of first order logic. In particular propositional logic does not contain variables 
and quantifiers though it is capable of dealing with ground (variable-free) predicate
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formulae. There is a trade-off to be made between tractability and expressiveness (a prime 
example being in frame-based systems), which in the case of RBS can be seen in the 
"Object-attribute-value" (OAV) representation scheme. This is one of the most popular 
forms of knowledge representations within RBSs and has been used in a large number of 
commercial tools and shells (e.g. Ml, OPS5, SI, Expert-Ease ...21)
An OAV representation is based on objects that have attached properties. These in turn 
can take a variety of values from {true, false), integer or real numbers or an arbitrary set of 
symbols e.g. colours {red, green blue ...}. Antecedent conditions are conjunctions, 
disjunctions and negations of tests of an attribute’s values where the tests are equality, less 
than, greater than or membership tests. Depending on the values and test used, the OAV 
representation is equivalent to FOL restricted to unary predicates, with equality, or more 
expressively (in terms of values and tests handled) binary and unary predicates, or most 
strongly unary functions with binary (and unary) predicates. In general rules can contain 
variables but no explicit quantifiers - any rule containing variables is considered to be 
universally quantified.
Considering OAV facts to be functions representing attributes applied to individuals 
representing objects that return values within the language means that all the knowledge is 
represented within the syntax of the language. However, by considering attributes to be 
predicates that apply to individuals with differing truth values means that some of the 
knowledge is moved to the interpretation structure. For example, Michalski et al (1976) (as 
reported in {Haack 1978]) have constructed a 12-value logic where the truth values are 
related to months of the year in which a proposition holds true. Rather than saying "Red 
spots appear in February" and assigning a value "true", the proposition is reduced to "Red 
spots appear" and a truth value of "2" is assigned meaning the proposition is true "in 
February". However the second rendering can be translated into the first without loss of 
information. Where the information is placed in the semantic/syntactic divide is not 
necessarily a matter of expressive power, but of computational issues.
See IHannan and King 1985] for an overview of these, and many more, systems.
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In the case of IDNs the syntax of propositions is hidden in the nodes and the semantic 
value assigned to a proposition is simply that assigned by the summation rules. The debate 
over where information should be placed translates into a debate about what interpretation 
mechanism should be used. Consider the fact "the colour of blockll is red". This is most 
intuitively captured as a unary function colour applied to object "block 11" with resulting 
value "red" (co/our(blockl 1) = "red"), or as a two place predicate (colour(block 11, red)). In 
either case the nodes representing these statements would be assigned a value in 
[true,false). Alternatively a node could be used to represent the colour of blockll as a 
unary predicate ‘colour(blockl 1)’ with a value being assigned from a set of values = {red, 
green, blue ..}. Combining these two different approaches to representing values with the 
two different approaches to representing individuals (in §5.2.4) as either information stored 
in the node or in the interpretation, gives four basic representation schemes for OAV 
systems.
SI: basic propositional scheme - instantiation by interface
S2: multi-valued scheme
S3: propositional with variables
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S4: multi-valued with variables
( 5 xT>((o,v))
Looking at each scheme in turn, the following benefits and drawbacks can be attributed. 
SI involves a simple interpretation scheme. All the information is stored as propositions 
attached to nodes, and queries can be evaluated by look-ups on the node-proposition 
mapping and getting a single value from a current admissible valuation22. There are two 
major drawbacks to this approach: the need for pattern matching and node/dependency 
instantiation capability in the user interface; and the large number of nodes and dependencies 
produced. However, given the simple structure of the interpretation, these dependencies are 
fewer in type and of less complexity than with other systems.
Scheme S2 prevents the proliferation of nodes and dependencies by having a single 
node capable of representing all possible values of an attribute, rather than having a node for 
each separate value. This in turn allows a single dependency to be used to capture all the 
dependencies of one attribute’s values on another. This results in a smaller network which 
can be further reduced in size by having conflicts in values resolved through the summation 
function assigning a single value, rather than using more nodes and dependencies to capture 
this resolution process. For example, consider the relationship between the colour and taste 
of fruit juices:
colour taste
orange orange
green lemon and lime, lemon
yellow lemon, lemon and lime
red blackcurrent
This assumes a fully instantiated network - in practice if all updates to the network have been made then if 
a node is not present in the network then there arc no nodes even potentially capable of supporting the query 
and the CWA can be invoked to assign a nil value.
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Representing these rules in SI takes 8 nodes and 4 dependencies while in S2 this takes 2 
nodes and 1 dependency. If values in S2 are sets of attribute values then specific 
combinations of tastes and colours could be allowed (green and yellow or lemon and lemon 
and lime) while others (e.g. green and red) are contradictory. To represent such conflicts in 
SI would take more dependencies. The negative side of this approach is that it leads to a less 
uniform interpretation structure with a variety of different disjoint sets of values being 
assigned to different nodes. The moving of information to the interpretation mechanism and 
the resulting increase in complexity makes secondary tasks such as tracing support and 
determining entailment relationship more complex. There is also a decrease in modularity if 
a number of S 1 dependencies are compiled into a single S2 dependency23.
The individual pros and cons of S3 have been discussed in §5.2.4 and S4 inherits the 
problems and advantages of both S2 and S3.
In conclusion, SI is to be preferred to S2 if the values that attributes take are discrete 
and few in number and there are no obvious correlations between values of attributes. As 
mentioned in §5.2.4, SI is to be preferred to S3 if the universe of discourse is small, i.e. there 
are are few individual objects, or the rules are narrow in scope and apply to few individuals
or ranges of values.
In the context of RBSs, it should be noted that the use of a pattern matching interface to 
instantiate dependencies is not the same as that of a pattern matcher firing rules. A 
dependency is instantiated whenever part of its antecedent condition is present (as opposed 
to firing when all the antecedent condition is satisfied) and there is no notion of conflict 
resolution nor any other procedural interactions between additions.
5 3.7 Uncertainty and the RBS-IDN
Dne of the main advantages cited for rule-based systems over a system based on logic or 
semantic networks is the ability to deal with uncertain information. That is, a numerical 
measure that represents how likely or how certain a piece of information is. Such a measure
25 If 
similar
the rule-base is stable (i.e. changes to the rules are not likely to occur) and homogeneous (i.e. have a 
status in terms of origin and/or confidence) then this is less of a problem.
213
5.3.7 Uncertainty and the RBS-IDN
can either be based on classical probabilities (Duda et al 1976], Dempster-Shafer theory 
(Ginsberg 1984], or certainty factors [Shortliffe 1976].
Systems based on numerical uncertainty measures can either be extensional in that 
numbers are assigned to individual propositions in the same way that truth values would be 
assigned in a particular interpretation, or intensional in that uncertainty is assigned to 
particular interpretations and within each interpretation a proposition is either true or false 
(Pearl 1988]. This classification is in the same vein as the procedural/declarative or 
syntactic/semantic distinctions (ibid p3]. However, given that probabilities can be used both 
extensionally and intensionally24 and the same applies to Dempster Schafer theory, this 
distinction is less than useful in deciding what kind of system of uncertainty to use.
Pearl (1988, p6-12] himself argues against extensional systems for three reasons; bi­
directional inferences are not handled properly; it is difficult to retract information; and by 
combining evidence locally the source of information is not considered and the same 
evidence can be repeatedly used to inflate the certainty of some proposition. Yet the system 
of Bayesian networks that he proposes appears to be a procedural or extensional use of 
probabilities.
Of the arguments that he puts forward, only the problem of combining evidence is 
justified with regard to an RBS-IDN. The problem of retracting information is handled by 
defeasible rules. The counter-intuitive results produced by examples of bi-directional 
inferences are the result of sloppy knowledge representation and of trying to handle 
deductive and abductive inferences in exactly the same way with the same mechanisms. The 
problem of multiple paths from one proposition leading to multiple support of a single 
common descendent is difficult to resolve and indeed Pearl does not do this himself. The 
basic method of local computation for propagating beliefs in a causal network only applies to 
dees or polytrees (i.e. singly connected networks where there is at most one path between 
ar>y pair of nodes). When dealing with multiply-connected networks it is necessary to 
employ techniques that remove the multiple connection either through joining nodes together
E-g. P(A) = 0.75 can be interpreted as meaning that A is true in 75% of cases (intensional) or that in any 
g'ven situation A hits a chance of being true three times out of four (extensional).
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or effectively breaking links between nodes.
If one tries to combine an RBS using extensional uncertainty with a TMS to provide 
defeasible inferences, the problem of assigning values to nodes (see §6.3.5) arises. If the 
uncertainty information is stored within the node, i.e. nodes represent propositions such as "a 
has value 0.75", then when the value is changed a new node must be created along with new 
dependencies, and the structure of the rule-base becomes lost. It is only by representing 
uncertainty information in the interpretation that defeasible inferences using uncertainty can 
be handled. This motivates a desire for multi-valued TMSs, and IDNs provide the perfect 
vehicle for implementing such systems.
In the rest of this section I will look at how IDNs can be used to represent and deal with 
a variety of uncertainty measures that could be incorporated for use within an RBS. In
85.3.7.1 I will briefly point to work done on using the Dempster-Shafer theory of updating, 
before showing (in §5.3.7.2) in detail how a certainty factor model can be constructed. 
Finally in §5.3.7.3 I will show how probability can be similarly handled through work on 
Bayesian Networks.
5.3.7.1 Dempster-Shafer Theory and the ATMS
Many papers have been written on ways of providing support for the Dempster Shafer theory 
of belief revision through the use of multi-valued TMSs. These have focussed on the use of 
the ATMS to represent different worlds, and on using the labels generated by the TMS in 
conjunction with a distribution function over the base set of assumptions, to generate 
uncertainty values for propositions25.
Being based on the ATMS, the application of DS theory in this way is obviously 
amenable to use within the IDN framework. Not only that but the flexibility of the IDN 
tramework with regard to easily changing interpretation structures means that it is easy to 
implement and switch between a system that simply uses ATMS labels or ATMS-DS labels
h is interesting to note that here values ¡ye being assigned to nodes on the basis of values assigned to par- 
"cukir worlds (i.e. intensionally), when the labels from which those values ¡ire calculated have in turn been gen- 
L'raicd from other nodes in the network (i.e. extensionally according to syntactic criteria).
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or some other interpretation mechanism.
5.3.7.2 Certainty Factors
The certainty factor model is an attempt to circumvent the large amount of data (in the form 
of conditional probabilities) needed to build a usable statistical model in domains such as 
medical diagnosis. As such, it is an attempt to model subjective or quasi-probabilities, where 
p(h) is not the frequency of some event h but a measure of belief (typically ranging from 0 to 
1) in h at some particular time.
The result of firing rules is to change the subjective probability of the consequent of the 
rule (h) through increasing or decreasing its belief given the certainty associated with the 
evidence (e) that caused the rule to fire. The measure o f increased belief in h given e, 
MB(h, e), is a proportional decrease in the uncertainty associated with a belief in h (where 
the uncertainty is measured by how far p(h) is from certainty, i.e. 1), dependent on how 
much the subjective probability has increased in the light of new evidence:
MB(h, e) = p(h ' C) ~ p(h) for 1 > p(h I e) > p(h)
1 -  p(h)
= 0 if p(h I e) £ p(h)
= 1 if p(h) = 1
Similarly the measure of increased disbelief in h given e, MD(h, e) is the proportional 
decrease in the uncertainty of disbelief (measured by how far p(h) is from 0):
MD(h, e) = 1 P^  for 0 < p(h I e) < p(h)
P(h)
= 0 if p(h I e) £ p(h)
= 1 if p(h) = 0
The measures of increase and decrease of belief in h given e can be combined into a single 
figure, the certainty factor CF(h, e) that summarises the size and direction of change in the 
subjective probability.
CF(h, e) = MB(h, e) -  MD(h, e)
1 -  min{ MB(h, e), MD(h, e) }
Ihis gives a range of values for CFs from -1 to 1.
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In reality, all propositions can be viewed as having no subjective probability (or more 
accurately, no bias in the subjective probability) in the first instance. This is done by 
considering prior probabilities (e.g. an expert’s preconceptions of the likelihood of some 
event) as pieces of evidence themselves. In this way the propagating and combining of 
pieces of evidence is reduced to manipulating changes in belief and disbelief. In early 
certainty factor models this was done by propagating and maintaining separate MBs and 
MDs and then combining them26. Later models simply used CFs.
For a hypothesis h, and events or pieces of evidence ej the following rules have been 
defined [Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984, p255] for combining certainty factors:
(R1) CF(h, ej ande2) = CF(h, e ,) + CF(h, e2) -  {CF(h, e,) x CF(h,e2)}
for CF(h, e i ), CF(h, e2) 2:027 
= CF(h, e ,) + CF(h, e2) + [ CF(h, e i ) x CF(h, e2)
for CFfh.eO, CF(h, e2)SO
CF(h, e ,) + CF(h, e2)
= ---------------------------------------------  otherwise
1 -  mini I CF(h, e , ) I, I CF(h, e2) I }
(R2) CF(hi and h2, e) = mini CF(hj, e), CF(h2, e) )
(R3) CF(h[ or h2, e) = max( CFfl^, e), CF(h2, e) )
(R4) CF(h, s) = CF'(h, s) x CF(s, e)
Rule 4 is designed to model a priori values associated with pieces of evidence. CF'(h, s) is 
the certainty value of h when s is known with certainty, i.e. CF(h, e) = 1, but when s is 
uncertain, certainty in h given s, i.e. the current value CF(h, s), is factored accordingly.
Given a rule in the knowledge base, r = a a  b —> c, the CF combination rules above can 
be composed to give a single CF value for the support provided by a and b, through r, for c:
CF(c, r) = CF(r, e) x m iniCF(a, e), CF(b, e))
( onsidering rules as justifications, R2 and R3 dictate how antecedent values are combined to
Certainly factors were derived using the equation CF(h, e) = MB(h, e) -  MD(h ,c).
’7 Note the similarity with P(AB) = P(A) + P(B) - P(AnB) = P(A) + P(B) - |P(A) x P(B)| when A and B 
■ire independent. This points to one of the drawbacks of CFs mentioned later it operates on an implicit assump- 
•ion of independence between events.
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get a single value for a rule; R4 shows how CFs can be attached to rules in order to reflect 
relative strengths of rules; and R1 defines how values associated with rules can be combined 
into a single value for a proposition. The rules above are associative and can therefore be 
generalised and applied to any number of values.
Considering conjunctive monotonic rules aj a  ... a  an—>e as dependencies in an IDN, a 
corresponding set of monotonic dependencies RA can be defined:
RA:(a! ,..., an)+ br— »Ae
Positive (+) antecedents represent the conjunctive antecedents of the rule and an extra class 
of antecedent (r) in added to indicate the rule strength. The following summation functions 
are then defined:
•SA,+(vi .... \ n) = m in[\i 11 £ i  £ n)
SA,r(vi) = v,
SA(v+, vr) = m ar|v+, 0) x vr
The function for combining values for dependencies is a generalisation of R1 presented
above:
SN(vi ,..., vn) = 1 — (1 — vj) X ... x (1 — v„) when vj > o for all i
= - 5 n ( -V )  ,..., —vn) when vj S o for all i
5 N(W! ..... Wm)+(X! ,..., xp)
= --------------- r ------------------------------- -------------- o therw ise
\-min{ ISN(wi .... wm) I. I (x| ..... xp) l }
where Vl^j^m. wj e { vj I 1 € i £ n, v; SO ) and Vl^k^p. x  ^ e { Vj I 1 S i S n, Vj S 0 }
Discontinuing rules, i.e. rules that decrease the belief in a proposition, are handled by using a 
negative CF attached to the rule.
Negation of antecedents can be handled by using an additional class of negative (-) 
antecedents. The value of a negated proposition is obtained simply by changing its sign. For 
example, if 7t has a certainty factor of -0.6, i.e. is believed to be false to a degree 0.6, then 
~l,t will be believed to be true with a degree 0.6. The summation function for negative 
antecedents is changed (from that of positive antecedents) to reflect this switch in sign. The 
summation for the dependency is changed to include the extra class of antecedent and to take
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the minimum level of support of all positive and negative antecedents.
Sa,-(vi .... vn) = Sa,+(-v i ......-v n)
S®(v+, v_, vr) = max{ min{\+, v_},0} x v ,
Defeasible non-monotonicity can be introduced by using yet another class of antecedent, 
uncertain (”) antecedents, where ~7t reads "if 7t is unknown then ...". The value associated 
with an uncertain antecedent is proportional to its closeness to 0, and the smallest value for 
uncertain nodes contributes to the value of the rules in the same way as negative antecedents 
were included.
5a -(v, ,..., vn) = min{ 1 -  IvJ II S i S n)
5®(v+, v_, vr) = max[ min{\+, v_, v-}, 0} x  vr
If 7t has a certainty factor of 0, i.e. there is no evidence supporting the truth or falsity of 7t or 
the evidence for and against 7t is evenly balanced, then 7t is unknown with certainty.
Ignoring the philosophical and technical arguments against CFs for the moment, there is 
a practical problem associated with the rules for combining CFs. This concerns the treatment 
of disjunctive rules.
In Mycin the interpretation of disjunctive antecedents is handled by R3:
CF(h! or h2, e) = max{ CF(hi, e), CF(h2, e) )
Consider the case where: hj is supported by ej, i.e. CF(hi, ej) > 0; h2 is supported by e2, 
CF(hlt e j) > 0; and et has no effect on h2 nor e2 on hj, i.e. CF(h2, ei) = CF(hi, e2) = 0. 
Applying Rl, we get the following value for h] given e\ and e2:
CF(h,, e, and e2) = CF(h,, e , ) + CF(h,, e2) -  (CF(h,, e , ) x CF(h,, e2)|
= CF(hj, Ci)
and a similar value for h2 given ei and e2:
CF(h2, ei and e2) = CF(h2, e2).
Applying R3 (the disjunctive rule for hypotheses) to get a value for hj or h2 given ej and e2 
produces the following:
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(Cl) CF(h] orh2,e[ and e2) = max{ CF(hi,ei and e2>, CF(h2, ej and e2) }
= maxi C F ih i.e !), CF(h2, e2> }
The problem arises if R1 is applied before R3:
(C2) CF(hi or h2, ej and e2> = CF(hj or h2, e j ) + CF(hj or h2, e2>
-  {CF(hj or h2, e i)  x CF(hi or h2, e2>}
= CF(h], ej) + CF(h2, e2) -  {CF(h,, e ,)  x  CF(h2, e2)}.
The composition of the rules R 1 and R3 is not commutative and unless there is a set way of 
applying rules there will not be a standard way of modelling this situation. Intuitively, Cl 
appears to model the situation where hj and h2 are disjoint, i.e. the disjunction is exclusive - 
the maximum support for the disjunction being the maximum support for either disjunct.
The second case (C2) appears to model an inclusive disjunction and is easily modelled 
in an IDN giving the summation rules above:
e l  ^and ^ and 2^* h] ^ and h 1 or h2, Il2 ► an d  ^  1 dr h2
The exclusive "or" case can only be modelled by the inclusion of a new type of 
dependency with disjunctive antecedents:
^  o r  • ,..., an)+ br ► o r ^
and summation functions:
SA"*(vi ,..., vn) = m ax{\l\ 1 S i S n )
5 A" ' ( v , )  =  v ,
SD™(v+, vr) = max[\+,0) x v r
This example (of ambiguity in an existing representation) demonstrates a general 
problem that IDNs will help to resolve. By attempting to code CFs as an interpretation 
mechanism, an ambiguity in the CF representation has been resolved and the representation 
extended, resulting in a more expressive system.
A larger problem that cannot be so simply resolved concerns the conceptual foundation 
1)1 C Fs. As noted earlier, CFs are supposed to capture pseudo probabilities. Given this, one
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would also expect CFs to behave in a similar manner to probabilities, with the implication 
being that CF(h, e) approximates to P(h I e). Indeed, when there is confirming evidence e (i.e. 
MD(h, e) = 0) and p(h) is small,
CF(h, e) = MB(h, e) = P(h I e) -  P(h) 
1 -  P(h)
and CF(h, e) will tend to P(h, e) as P(h) tends to 0. This however is only an extreme case and 
the approximation breaks down at higher values.
In the same way that CFs for propositions are supposed to behave like probabilities, the 
CFs associated with rules are supposed to act like a priori conditional probabilities. 
However, given the CFs reflect subjective judgements there tends to be little (external) 
justification beyond the fact that a set of rules produces the right result. There is also 
clustering of CFs around particular, functionally critical, points: e.g. 0.2 for rules that have 
small influence on a proposition, and 0.8 for (almost indicative) rules that have large 
influence. This implies that granularity in distinctions between the significance of two events 
is very small - either two events are significant (or insignificant) and cluster around 0.8 (or 
0.2) with a very small difference between the two, or one is significant while the other is not 
producing a large distinction.
Finally, there is a deep, built-in assumption about the independence of evidence 
[Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984, p267]. This is an obvious outcome of designing a system that 
attempts to dispense with a large number of conditional probabilities. Although this 
independence is necessary to ensure qualitatively correct behaviour (for example, by not 
counting a piece of evidence more than once), there is no guarantee of independence in the 
structure of the rule-base.
These three points form the basis of arguments against the use of Certainty Factors: CFs 
do not have similar values to equivalent conditional probabilities; typically CFs need have no 
external justification and cluster at conceptually or functionally (in system terms) significant 
points; and there is no guarantee that the assumptions under which the CF model works will 
actually be built into any system that uses CFs.
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There is no point in providing a CF-based system if no attempt is made to refute the 
arguments against CFs. There are three points I wish to make. The first is the standard 
defence of CFs: the CF model is an ad hoc approach and the validity of this approach can 
only be justified by its successful application in a particular domain. E.g. "The empirical 
success of MYCIN using the model of Buchanan and Shortliffe (i.e. CFs) stands in spite of 
theoretical objections" [Adams 1986]. Providing CFs within an IDN framework can be 
justified on the same basis and it is up to the designers and users of this tool to do so.
Having said this, the success of MYCIN is partly attributable to the independence of 
causes and symptoms in MYCIN’s domain, and success in using CFs is likely to increase as 
independence between rules increases. By representing rules as a network in an IDN it is 
easy to enforce independence by checking for multiple paths from a single antecedent to a 
single conclusion.
Finally, as outlined in §6.5.2 it is possible to use a learning algorithm to adjust the CF 
values assigned to rules in order to minimise the discrepancy between system performance 
and expected results. In this way, the subjective probabilities are used as a starting point in 
order to produce a more accurate system, based on a set of test data. This avoids problems of 
tuning CFs for rules in isolation and on an ad hoc basis.
5.3.7.3 Bayesian Networks as IDNs
Attempts to combine the rule-based approach of certainty factors with a more statistically 
valid approach have led to the development of systems based on Bayesian networks [Pearl
1988],
In a Bayesian network, nodes are used to represent statistical variables and a belief 
value is assigned to each node x by a local computation. The belief value "Bel(x)" is a tuple 
consisting of probabilities assigned to each possible value of a variable. If the variable 
represented the ability to fiy this might have two possible values, "yes" and "no", or four - 
very well", "well", "badly" and "not at all". Bel(x) is calculated by summing the evidence 
available both from parent nodes (representing causal information) and from child nodes 
' ‘•¡agnostic information) using the belief values assigned to these nodes. In particular given
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a node x with n parents and m children
m  n
BEL(\) = a  * [ n  Hj (x)] * [ 2  P(x I p) n  Jt(pi)]
j = l  pe P  i= l
where pj(x) is the (posterior) probability distribution supported by the j-th child (excluding 
the influence of x); and where p is a permutation of the set of parental causal values, 7t(pj) is 
the (prior) probability distribution of the i-th parent value of that permutation, and P(x I p) is 
the probability distribution of x conditioned on p. These distributions are combined using 
the outer product * (i.e. (a, b)*(c, d) = (axe, bxd)) and the result is normalised using some
r
constant oc (so that the sum of probabilities for each possible value of x is one, n  x, = 1).
i = l
In effect each node has an associated prior (7t) and posterior (p) probability distribution 
calculated from its parent and child nodes respectively. As prior and posterior distributions 
are altered at leaf nodes (that represent initial causes and final outcomes), prior probabilities 
are propagated forward down the network while the posterior probabilities are propagated 
backward. The conditional probabilities associated with the casual links are similar in nature 
to certainty factors associated with rules and are a static part of the system entered during the 
knowledge ac quisition or model building phase.
By having separate dependencies to control the propagation of prior and posterior 
probabilities, and given the local nature of the belief value computation it is easy to see how 
Bayesian networks conform to an IDN model of computation. It is interesting to note that in 
the case of purely causal reasoning posterior distributions can be treated as uniform, i.e. 
mu(x,) for all values of all nodes28, and backward dependencies and propagation are not 
required.
Because of the possible causal dependence between parents and the need to condition 
the posterior probability on the joint distribution of the parents, the parents must all be 
bnked as a single dependency with an associated conditional probability matrix. This leads 
*o a loss of modularity as causal links cannot be added without modifying the existing 
network. However, this is what one would expect as the associated conditional probability 
"* as with anticipatory nodes [Pearl 1988 p!81]
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matrix is bound to change (if only to be expanded) given the introduction of new variables. 
In special cases, if independence can be assumed for all parent variables and values then this 
is not the case. Causal links can be represented by individual dependencies and the j oint 
distribution can be calculated from the individual distributions for each parent.
In conclusion we can see that Bayesian networks can be represented as a particular 
form of IDN and that, as originally presented, Bayesian networks and IDNs share much of 
the same underlying philosophy. Finally, Bayesian networks show that it is possible to use 
extensional uncertainty information in a principled manner. This is one of the main thrusts of 
the research into IDNs - to provide principle and semantics to the use of potentially ad hoc 
network representations.
5.3.8 Conclusion
In this section it has been shown how the RBS paradigm must be adapted in order for the 
rules contained in such systems to be represented within an IDN framework. The benefits of 
doing this include: a generic ability to handle defeasible, non-monotonic inferences; and the 
ability to perform a variety of tasks using the same network structure simply by changing the 
interpretation mechanism. One such task (reasoning with uncertain information) is examined 
in depth and it is shown how various approaches can be implemented. All these approaches 
benefit from the fundamental characteristics of IDNs: a network representation is used to 
explicitly represent dependencies between data; values are calculated using only values from 
directly linked nodes; and changes in values are only possible through changes in the 
network (given an unambiguous network).
5-4 Inheritance Networks
Semantic networks or inheritance networks were one of the first Al knowledge 
representations and found favour because of their ease of understanding and intuitive nature. 
,n their most simple forms such networks perform reasoning through simple network 
traversal algorithms.
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In this section I show how a variety of these algorithms, with a variety of complexities, 
can be implemented as IDNs. In particular just a single network structure is required with 
different methods of inheritance implemented through different summation functions over 
different sets of values. Each set of summation functions effectively defines a different 
semantics for the same network.
Having shown how a variety of inheritance systems can be implemented, some 
theoretical results will be proved that relate to the constructibility and ambiguity of 
interpretations. This is an attempt to generalise Touretzky’s work on the mathematics of 
inheritance systems, and show how IDNs provide a framework for the analysis of any 
network algorithm. In this respect, the work in this chapter in particular, and in the thesis as a 
whole, can be seen as an extension of Touretzky’s ambitions: that is, to highlight problems 
with existing (network-based) algorithms and through a more formal approach to their 
specification, gain an ability to analyse and solve them.
5.4.1 Basic Network Representation
For the sake of this thesis I will consider a semantic network to be a labelled directed 
graph. The nodes of the graph represent classes of objects (or variously, sets, concepts, 
properties etc) and/or individual objects that may (or may not!) be members of some class 
(or classes) of objects. All the objects in a given class share the properties of that class 
(although see below for exceptions to this when considering inherited properties), and a 
predicate that denotes the members of that class can be constructed. The links between nodes 
represent relationships between classes and/or individuals and can be thought of as unary or 
binary predicates in FOL.
These relations can be of four different types: it can relate one concept or set of 
individuals to a second concept or set of individuals. For example, consider the following
network:
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COLOUR
c a n a ry ------------------------^  b ird
Figure 5.4.1 (a)
This could be considered as one of four possible interpretations .
• Vx,y. canary(x) a  yellow (y) —» colour(x, y)
= every canary and every yellow object have the same colour.
• Vx. canary(x) —> colour(x, yellow)
= every canary is coloured yellow 30
• Vy. yellow(y) —> colour(canaries, y)
= every yellow object is of the same colour as the set of canaries
• colour(canaries, yellow)
= the colour of the set of canaries is yellow.
The last two of these links are less intuitive reading but could be thought of as relating 
properties of the set of canaries in abstract terms. For instance one might want to say that the 
set of canaries, or "the canary" referring to a single individual (concept) that embodies the set 
of canaries, is yellow without actually committing oneself to saying that each particular 
individual is indeed yellow.
Of the links or relations used in semantic networks, the most common and familiar type 
of link is the "IS-A" link. This link has been given many different interpretations: indeed, it 
has been said that "there are almost as many meanings for the IS-A link as there are 
knowledge representation systems" [Brachman 1983]. Of the ones given by Brachman [1983 
p32], many of them correspond exactly to the type of distinctions made above. Of these 
interpretations, given that nodes stand for classes of objects, the appropriate interpretation is
29 tv •This is without even considering the possibility of links representing proto-typical or default relationships, 
or indeed links having any other different type of meaning (e.g. see IWoods 1975])
This is equivalent to yellow(colour(x)) where colour is a partial function, i.e. each node has at most a sin­
gle colour.
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that of generalisation (or subset when considering the corresponding predicates)-*1.
For example, consider Tweety the bird: bird IS-A (!) mammal and therefore the class of 
mammals includes all individuals that are birds. The predicate "mammal" is true for all 
individuals that satisfy the predicate "bird" and the IS-A link can be interpreted as a 
universally quantified32 statement: Vx. bird(x) —> mammal(x).
5.4.1.1 Inheritance and Cancellation
One of the main advantages cited for semantic networks as a knowledge representation is the 
ability to "see" clusters of concepts. Within these clusters, the number of links between 
nodes represents a kind of semantic closeness. Given that general shared concepts are 
pushed up a taxonomy or hierarchy, those that remain close are less general and therefore 
share more common points.
The move to have concepts represented just once at the most general level necessitates 
having some mechanism to reclaim those properties. This is provided by inheritance in one 
of its many forms: if A is a subclass of B and B has property C, then A has property C. In 
general, (see below for exceptions) IS-A is a (!) a transitive relation and the aim of a network 
is to compactly represent those concepts that IS-A other concepts.
Using IS-A links to represent subset/superset relations, the properties applying to 
individuals or classes could be found in a variety of means: a program could walk the 
network, traversing the IS-A links to find additional properties or concepts; makers could be 
propagated up the network and the properties so marked would apply; or a subnet could be 
constructed and attempts made to match it to the existing network structure.
Semantic networks as a collection of nodes with labelled links have no inherent logical 
structure. There is nothing preventing a network containing concepts "flying animal" and
1 It should he noted that if leaf nodes are to he considered as tokens or individual objects (rather than indi­
vidual classes that have a single member or predicates that hold for a single element in the universe of discourse 
IB rachm an I979|) then the IS-A link must be considered its a set membership relation or predication for 
leaf/non-leaf link IBrachman I983J.32 .
Inis ignores for the moment the possibly conditional nature of the IS-A link that arises when considering
exceptions.
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"non-flying animal" and having IS-A links pointing from another concept, "Tweety", to both 
(possibly though intermediate nodes such as "bird" and "animal" respectively). Thus a 
network can say without any idea of impending contradiction that Tweety both flies and 
doesn’t fly.
By adding a polarity to links it is possible to use a single node to represent a concept 
and its negation in the same place, and perform some kind of processing so that only one of 
the two relations is allowed to apply at a given node. Thus if "Tweety" IS-A "flying animal" 
and IS-NOT-A "flying animal" then a contradiction is avoided by allowing one or other of 
these links to have precedence.
How precedence between conflicting relations is decided poses problems for simple 
propagating algorithms. The simplest algorithm is to apply the first relation that is found, so 
that if IS-A is traversed before IS-NOT-A then Tweety could fly. This means relying on 
implementation-specific details to determine the properties of a network, and potentially 
"trivial" changes (such a changing the order in which links are added to a network) result in 
changes to the interpretation of the network.
A common algorithm used (e.g. FRL or NETL) in an attempt to circumvent this 
problem, relies on choosing the conflicting relation that has the shortest number of links back 
to the original concept. Given the following network:
I weety does not fly, as the shortest path uses a IS-NOT-A as its final link. But this algorithm
►  bird
Tweety
►  broken-wing-animal -t- i » t t t i t
Key: IS-A link IS-NOT-A link
Figure 5.4.1.1 (a)
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is also subject to "trivial" changes affecting the interpretation. Adding a redundant link, 
"Tweety" IS-A "bird" (which can be calculated from the network) there is no longer a 
shortest path and it is unclear (again) whether Tweety can fly or no.
Touretzky [1984, 1986] attempts a formal analysis of inheritance and presents an 
algorithm, the shortest inferential path algorithm, that is stable with regard to adding 
redundant information and can resolve some conflicts in inheritance. In the following 
sections I shall show: how the three different algorithms can be implemented using different 
interpretations of the same network; how the correspondence between some of Touretzky’s 
theorems and definitions relate to IDN concepts; and finally show why Touretzky’s 
algorithm canno t be implemented in the way he desires using parallel marker propagation 
machines.
All this demonstrates the usefulness of IDNs as a knowledge representation and 
analysis technique and shows how IDN concepts are common across yet another A1 
representation.
5.4.1.2 Interpretation of IDN-based Semantic Networks
The basic IDN reasoning technique is to construct complete interpretations of networks, 
corresponding to finding the closure of a set of axioms. There is less emphasis on 
relationships between particular nodes. This may not be the case with semantic network 
applications where the questions are of the type "Does x have property P".
IDNs still support this approach in a variety of ways. First, a partial admissible 
valuation could be created over the network connecting x and P. Second, some other type of 
interpretation mechanism could be used (e.g. dataflow processing). Finally, it may be 
possible to produce a definition of entailment based on admissible valuations and linked to 
the structure of the network, so that questions of the above type can be answered more easily.
None of these suggestions detract from the basic validity of using IDNs to capture 
semantic network information and processing. As long as the summation functions capture 
some approach to semantic network processing, then finding admissible valuations will be a 
eorrect way of deriving the appropriate information.
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The representation of semantic networks has three basic components: a set of dependency 
types to represent links found in the semantic network and to cover assertions (of facts); a set 
of values that are assigned to nodes to show which concepts are related; and a set of 
summation functions for the dependencies and nodes that govern how values are assigned 
and implement a particular inheritance algorithm.
IS-A (and IS-NOT-A) links are easily represented by a dependency with a single 
antecedent and consequent. However other relations (excluding IS-A and IS-NOT-A) will 
have a second antecedent that indicates the relational link that any particular dependency 
instantiates. This is done for the sake of flexibility and to reduce the number of types of 
dependency33. So the link "Tweety IS-A bird" becomes
T weety a,,, —»sn+ bird
where Tweety and bird name unique nodes in the network34. "Tweety HATES cats" is 
represented by
T weety an, hatesrei — >SN+cats
and as before "Tweety", "hates" and "cats" are uniquely named nodes.
Negation or cancellation links are defined for both IS-A links and relation links, through 
the introduction of two more types of links:
T weety ani — >s n -  bird 
Tweety an, hatesre|—kSN_cats
representing "Tweety is not a bird" and "Tweety does not hate birds" respectively33.
Without this facility each different relation, e.g. IS-A. "colour”, "hates" etc, would have to be a different 
type of dependency with a different summation function. This approach ensures access to the interpretation of 
the network through assertional dependencies allowing a degree of flexibility in changing the network interpre­
tation and structure in a dynamic fashion.34 i
in practice the nodes and links «ire represented using system-generated names and the external denotation 
is provided by a mapping between system names and user-dclined names.
Touret/ky also introduces an unknown link "Tweety may be a bird or may not be a bird". However 1 tun 
uncertain about the semantics he gives to this link ¡tnd will therefore exclude this kind of link from considera­
tion. The uncertainly arises from the fact that an unknown link cannot he overridden by positive or negative 
evidence - if a direct link saying Tweety hits unknown status with regard to being a bird, then saying Tweety is 
a canary and canaries are birds, does not provide evidence for Tweety being a bird. However, if it is shown to
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The only other kind of links are assertional dependencies that are used to introduce 
tokens into the network that are then propagated around the network to construct an 
interpretation. For example, — >V] Tweety identifies Tweety with the token V!.
This then is the basic structure of semantic networks as IDNs and in the next section 
various algorithms for constructing interpretations will be given. In general this shall work 
as follows: a set of tokens will be defined; a way of interpreting assignments of tokens to 
nodes will be given; and a method of propagating and combining tokens that specifies a 
particular inheritance algorithm will be outlined.
5.4.2 Interpreting Semantic Networks
The simplest interpretation for semantic networks is to use a single token to represent a 
single concept c and propagate that token across IS-A links and relational links. If the token 
+ arrives at node p, then this is interpreted as saying p holds for c, i.e. p(c) is true. In the 
course of its travels, + may be modified to become - ,  +r or - r  where r is some other token. In 
this case its arrival at p is interpreted as follows:
-  s  p(c) is false
+r = r(c,p) is true
- r  = r(c,p) is false
The hybrid token +r is to be interpreted as a lambda expression A.x.r(c,x) where x is either a 
concept name or instances of that concept.
The assignment of positive or negative tokens is done by SN+ or SN- dependencies 
that have no antecedents and therefore act as assertional dependencies.
The simplest inheritance algorithm is to propagate tokens in a non-deterministic, 
implementation-specific way - the first token to arrive at a node is the one that applies. 
Consider the following network:
1x1 desirable then unknown links could easily be included in the definition of IDN semantic networks.
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By assigning Joey a token + with an assertional dependency, one could construct an 
interpretation where ostrich was +, bird was +, flightless-bird was + and flying animal was + 
thereby preventing flying animal from being negative. Alternatively, values could be 
assigned to ostrich (+), flightless bird (+), and flying animal (-) even before bird (+) was
considered.
The summation functions for this kind of interpretation are as follows, given v::w represents 
the concatenation of the two tokens v and w, and a set of tokens T is consistent iff 
(+, -} <L T and Vre {+r , -r} £  T .
V  = Pw  ({ nil, + , - | u (  p::r I p e { + , - } ,  r e  :*.) ) 
where ^.is some set of relation tokens
SN(v, .... vm) = v c v 1u . . .  u v m
where v is a maximal and consistent but implementation-dependent
•Ssw+ivi.v2)= {+::rIv, = + , r e  v2 ^ 0 )
= {vj ) for v2 = 0
[this assumes that non-labelled relational links are IS-A links]
= (n il) otherwise
5sn-(vi . v2)= {-::rl v, = - ,  r e  v2 * 0 }
= {v j } for v2 = 0
[this assumes that non-labclled relational links are IS-NOT-A links]
= [nil)  otherwise
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5SN +.a(v i .......v m ) =  + if Vi.+e Vj or {v, vm} = 0
= nil otherwise 
5SN +.r(v )  = { r I re v, re J i }
Ssn-,» (v i »•••» vm) = -ifV i.-€ V i or {v, .... vm} = 0
= nil otherwise 
5S N -,r(v )  = I r I re v, re }
It should be noted that hybrid tokens representing lambda expressions do not propagate over 
any links once they have been created. It would be possible to create, as a straight forward 
extension, a type of link which does look for and propagate relational tokens. Given time and 
space considerations this has not been attempted. However, the simple extension to allow 
links with multiple antecedents has been included. This allows for the coding of simple 
conjunctive links: e.g.
Figure 5.4.2 (b)
5.4.2.1 Shortest Path Algorithm
Keeping with the same basic representation (i.e. not introducing named tokens for concepts) 
a shortest path algorithm can be implemented by extending the set of values assigned to
nodes:
V  = values' x  Z  where values' arc the values defined above 
and Z  is the set of non-negative integers
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SN( v , .... vm)
= nil if Vi.Vj = [nil)
= {<tj, rij > I ti = p::r where p e  {+,-}, r e  :£and Vj*i. tj = q .r -» i < j] 
u  {<t,,n;> 11, = p::r for some (implementation-dependent) choice of p from (+, 
where <+r, n,> , <-r, n,> e  v, u  ... u  vm 
and <tk,nk> e  V].tk = q::r a  nk < n j}
SsN+(v l> v2)
= [<+::r , n> I V] = <+, n>, r e  v2 *  0 }
= {v j } for v2 = 0
[this assumes that non-labelled relational links are IS-A links]
= lnil) otherwise
5s n - ( v i . v 2 )
= {< -::r , n> I vi = <-, n>, r e v 2 # 0 )
= {vi } for v2 = 0
[this assumes that non-labelled relational links are IS-NOT-A links)
= {nil) otherwise
■S'SN+.a(vl ••••. vm)
= <+, n+l> if 3i.<+, n> e Vj and Vj.<+, nj>e vj a  nj < n
= <+, 0> if {V|  vm} = 0
= nil otherwise
5SN+,r(v) = ( r I re v. re }
5sn-.«(v i ..... vm)
= <-, n+l> if 3i.<+, n> e and Vj.<-, nj>e vj a  nj S n
= <-, ()> if (V | .... vm) = 0
= nil otherwise
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5SN-,r(v) = { r I re v, re }
Given this interpretation, the network above has a single admissible valuation V:
node Joey ostrich flightless-bird bird flying-animal
value <+, 0> <+, 1> <+, 2> <+, 1> <+, 2>
The value < -, 3> is not assigned to flying animal as the token <+, 2> inherits along a shorter 
path. However, the shortest path algorithm doesn’t help in interpreting a network when there 
are no shortest paths. The network remains ambiguous with multiple interpretations^.
5.4.2.2 Individual Tokens
Another dimension of complexity is to introduce named concept tokens rather than the 
simple {+, -}  set of tokens. Instead, a set of individual tokens I = |i , ¡2 ... ) is used to 
denote individuals, with hybrid tokens +ij and —ij used to indicate that a predicate applies 
positively or negatively to the jth individual, while +ri and -ri assigned to a node p indicates 
that r(i,p) is respectively true or false.
The summation functions defined above have to be quantified for each individual token 
so that
S.SN+,a(v l ••••» v m)
= <+, n+l> if 3i.<+, n> e Vj and Vj.<+, nj>evj a ^  S n
becomes
■SsN+.a(vi . vm)
= { <+i, n+l> I 3i.<+i, n> e \\ and Vj.<+i, nj>€ Vj—> nj <, n )
In order to account for the increased number of tokens, new assertional dependencies must 
be added. This is done through dependencies with no antecedents but that are typed 
according to the values they assign. The dependency — >*p having a summation function
depending on whether a particular interpretation allows none or many interpretations of an ambiguous
network
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contributes the token i to p’s node level summation function, S ^ .
S.4.2.3 Redundancy and the Inferential Distance Algorithm
Shortest path algorithms (SPAs) can solve some of the difficulties in interpreting networks: a 
partial order can be imposed on concepts to arbitrate between certain conflicting concepts. 
What an SPA cannot do is to take account of redundant information. Nor can networks be 
compounded in expected ways. Consider Joey the ostrich again:
As the network currently stands Joey is a flying-animal using a SPA. Introducing what 
appears to be redundant information, that Joey IS-A non-flying-bird - something that the 
system calculates anyway, introduces ambiguity. There is now conflicting and equal 
evidence that Joey may or may not be a flying-animal.
A more interesting property of using an SPA is the non-compositionality of networks. 
Consider adding the link non-flying-bird IS-A bird. Looking at the network from this point 
upward it appears unambiguous in the light of SPA: non-flying birds are not flying-animals 
and cannot even appear to be without directly introducing contradiction into the network 
(e.g. by adding non-flying-animal IS-A flying-animal).
►  non-flying-bird
Joey
Figure 5.4.2.3 (a)
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Figure 5.4.2.3 (b)
This network appears to say exactly what is required about non-flying-birds, birds and 
flying-animals. Yet adding information about Joey the ostrich (who is obviously a bird) 
distorts the intended meaning and there is a non-flying-bird who is also a flying-animal 
through virtue of being a bird. Obviously these problems could be circumvented through 
better structuring of concepts but that would miss the point: given an SPA, the intended 
meaning of a network can only be preserved by not allowing the addition of redundant or 
extra information.
Touretzky’s Inferential Distance Algorithm prevents the addition of redundant 
information causing changes in the interpretation, by using the most specific paths in 
calculating interpretations. If there is both a single-step and a multiple-step relationship 
between two nodes then the single-step relationship is ignored. Competing paths are then 
compared using these maximal paths. In a sense this is equivalent to using some kind of 
longest path algorithm. When it comes to interpreting networks, single-step relationships win 
over multiple steps, while conflicting multiple-step relationships result in ambiguity, and 
conflicting single-step relationships result in contradiction or inconsistency. If there are two 
inheritance paths sharing a common initial subpath, followed by a single step in one case and 
a contradictory multiple-step relationship in the other, then the single step wins over multiple 
steps, while two conflicting multiple-step relationships result in ambiguity, and two 
conflicting single-step relationships result in contradiction or inconsistency. Because the 
addition of redundant information does not change the maximal path (as any redundant path 
short-cuts the maximal path) such changes to the network will not change its interpretation.
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Other than solving some of the problems of SPAs, Touretzky’s main contribution is in 
providing some formal analysis of the inferential distance algorithm. In particular he defines 
expansions (or variously, extensions) as consistent and closed sets of single and multiple set 
relations and proves the following "major theorems" [Touretzky 1984 p324]:
• every acyclic inheritance network has a constructable extension;
• every extension of a (finite) acyclic inheritance network is finite;
• an extension is inconsistent iff the network itself is inconsistent;
• the union of any two distinct extensions is inconsistent;
• a network is ambiguous (has multiple extensions) iff it has an unstable-,7 extension;
• every extension of an ambiguous network is unstable
In the next few sections I will sketch Touretzky’s definition of inheritance, show how it can 
be translated into summation functions for our previously defined network structure, show 
that expansions correspond to admissible valuations, show how the majority of results above 
are a natural product of IDN admissible interpretations, and finally explain why Touretzky 
found it impossible to get a correct distributed algorithm for constructing expansions.
5.4.3 The Mathematics of Inheritance Systems
The following definitions form the basis of Touretzky’s algorithm and describe what should 
be produced by an IDA-based reasoner. For the sake of these definitions an inheritance 
network is a set of pairs <+x, p::y> where x and y are nodes in the network and p e (+, - ,#) .  
A sequence of nodes <x ..... y> represents the chaining together of pairs to show the 
inheritance of relations or concepts. The pair <+Tweety, +bird> is read as Tweety IS-A bird 
while the sequence <+Tweety, +bird, +flying-animal> represents the fact that Tweety IS-A 
flying-animal through virtue of being a bird.
Defn T2.138
The consequences, cons(<t>), of a set of sequences <l> 7*
7 this will he explained in the following section
iK The theorems ¡ire numbered as they appear in [Touretzky 1986 p 39-44],
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= {<x, y> I <x ,..., y> e <t>}.
Defn T2.2
A set of sequences d> contradicts <xi ,..., xn> iff <xf, x',> e const <t>) where x,, x\ 
have the same token or literal but a different sign - e.g. x = +bird and x’ = -bird or 
#bird.
Defn T2.3
A token y is an intermediary to <X\ xn> in <J> iff 3i.y = x, or
3<xj ,..., Xj, yi ,..., ym, Xj+ i >  e <t>, l<j<m, l<i<n. y =  yj. [i.e. there is a path from x\
to x1+1 that goes through y courtesy of a subsequence between xj and x1+1.]
Defn T2.4
A set of sequences d> precludes <X[ ,..., xn> iff 3<y, x 'n>e<i>. y is an intermediary to 
<xj ,..., xn> in d>. [l e. d> precludes the multiple-step relation <X] ,..., xn> iff there is 
a single-step relation on the longest possible path from X! to xn that would assert the 
opposite conclusion.]
Defn T2.5
<X[ ,..., xn> is inheritable in d> iff n>2 and <xj xn_j>, <X2 xn> e d> and <t> 
neither contradicts nor precludes <xj ,..., xn>.
Defn T2.6
A set of sequences <t* is closed under inheritance iff 
Vs. s is inheritable in <1> => s e <J>.
Defn T2.7
A set of sequences <J> is an expansion of S iff S £  4> and d> is closed under 
inheritance.
Defn 12.8
A set of sequences <t> is grounded in S iff Vse «!>. s is inheritable in <1>.
Defn T2.9
A set of sequences <t> is a grounded expansion of S iff is an expansion of S and <t> 
is grounded in S.
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Defn T2.15
A set of sequences <J) is consistent iff <I> contradicts none of its elements.
Defn T2.16
A set of pairs T (i.e. an inheritance network) is ambiguous iff it has more than one 
grounded expansion.
Defn T2.17
An expansion <I> is unstable iff it contains sequences <x, yi yn> <yi yn, w> 
<x, zj zm> <zj ,..., zm, w’> and <t> precludes neither <x, yi yn, w> nor 
<x, zi Zn,, w’>. [I.e. both <x, yi ,..., yn, w> and <x, z\ zm, w’> would be 
inheritable in unless contradicted by d>. As x, yj ,..., y„, w> and <x, z\ zm, w’> 
are mutually contradictory, at most one of them can be inherited at a time.|
The first nine definitions are used to describe what an IDA should produce, i.e. a 
grounded expansion of an inheritance network (or certain parts thereof). The last three 
definitions are used to describe under what conditions a network is contradictory, ambiguous 
or unstable, i.e. conditions under which the network doesn’t have a single consistent 
interpretation. I shall now show how Touretzky’s notion of inheritance can be reproduced in 
an IDN-based semantic network.
Touretzky’s work is founded on the idea of grounded expansions: that is, sets of 
inherited relations that are closed and grounded. Closure ensures that all possible inheritable 
relations are included in an expansion while groundedness ensures only those relations that 
are inheritable are included. Imagine a valuation of a IDN-based semantic network (SN- 
1DN) where each concept node is labelled with the relations inherited by that node. If a set of 
summation functions can be constructed that capture the definition of the IDA then 
expansion will correspond to admissible valuations.
The correspondence of grounded expansions with admissible valuations is based on two 
conditions that follow from the definition of admissible valuations:
SN(n, V) = V(n) <=> SN(n, V) c  V(n) and V(n) c  SN(n, V)
(riven SN(n, V) calculates all the paths inheritable at n, given the paths inheritable at the 
antecedents of n, the first condition requires that an admissible valuation includes all the
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inheritable paths for all nodes, while the second condition requires that the admissible 
valuation contains only the inheritable paths.
Assuming deterministic summation functions we have proved that acyclic networks 
have a single admissible valuation. This means in the context of an SN-IDN that finite 
acyclic networks have a finite, constructible valuation.
The flaw in this argument is that summation functions for an SN-IDN cannot be 
deterministic if they are to exhibit ambiguous behaviour, i.e. have multiple admissible 
valuations. In order to have multiple admissible valuations the summation functions must be 
non-deterministic.
There are two ways to circumvent this problem. The first is to make the summation 
functions deterministic by maintaining all possible valuations simultaneously. The second is 
to develop a notion of non-deterministic IDNs and show that the acyclic networks of this 
kind still retain the properties of interest.
The following section will explore non-deterministic functions and prove general 
versions of the majority of Touretzky’s theorems, i.e. theorems that hold for any IDN 
satisfying the necessary (abstract) pre-requisites on the structure of a network and its 
summation functions.
The section after that will briefly explore multiple-context network reasoners as an 
alternative way to dealing with ambiguity in network interpretations.
5.4.3.1 Non-Deterministic IDNs
In order to develop a theory of non-deterministic IDNs it is necessary to define what is meant 
by such a thing. The basic notion to be captured is that of a function that, for any given value 
in its domain, could return one of a number of possible values in its ranged Which value is 
to be returned is decided purely at random.
In this respect the function is not a proper function (which is defined as a many- or one-to-one mapping), 
hut I shall continue to call it this for the sake of continuity. Properly it should be called a relation.
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l)efn4llA function/ : D— >R is non-deterministic, of order m, iff Vde D. 3R 'cR ./(d) e R' 
and 1 S IR'I < m and 3n<m. f is non-deterministic of degree n.
The set R' will be called the sub-range of/ at d, written R ld
If the sub-range were empty for some deD  then /  would be undefined for some 
values. If the sub-range always contains a single element, i.e ./is  of order I, then/is 
an ordinary deterministic function.
Rather than try to identify the sources of indeterminacy in the summation functions of a 
network, the value of each node in a given network can be considered the result of a single 
function, taking a (partial) valuation of the network and returning a single value out of a 
choice of m elements, i.e. V^fn, V) is of order m. The sub-range of V'N at n given valuation 
V, will be a subset of the values V, written V \n,v41- It should be noted that the sub-range is 
self-referential for cyclic networks. It may not possible to know what set of values a node 
might take without actually knowing the value the node will take! This is an area that has not 
been explored as only acyclic non-deterministic networks have been considered up to this 
point.
Where previously valuations were admissible if the valuation assigned the same value 
as that calculated by the summation functions, a valuation of a non-deterministic IDN is 
admissible if the valuation returns a value that could have been returned by the summation 
functions, i.e. is in the sub-range of TN for n given valuation V.
Defn For a network <N,I)>, V is an admissible valuation iff Vne N. V(n) e T'l n y
A function / : D— >R is deterministic, of order m, iff VdeD. 3R 'cR ./(d ) e R' and 
1 < IR'I ^ m and 3n<m. f is non-deterministic of degree n.
The following theorem uses this definition to show that finitely deterministic acyclic 
networks, i.e. networks which at every node return one of a limited (finite) set of values, 
have a finite set of admissible valuations. The non-determinism licences an implementation
40 This is the obvious definition of a non-deterministic function e.g. [J. Gersting. 1982, "Mathematical 
Structures for Computer Science". Freeman and Co, San Francisco p75],
41 Given the value of (n, V) is dependent on a panicular network, being calculated from the dependen­
cies attached to n. the sub-range should have some indication as to which network this applies to. However, for 
the sake of brevity this reference will be omitted.
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to return one of a set of possible valuations yet still restricts what is deemed the "right" 
answer.
This can be achieved due to one basic fact - because an order can be established on the 
nodes in the (acyclic) network and only a finite set of valuations is allowed for the first n-1 
nodes, and the choices for the nth is determined by those values, then only a finite set of 
values is admissible for the nth.
Thin If a network <N,1)> is acyclic and non-deterministic of order m>l, then 
1 £IVA(<N,D>)lSmINI 
Proof By induction on INI
Because <N,D> is acyclic, it can be decomposed into a series of subnetworks 
<N|*D|> for 1 S i S INI where Ni+1 = Nj u  (ni+1), = D, u  {di+| }, and
cww(d1+1 ) = ni+1 and conj(d1+1 ) q  Nj. N0 = D„ = 0 .
Inductive Hypothesis
For any i and any m assume 1 <, IV^/4(<Nj,l),>)l £ m 'N|1. As D(ni+1) = {d1+1 } and d, 
contains no reference to n1+1 or its descendents, VN(n1+i,V) is wholly determined by 
VI ¡y for any V e  V1N1.
Furthermore, as VN is non-deterministic of order m VN(ni+i, V) e {V| vp ) for 
I S p S m  and any V.
So W eV A (<N |,I),».V vj. V u  {(ni+1, Vj)) e VA(<N|+I,I)I+I>) and 
IK4(<N|+I,D|+I>)I = IV'/4(<Ni,I)|>)l x p.
As 1 2 IV/4(<N|,I>|>)l S m and 1 £ p £ m ,
1 SlV'A(<Nl+„ D * ,> ) l£ m IN‘l xm  = m IN- '
Base Case
For any m,N] = |n , ) , I ) ,  = (d, }, a/ir.v(n| ) = 0  and
avc-p'. W e  V INI. V^fn,, V )e  V where V = { v ,  .... vm|.
Therefore 1 £IK4(<Ni, D| >)l S m and by induction 1 i  IV^(<N,I)>)I <, m INI.
The proof does not depend on m and INI having a particular value and as such the 
proof holds for any order of non-determinism and size of network greater than or
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equal to 1.
□
Note The theorem that every deterministic network has a 
of this, more general, theorem.
single valuation is a special case
N ’
This theorem proves that every acyclic network, be it deterministic or non- 
deterministic, has one or more admissible valuations. As the proofs are constructive in nature 
(i.e. do not rely on a contradiction) it also proves that each network has one or more 
constructible admissible valuations. This reproduces Touretzky’s Thm2.11. Furthermore, 
given: the network is finite; the proof shows that a value can be constructed for each node; 
and that the value is finite, the resulting admissible valuations must als o be finite 
(Touretzky’s Thm2.8).
Touretzky’s other main theorems deal with ambiguity and stability. To examine these 
concepts as properties of IDNs we first need to define them. The first is a straight forward 
translation of Touretzky’s definition, and intuitively obvious.
Defn An IDN is ambiguous iff it has more than one admissible valuation.
Stability, as defined by Touretzky, is a very narrow concept tied into his network 
representation and Inferential Distance Algorithm. The basic idea is that an interpretation or 
expansion of a network is unstable if at any one point, either one of a pair of conflicting 
paths could be inherited. This is obviously related to non-determinism and gives rise to the 
more general definition for IDNs:
Defn Given a network <N,D>, an admissible valuation V is unstable iff 3ne N. I'k'ln,vl S 2. 
I.e. there is a node s.t. the sub-range of TN at n given V contains two or more 
elements, or again, V^fn, V) is non-deterministic.
The following theorem is then a straight forward application of this definition. In brief, if a 
network is acyclic then the nodes can be ordered, and if there are two admissible valuations, 
there must be a first node at which the valuations disagree. But if all the ancestors have the 
same values in the two different interpretations, this can only happen if the valuation 
function at that point is non-deterministic.
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Thm (Touretzky 2.13)
If an acyclic network <N,D> is ambiguous then each of its admissible valuations is 
unstable.
Proof As <N,D> is ambiguous, 3Vi, V2 e TA(<N,D>). V! # V2. As V] * V2 and <N,D> 
is acyclic 3n. Vi(n) * V2(n) (*) and Vmeancs(n) V^m) = V2(m). If is 
deterministic then by the Isomorphic Parent Lemma, Vi(n) = V2(n), contradicting 
(*). Therefore V/N is non-deterministic with order at least 2 and the valuations 
V[, V2 are unstable. The same argument applies to any pair V,W e VA(<N,D>) so 
all the admissible valuations of <N,D> are unstable.
The converse can also be easily proved. If a network has an unstable admissible 
valuation then the network is ambiguous, for a valuation is unstable iff two or more different 
values are admissible at a single node. Each of these values will give rise to a different 
admissible valuation and the network is therefore ambiguous.
Thm (Touretzky 2.14)
If an acyclic network <N,D> has an unstable admissible valuation then it has more 
than one admissible valuation.
Proof As usual, as <N,D> is acyclic an order can be defined on N. Given V| e VA(<N,D>) 
is unstable and that ne N is the first node where V'1'1 is non-deterministic, i.e. 
I'f'l n-vl ^ 2, 3ve 'P'ln,v- v 5* Vi(n). As <N,D> is acyclic, values can be calculated for 
all nodes N' following n using the partial interpretation:
V2(m) = V^m) for me N\ |N ' u  {n} J 
V2(m) = v for m = n
There is guaranteed to be at least one admissible valuation V ' of <N,D> subsuming 
V2 (i.e. V ' and V2 agree over N\ N'), otherwise V'N would be undefined for some 
neN'. As V'(n) = V2(n) * V](n), V ' and Vj are distinct admissible valuations of 
<N,I)>, making <N,I)> ambiguous.
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S.4.3.2 IDN Coding of the Inferential Distance Algorithm
All the previous discussion of reproducing Touretzky’s work given general results for non- 
deterministic IDNs relies on the existence of a set of summation functions capable of 
implementing the Inferential Distance Algorithm. In this section such a set of functions will 
be produced and shown to be correct.
The values assigned to nodes will be sets of sequences, where each sequence is made up 
of signed tokens. Each token represents a type or individual and the sequence denotes a 
transitive IS-A relationship between all elements of the sequence.
‘V’ = Pw ( T .) where T = { p::r Ip e  { + , - } ,  r e T } ) 
and T is  some set of individual and type tokens.
The summation functions can then be defined for the dependencies outlined in §6.4.3. The 
relational antecedent is used to build the inheritance sequences by indicating where the 
sequences are being inherited. Each dependency takes the sequences to be inherited and 
appends the new element to each sequence. At the node level, sequences that are 
contradicted or have intermediary sequences are removed, leaving a set of consistent and 
maximal (in the sense of being the longest or most complete) sequences.
For example.
Figure S.4.3.2
the sequences <+a +c> and <+a +b +c> are both propagated to c, but <+a +b +c> is an 
intermediary to <+a +c> so <+a +c> is removed. The sequences <+a +b +c +d> and 
<+a fb -d> are then both propagated to d, but as <+a +b -d> contradicts <+a +b +c +d>, 
<+a +b +c +d> is removed.
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SN(vi vm) = S e Pw ( T.) where 
se S iff 3i.se Vj and
VjVte vj.t is not an intermediary to s and 
Vue S.u does not contradict s.
Note: if 3sj e v, and sj e Vj s.t. S] and S2 are contradictory but neither has an intermediary 
(i.e. both are inheritable) then one and only one of Si or S2 must be in S. Which is to be 
included is the source of non-determinism - either is a valid choice.
•Ssn+(vi . v2)
= { s * r l s e  v j . r e  V2 * 0}
= 0  for V2 = 0
where * is a function for joining two sequences
5s n - ( v i .  v2)
= {s * r I s e v j . r e  V2 * 0  (
= 0  for V2 = 0
S.SN+.a(v ) =  ^SN+,«(V) =  v 
^SN+,r(v )
= { 11 te v, t = +::r, re T )
SsN-,r(v)
= { 1 1 te v, t = -::r, re T )
All that remains to be proved is that this set of summation functions produces the set of 
inheritable sequences dictated by Touretzky’s definition (T2.5). This is done by showing that 
>f maximal paths are propagated through a network, and if such a sequence is not 
contradicted or becomes non-maximal, then it can be inherited to the next node in a network. 
This is done using Touretzky’s notion for clarity and ease of use for the appropriate 
definitions.
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Thm If s = <xj x„_i> is inheritable and <xn_], xn> e  V (where T is an inheritance 
network), and
there are no intermediaries to s, i.e. 3<xi Xi, yj ym, Xj+i xn_t >, then 
<xj xn> is inheritable iff <xj xn> has no intermediaries and is contradicted. 
Proof For <xi xn> to be inheritable <xi xn_i> and <x2 xn> must both be 
inheritable and <xj ,..., xn> must be neither contradicted nor precluded. It can be 
shown that if <xi xn_i> has no off-path intermediaries then <x2 xn> is 
inheritable iff <X] xn> is not contradicted and so the theorem holds.
All that is required then is to show that <x2 xn> is inheritable.
As <xi xn_i> is inheritable, <xj x„_i> is inheritable for all 1 <i<n-1. So if 
<Xj xn> were inheritable for some 2<j<n and <Xj_i ,..., xn> were neither 
precluded nor contradicted then <xj_i xn> would be inheritable
(as <xj_i .... x„_i> is inheritable).
So if V2<j<n.<xj_i xn> is neither contradicted nor precluded then <xj xn> is 
inheritable.
If there are no off-path intermediaries to <xj ,..., xn>, <xj ,..., xn> is precluded iff
<xj, x'n> e T for i<j. If this were the case then <xj ....  xn> would be contradicted
(contradicting the premises of the theorem).
Similarly, <Xj xn> is contradicted iff 3<xj, Z\ Zp, xn> but if <X] xn> has no 
off-path intermediaries this is only possible if <xj, x'n> e T where xj = so <xj ,..., xn> 
cannot be contradicted without contradicting <xj .....xn>.
So if the longest (maximal) sequences are propagated so that no off-path intermediaries 
exist, then a sequence can be inherited iff it is not contradicted or becomes non- 
maximal.
□
This proves that the summation functions outlined above are a correct implementation 
of the IDA.
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5.4.4 Multiple Context SN-IDN
An alternative to having non-deterministic summation functions would be to maintain all 
possible interpretations through the use of a multiple context reasoner. This is an obvious 
way of avoiding non-determinism - rather than having a function return one of a set of 
possible values, have the function return the whole set.
In the case of SN-IDN this would mean assigning each node a set of sets of sequences 
where each set of sequences are contradictory. Consider the network:
Figure 5.4.4 (a)
If the token a were propagated around the network, with tokens b,c,d,e,f used to label 
dependencies attached to B, C, D, E, and F respectively then the following admissible 
valuation would result:
Node Value
A {{(+a)} )
B {{(+a + b ) ) )
C { | (+a+b+c)))
D ! l (+ a + d ))}
E {{(+a +b +e>) {(+a +d -e))}
F {((+a+b+c+f)l  K+a+b+e-f)}}
Two sequences are inheritable at E: (+a +b +e) and (+a +d -e). As they are contradictory but
neither is precluded they must be put into separate sets. Similarly, F has two possible sets of 
sequences it could inherit.
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Having constructed a single admissible valuation, in order to work within a single 
context, it is necessary to choose a consistent set of sequences in the same way that a 
particular ATMS context must be constructed from a set of node labels. This is done by 
choosing an initial set of sequences and then including all sequences that are super- 
sequences of these, given the constraint that they must all come from the same subset of 
sequences assigned to a node. For example the sequences (+a), (+a +b), (+a +c), (+a +d) are 
all consistent super-sequences of (a). One of the subsets {(+a +b +e)} or {(+a +d -e)} must 
be chosen, and having done so, the choice of (+a +b +c +0 or (+a +b +e -f) is constrained by 
whether (+a +b +e) has been included in the current context - if it has, a free choice is 
possible, otherwise (+a +b +C +0 as (+a +b +e -f) is not supported.
The ambiguity and instability can be defined in terms of the number of contradictory 
sets of sequences and the conditions that apply to make two sets contradictory. The results 
that hold for non-deterministic IDNs should go through with the appropriately modified 
definitions.
The multiple context approach to dealing with ambiguity is less simple than the use of 
non-deterministic functions. It uses a more complex set of values and summation functions. 
It also requires a secondary interpretation to extract a single consistent context. However it 
does give the added advantages of being able to consider all possible contexts given just a 
single initial interpretation. It is also possible to reason about those contexts and choose one 
that contains a specific set of sequences. For example, if a context were required where -f 
was inheritable from a, it would require the sequence (+a +b +e -f) which would in turn 
require (+a +b +e) which would in turn exclude (+a +d -e).
5.4.5 Conclusion
In the preceding two sections, two approaches to dealing with ambiguity in inheritance 
networks have been outlined. Both rely on assigning complex values to nodes in the network. 
In the first case, sets of inheritable sequences are calculated while the second uses sets of sets 
of sequences.
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In order to deal with redundancy through preclusion it is necessary to use such complex 
values, i.e. have sequences propagated through the network, rather than rely on single tokens. 
Without the information contained in the sequence that explains how a particular token was 
inherited it is impossible to decide, through a purely local computation given the information 
propagated to a single node, whether a given sequence is precluded or contradictory or 
inheritable. By limiting the local computation to single values (i.e. tokens), Touretzky’s 
approach will never produce correct results, without conditioning.
This conclusion arises out of the study of the IDA and its re-implementation as an IDN. 
Other results of this work related to Touretzky’s work are the general results produced in
85.4.3.1 on the constructability of interpretations and the origin of ambiguity in a network 
that apply to all non-deterministic IDNs.
The study of implementing (or viewing) semantic networks as IDNs has many benefits. 
In addition to showing how the framework of IDNs can be used as an analysis tool, it shows 
how one network structure is capable of supporting many different types of interpretation. It 
also provides a good example of dealing with contradictory or ambiguous interpretations: 
either resolve the contradiction and maintain a single interpretation (as with the JTMS) or 
move to a multiple context system and maintain all possible contexts (as with the ATMS).
Finally, it has shown how the IDN can be used to provide a formal tool for analysing 
the desired behaviour of network algorithms. By identifying semantic networks with IDNs 
and grounded expansions of the former with admissible interpretations of the latter, the 
desire for potentially ambiguous behaviour leads to a non-deterministic approach, which in 
turn leads to multiple possible interpretations thus providing the required ambiguity. 
However, in order to resolve apparent ambiguity in cases where it is not warranted, it is 
necessary to use more complex values in interpreting the network.
5.5 Summary
This chapter has shown how IDNs can be used to represent structures from many existing AI 
knowledge representation paradigms. This has not only shown the flexibility of IDNs as a 
representation tool but has provided a number of case studies that illustrate the following:
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• IDNs give flexibility within a particular representation or structure to change the 
interpretation of that structure as shown by: the reuse of one basic network 
representation for Semantic Networks to implement different inheritance algorithms; 
the use of different uncertainty measures for Rule-Based Systems; and the development 
of a NATMS as derivative of the ATMS;
• IDNs provide an easy way of specifying network algorithms as shown by the preceding 
examples;
• IDNs provide a framework for the analysis of network-based algorithms: in particular 
highlighting the source of multiple extensions for Default Logic and generalising 
Touretzky’s work on Semantic Networks and the ambiguity and constructibility of their 
interpretations;
• IDNs show, by splitting the representation into basic elements, that what is represented 
is just as important as how it is represented, as shown by the need to capture the right, 
"intuitive" inferences in Default Logic; and finally
• IDNs, through their approach to belief revision and continuous support, give rise to new 
developments of existing paradigms, as illustrated by defeasible inference within Rule- 
Based Systems.
In addition to showing the usefulness of IDNs as a theoretical and practical 
development, this chapter highlights several basic themes or ideas with regard to IDNs. First, 
self-referential support (i.e. circularities in networks) gives rise to many problems: they are 
computationally intractable; there is not always a guaranteed interpretation of such a 
network; and they are one source of ambiguity in networks. Secondly, two approaches to 
dealing with contradictions repeatedly arise; either work within a single context and attempt 
to change contexts as it becomes inconsistent; or construct all possible contexts using a 
multiple context reasoner. Despite the flood of literature supporting a multiple context 
approach as epitomised by the ATMS, single context systems have their own merits. By 
being able to operate in both modes through changing interpretation structures, IDNs can 
transcend this division.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
"And now, the end is near and so 1 face the final curtain ..."
Little now remains of this thesis, except to look back at what has gone before and to point 
the way forward to what yet may come. The research that led to this thesis has suffered from 
the problem of trying to keep the subject area within manageable bounds.
What started out as an in-depth review of Truth Maintenance Systems with a view to 
providing a generalised TMS led into ever expanding areas, in an attempt to understand on a 
technical and pragmatic level what it was that TMSs did, and were used for. This happened 
on two divergent fronts: first into non-monotonic logics and then general belief revision on a 
technical level; and secondly into rule-based systems, semantic networks, and problem 
solving and representational issues on a more pragmatic level. All this combined to produce 
the idea of an Interpreted Dependency Network.
In order to bring together the large amount of ground covered by this research, the 
following sections attempt to summarize the thesis and its contribution, and also highlight 
some of the areas that the thesis could have spread to cover but did not.
6.1 The Thesis in (less than) 100 Words
Belief revision is the process of adding and subtracting information to some model in the 
light of external events and changes in internal state through processes such as reasoning and 
maintaining consistency. In order to produce non-monotonic behaviour and maintain 
consistency in an environment in which external factors represented by premises, 
assumptions and/or defaults in the model can change, it is necessary for each proposition to 
have a set of explicit justifications for its current level of belief, and for the belief in a 
proposition to wax and wane as the support provided by the justifications changes. This is the 
general philosophy that lies behind existing Truth Maintenance Systems.
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Interpreted Dependency Networks provide: a way of specifying belief values and types of 
justifications; a definition of how propositions should be interpreted, i.e. assigned a belief 
value, given a particular set of justifications; and an algorithm for constructing exactly those 
interpretations. In particular, IDNs can be used to reconstruct existing Truth Maintenance 
Systems in a single unified structure.
6.3 The Contribution
The work in this thesis contributes in a variety of ways to the development of AI in general. 
It contributes:
• to work on TMSs through a thorough review and analysis of existing systems;
• to extending and generalising various existing AI results, representations and 
mechanisms through the application of IDNs to those domains; and
• to belief revision in general by demonstrating the benefits of a foundations approach 
and by showing the necessity of constructing a model that captures the right set of 
inferences by explicitly building them into the model.
In addition to defining IDNs and making the above contributions, the examples contained in 
the thesis provide a set of cases showing how IDNs can be applied and what benefits can 
result.
6.3.1 Truth Maintenance Systems
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of existing styles of TMSs (§2.1) along with 
existing unifications of TMSs (§2.2). What emerges is a deconstruction of TMSs into three 
parts: a network of dependencies; an interpretation of the network based on labelling nodes; 
and the alteration of the network structure to perform such tasks as maintaining consistency 
and automatically extending a network.
6.3.1 Truth Maintenance Systems
Another result of the review is the finding that any generalisation of TMSs must be able
to
• handle automatic updating of values through Truth Maintenance,
• represent and perform default inferences, and
• handle changing sets of assumptions
as these characteristics occur separately in existing systems.
The fact that IDNs are a successful generalisation of existing TMSs can be seen both by 
the reproduction of existing TMSs as IDNs (in §3.3) and the construction of an extended, 
non-monotonic ATMS (the NATMS defined in §5.1) that shares the same network structure 
as the JTMS and needs no extra machinery outside the network in order to construct 
admissible interpretations. Although an IDN is not necessary for the implementation of the 
NATMS labelling scheme and network structure, this section (§5.1) amply demonstrates how 
TMSs can be easily implemented as IDNs. To change from an ATMS to an NATMS it is 
only necessary to re-define the summation functions in two places.
A number of smaller contributions include providing a sound, complete and terminating 
algorithm for the JTMS, along with an analysis of the complexity of constructing 
interpretations of JTMS networks. Although it has been shown that this is a non-polynomial 
problem. Chapter 4 shows that the complexity is determined by the number of cutsets, and 
the arrangement of the cyclic and acyclic components of a network. The number of possible 
interpretations of a cyclic component is exponential in the number of possible values raised 
to the power of the number of cut-points, while the number of possible interpretations of a 
network is the product of the number of interpretations for interacting cyclic components. 
For example if component A depends on components B and C, then 
IVAtA)l S IV/4(B)I x ll/A(C)l, and for a set of values V and cut-points CPc for C, 
IFA(C)IS I CPc .
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In addition to the NATMS showing how IDNs provide a vehicle for generalising and 
synthesising different TMSs, other application areas are examined in Chapter 5 in order to 
demonstrate the use of IDNs and provide support for the thesis.
One key part of the thesis is that links between propositions, i.e. inferences, should be 
explicitly represented by dependencies. This is demonstrated in §5.2 when Morris’ attempt to 
solve the problem of multiple interpretations is examined. He succeeds in solving the 
problem only by carefully choosing which inferences should be included in a particular 
network. My work shows that a more careful (but still intuitively appealing) encoding of the 
problem based on including contra-positive forms of implications results in the return of 
multiple interpretations. It is possible to produce the "right" (intuitive) results in default 
reasoning (using any particular system) but it requires the explicit representation of 
dependencies between different types of abnormality.
Propositional rule-based systems (PRBSs) are an excellent example of a type of system 
where links between propositions are represented explicitly. Given this, it should be no 
surprise that they are easily representable as IDNs. However, this is not the full story. Such 
systems usefully work on a "match-select-fire" iteration whereby rules are examined to see 
which antecedent conditions match with known facts, and one rule out of those that match is 
selected to be fired, with the consequent being added to the set of known facts.
Representing PRBSs as IDNs involves a new paradigm. Rather than matching, selecting 
and firing and then forgetting the rule, using IDNs means there is a persistence between 
antecedent condition and consequent result that is not normally present'. This gives rise to a 
defeasible (not necessarily non-monotonic) rule-based system. This means that principled 
non-monotonic rule-based systems can be constructed at little extra cost and without some of 
the problems that can result.
Finally, one of the benefits I claim for IDNs is that having a formal structure to the 
interpretation provides a means for analysing network-based algorithms that can be framed 
1 Parallels can be drawn between this model o f interaction and that of spreadsheets.
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as IDNs. This is demonstrated by showing how a variety of existing semantic network 
inheritance algorithms can be implemented as different interpretation mechanisms on top of 
a single unified network representation. A desire to produce ambiguous behaviour in such 
networks (in order to demonstrate how the Inferential Distance Algorithm works) leads to a 
non-deterministic paradigm for IDNs. The study of this type of network shows that most of 
Touretzky’s work on proving the existence and stability of interpretations of networks using 
the IDA is a product of the non-determinism, rather than any other particular property of the 
IDA.
6.3.3 Belief Revision
The major contribution of this thesis is in supporting the foundations approach to belief 
revision. Little work, bar that on argument structures, has been done on this approach - most 
work has focussed on a consistency approach. This thesis has attempted to show that a 
foundations approach is not only preferable to a consistency approach (as argued in §1.2.3)
but is feasible. In attempting to argue this I have thrown up some interesting problems
arising from the consistency approach, as put forward by Gardenfors. One such result is that 
Gardenfors’ postulates for belief revision are incompatible with a foundations approach - the 
postulates themselves embody a consistency approach, and in order to deviate from that 
approach, it is necessary to change the postulates.
Obviously the main result of the thesis must be the definition of the IDN for without
this framework it is not possible to make all the other contributions mentioned above. It
would be impossible to formalise the intuitive notion of "support" without some kind of 
formal mechanism such as that provided by the definition of dependencies and summation 
functions. Without the notion of an admissible valuation as a closed and consistent 
interpretation of a network, it would not be possible to show in detail how a foundations 
approach to belief revision could be applied to rule-based systems to get defeasible reasoning 
nor how multiple interpretations depend on cyclicity in a network or non-determinism in 
interpretation functions.
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IDNs provide a test bed with which to explore the use and limits of a foundations 
approach to belief revision. Without it, the championing of a foundations approach is little 
more than speculation.
6.4 Future Applications
The contributions made in the thesis to various application domains provide a guide to 
potential applications of IDNs above and beyond those mentioned in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
These fall into two broad categories: practical applications; and theoretical applications.
Practical applications are those that make use of IDNs in building representation 
systems and/or practical problem solvers based on a model of some domain. Any distributed 
network-based algorithm might be represented using IDNs, and the ease of specification 
through the definition of dependencies and corresponding summation functions means it is 
easy to produce tailor-made belief revision or Truth Maintenance Systems. This thesis 
provides a selection of such interpretation schemes along with several ways of tackling 
problems, i.e. using single or multiple contexts with or without quantitative measures of 
belief. A variety of approaches to reasoning with a model are also provided in the thesis 
along with a general purpose interpretation algorithm which can be tailored to suit particular 
problems.
On the theoretical side, IDNs provide a useful analysis tool. In order to represent a 
problem or model as an IDN, two things must be made explicit. It is necessary to deconstruct 
any interpretation mechanism into a set of (distributed) summation functions. This forces an 
analysis of the semantics of the interpretation, as for example happens with the inheritance 
algorithms in §5.4.
Secondly, by forcing the links between propositions to be explicitly represented by 
dependencies, it is necessary to examine the connections between propositions. In this way 
the interactions between data must be analysed and an otherwise intuitive appealing 
representation of a problem may be shown to have limitations caused by missing inferences 
(as shown in §5.1) or unwanted conclusions as the result of extra dependencies.
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Having constructed an IDN it then becomes a simple matter to prove the termination or 
complexity of an algorithm based on the complexity of the summation functions and the 
general interpretation mechanism. Similarly, the topology of the network in connection with 
the properties of the summation functions can be used to determine whether it is ambiguous.
6.5 Further Work
In the course of this research two areas have been examined in passing but have not been 
followed up due to constraints on time. These have been in the investigation of consumers 
and the addition of learning algorithms for defeasible RBSs.
6.5.1 Consumers
The term "consumers" originates in work done by de Kleer [1986]. The basic idea is to have 
a procedure that is attached to a node which is run when a particular label is calculated for a 
node. The result of running this procedure is to make some change to the structure of the 
network by adding extra nodes, dependencies, constraints on the problem solving 
environment, or even other consumers. This provides a mechanism for extending the 
network in certain predetermined ways with dependencies or nodes which are not initially 
required in the network. This in turn provides a way of controlling the construction of 
interpretations for the network by incrementally constructing the network. It also provides a 
way of performing reasoning about the internal structure of nodes, i.e. the proposition 
represented by a particular node. So, for example, consumers could be used as a mechanism 
for pattern matching in an RBS-type system.
It would be interesting, and in some cases necessary, to have this type of mechanism in 
order to increase the flexibility and power of IDNs. One restriction on de Kleer’s consumers 
is that the arguments passed to the consumer are limited to the antecedents of the 
justifications of the consumer’s node. One possible extension to the idea of consumers would 
be to allow the use of network-traversing algorithms or other pre-defined functions. For 
example, an upward traversal might be used to trace the origin of support for a particular 
value by traversing only those dependencies that propagated the value in question. This is
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precisely what is done by the first step of Doyle’s [1979 p i9] dependency directed 
backtracking algorithm.
Allowing consumers to be added to an IDN, be they as restricted as de Kleer’s in terms 
of inputs and allowed outputs, or merely limited to a set of pre-defined functions, or more 
generally allowed to contain arbitrary procedures, has certain drawbacks.
A network interpretation may rely on particular properties of the network. It may be 
that only acyclic networks are allowed, or that acyclic and cyclic networks are interpreted 
differently, or that any cycles must be monotonic. If a consumer is allowed to add 
dependencies to the network there is no guarantee that these properties will be preserved.
Even if the network is interpretable given any set of possible actions there is great 
difficulty in predicting the consequences of allowing consumers. It is possible that a 
consumer will be fired given a certain value and the outcome of running the consumer will 
be the retraction of the value that led to the firing. There are no dependencies between 
consumer antecedents and conclusion, and if there were, this could lead to unsatisfiable 
cycles - consider a consumer which is fired but invalidates its own firing condition. The 
action would have to be undone, revalidating the consumer’s antecedent condition and 
leading to a re-execution.
There is also the issue of the interaction between constructing interpretations and firing 
consumers. One approach is to construct an interpretation, fire a consumer to modify the 
network, and interpret the extended network before firing another consumer and so on. This 
is a conservative approach that means that many intermediate interpretations must be 
constructed before reaching a final interpretation. There would also be problems in 
scheduling the consumers. Different schedules could produce different sets of dependencies 
with different interpretations of the same set of nodes.
A more radical approach would be to fire all consumers that are valid after the first 
interpretation. This runs the risk of doing too much work by extending the network 
unnecessarily - if a conservative approach had been taken instead some antecedent 
conditions may have been invalidated and the consumers not fired.
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In addition to consumers causing problems deciding exactly what interpretation of 
which network is the intended one, there is an even bigger problem in determining the 
complexity of such procedures. If it is not known what interpretation will be constructed it is 
even harder to decide how long that would take.
6.5.2 Learning Algorithms for KBSs
The defeasible rule-based system (DRBS) outlined in §5.3, when combined with an 
uncertainty measure such as certainty factors, bears a strong resemblance to a simple neural 
network. Both consist of directed graphs (although the DRBS allows for multiple antecedents 
or sources for edges or dependencies) and both label the nodes and edges from a set of 
numbers. In the same way as the value assigned to a node in an admissible valuation of an 
IDN is a function of the values of the antecedents, the value assigned to nodes in neural 
networks is a function of the strengths of the links. Finally, both the neural network and the 
DRBS can be viewed as a distributed representation of a function that maps input patterns to 
output patterns.
In the same way that neural networks adjust weights of arcs to minimise the error 
between the output of the network (given some input pattern) and the expected result 
(corresponding to the input pattern) in some set of training patterns, the DRBS could be 
tuned by adjusting the certainty factors associated with each rule. This opportunity is not 
available to normal RBS as the output is not merely a function of the inputs - it is also a 
function of the order in which rules tire.
Rather than have a neural network decide the strengths of connections (correlations) 
between inputs and outputs (often in an undecipherable way) by adjusting weights 
accordingly, trainable DRBS holds out the opportunity of a knowledge engineer specifying 
the causal connections between concepts, and letting a learning algorithm decide the relative 
import of the rules, by running it over a set of training cases. In this way, certainty factors 
become less of an intuitive judgement made by an expert and more of a meaningful 
correlation between data. The knowledge engineer may provide a starting point for the 
system, and in cases where there are two or more (local) minima in the error function that
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determines the correlations, the starting point may determine which solution is chosen for the 
rule weighting. However, in this kind of system it would be the primary responsibility of the 
knowledge engineer to specify a basic causal model and it would be up to the learning 
system to tune that model so it best fits the available cases.
The success of this kind of approach would rest on the convergence of the error 
minimising process over a multi-layered network, such as back propagation [Rumelhart et al 
1986]. Although I have conducted experiments on the convergence of hand-crafted 
functions extracted from a network structure, I have not attempted to do this on a large scale 
using automatically generated networks and automatically defined error functions.
6.6 Implementation
The focus of this work has not been on implementation but specification - it is more about 
what to do in a conceptual sense than about what to do in a programming sense. In this 
respect most of this section could be included in the further work section.
There are three basic parts needed for any implementation. The first is the data- 
structures needed to represent the network; the second is a set of low level functions or 
procedures needed to access and manipulate the structure of the network (e.g. the cons and 
ants functions) and to calculate the values of elements of the structure (i.e. the summation 
functions); and the third is an overall mechanism for controlling the creation of 
interpretations, providing functionality to edit the network and for running other procedures 
over the network.
Of these three levels, the first two have been implemented in LISP to a sufficient degree 
to allow for the construction of a simple interpretation mechanism for acyclic networks and 
also for a construction strategy based on simulated synchronous message passing. In this 
implementation, each node would repeatedly calculate its value until its value was 
admissible. Changes in a node’s value would be propagated by notifying consequent nodes 
that they needed to (re)check for admissibility. This paradigm was abandoned as it was 
incapable of interpreting cyclic networks and was inefficient on a traditional single 
processor, von Neumann architecture. Nevertheless, this implementation was sufficient to act
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as a test bed for the IDN summation functions (e.g. for certainty factors, ATMS and JTMS 
interpretations, Inferential Distance Algorithm) described in the thesis.
The algorithms included in Chapter 4 represent a number of procedures capable of 
constructing interpretations and are described in enough depth to be able to prove properties 
such as completeness and termination. They are also described at a sufficiently high level to 
be implemented in any number of ways, in any number of languages - there is little 
constraint in terms of machine architecture or programming constructs (beyond the ability to 
call sub-routines or procedures and to iterate). What the algorithms do constrain is the style 
of programming. There is an implicit procedural style of programming at a high level.
Despite this implicit constraint in this thesis, the typed network representation along 
with the distributed natures of the summation functions and the calculation of values for 
antecedent classes, dependencies and nodes, suggests that there might be benefits to be 
gained from employing an object-oriented approach based on message passing, or from using 
a parallel architecture.
Parallelism is often seen as a way of gaining computational benefits - having multiple 
processors means that algorithms can potentially run orders of magnitude faster than they 
would on conventional serial architectures. However these advantages can only be realised if 
the algorithm can be decomposed into suitable pieces to be distributed over the available 
processors, and if the overhead of communicating between processors is kept at a level 
below that of the benefits derived from the multiple processors. Another problem that 
restricts the benefits achievable is the need for synchronisation between processors. If one 
processor has to wait for another to finish before it (the first processor) can complete its task 
and it can do no other work in the meantime, the speed up will be less than if the 
synchronisation were not needed.
The task of calculating a node’s value, given values for an antecedent is an easily 
identifiable piece of work and an obvious level at which to distribute the algorithm across a 
group of processors, assigning one or more node to a processor. Furthermore, given a node’s 
value is a function of the values of its antecedents, the communication needs for a particular 
node are determined by the topology of the network and can be efficiently managed by
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distribution of nodes to processors in such a way as to most closely match that topology. 
Despite these solutions to the problems of decomposition and communication, the problem 
of synchronisation is a limiting factor in IDNs. A node’s value will be admissible only if 
calculated from antecedent values which do not subsequently change. This means that 
calculation must be postponed (or only partially completed) until all antecedent values have 
been calculated. This in turn means the maximum amount of parallelism is determined by the 
breadth of the network - i.e. how many nodes can be calculated at any one time, according to 
depth. Efficiency gains will be limited to some percentage of INI, with the percentage gain 
determined by the topology of the network. Despite the relatively small size of gain (in terms 
of polynomial complexity), the speed-up could be significant (in absolute terms) for large 
and/or broad networks.
Object-oriented programming offers the benefits of easy specification, code reuse, and 
extendibility. The ease of specification comes from a data-oriented approach to design - it is 
easy to determine what objects are needed in the system (nodes and dependencies) and the 
procedures needed to interpret them (summation functions). The code reuse comes from two 
places - the sharing between objects of the same type in a system and sharing by defining 
similar objects in different systems. The extendibility is also a product of the data-oriented 
design - new functionality is added to a system by defining how classes of objects respond to 
new requests or methods.
The definition of IDNs exhibits many of the qualities needed for an object oriented 
approach. The definition of the network (§3.2.1) explicitly mentions different types of nodes, 
different types of dependencies attached to nodes and different types of antecedent classes 
within those dependencies. Each object’s type determines its summation function and where 
the values needed as arguments for that function should be obtained, and these in turn define 
how an object is to be interpreted. By defining the summation functions, the designer 
specifies the interpretation mechanism (the origin of the argument values being defined by 
the valuation functions in §3.2.2 and the topology of the network).
Collections of objects such as cyclic or acyclic components can also be viewed as typed 
objects with different interpretation functions (cf §4.1 vs §4.2). Given the components of a
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network themselves form a network, many of the same concepts (e.g. topological ideas of 
antecedents and consequents) apply. This is so much so that an interpretation algorithm for 
non-deterministic acyclic networks could be applied to the network of components by 
substituting a component valuation function for a node valuation function.
Code reuse across different IDN systems can be seen in §5.1. The NATMS borrows the 
network structure from the JTMS-IDN and borrows some of the summation functions from 
the ATMS-IDN. Similarly an uncertainty measure based on Dempster-Shafer theory might 
reuse ATMS-IDN functions.
Finally, having defined the network structures and summation functions in order to 
allow for the construction of admissible valuations, new interpretations (e.g. to check 
consistency as in §5.3.4 or use a different inheritance algorithm as in §5.4) could be 
constructed either by adding new methods to objects, or by redefining existing ones.
All the approaches, benefits and drawbacks described in this section (beyond the 
implementation covered in the first three paragraphs and the examples of object typing and 
code reuse) are hypothetical. Further work needs to be done in investigating typical network 
topologies, size, and the implications for the long term storage of information in IDNs in 
order to assess the potential for parallelism. It is also necessary to investigate how the 
construction of interpretations in an object-oriented system can be controlled via message 
passing in order to assess the practicality of such an approach. A research project is never 
finished!
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Counter Example to Goodwin’s JTMS Algorithm
This appendix is included to show that the algorithm described by Goodwin [1987, p83] is in 
fact incorrect as given1. To see this consider the following network.
Figure A1 (a)
Imagine that all the nodes are unlabelled. This could happen for example by the 
removal of justification supporting both B and C. Alternatively the network could be a 
single strongly connected component in a larger network which is in the process of having its 
labelling recalculated.
Goodwin’s algorithm goes through 3 steps (the step/function names below are taken 
directly from Goodwin’s algorithm) while there are any unlabelled nodes in a strongly 
connected component S.
(1) Propagate.constraints (S)
(2) Find.not.well.founded (S)
(3) Partition (S, in, out)
Each step may return t, in which case the latter steps are not executed as a well-founded 
complete labelling has been found.
1 In order to follow this counter-example, very low levels of detail must he considered. For this reason it is 
recommended that the reader consult Goodwin's paper for a more complete explanation of his algorithm
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Propagate.constraints (S)
This function attempts to propagate values from a partial valuation to obtain values for 
previously unlabelled nodes.
In our example, as there is no partial valuation, this function returns nil.
Find.not.well.founded (S)
This function attempts to find those nodes for which a dependency exists where all the 
monotonic antecedents are labelled, or in turn have a dependency whose monotonic 
antecedents are labelled.
The idea is that not-well-founded nodes are assumed to be out. These are nodes whose 
values could not be calculated even if all non-monotonic antecedents were assumed to be
out.
If all the nodes in S are well founded then the function Partition is called.
In the example above, all the nodes in S are well founded: B and C have no monotonic 
antecedents, therefore making A well founded too.
Partition (S, in, out)
This function attempts to assign values to nodes by tracing back over all dependencies 
starting at some arbitrary point S. The nodes are assigned the value of the second argument, 
initially the value in, but as non-monotonic links are traversed the second and third 
arguments are swapped, i.e. alternates between in and out.
If a node is arrived at that has already been labelled, but with a value different from that 
about to be assigned then the algorithm terminates with an error - an odd loop has been 
discovered.
Tracing the calls to Partition, ignoring the third argument which has no use, produces 
the following tree of calls, where P(n, v) is a call to Partition that attempts to assign the 
value v to node n.
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P (A, out) P (C, out )
P (A, in ) P (B, in )
isomorphic to other branch 
with A and C transposed
Figure A1 (b)
P (B, in )
P(B ,out) P (C, out) PCA.m) P (B, in )
P (A. in ) P (B, in ) P (B, in ) P (C ,in )
Figure A1 (c)
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Starting from either A (fig A 1(b)) or B (fig A 1(c)) or C (which is isomorphic to fig 
A 1(c) with B mapped to C and vice versa) leads to an odd loop being detected and the 
algorithm terminating in error.
Yet the valuation
V(A) = V(B) = out 
V(C) = in
is admissible. This corresponds to the admissible state (using Doyle’s terminology)
( A ) u S
where S represents the network
I { A ,  B)out— >s l C ,  ( A ,  C}oul— >s l B ,  {B, C ) j n — >s l A ) .
Furthermore, {A } u S  is an admissible extension of S, according to the definition given by 
Doyle [1983, p350]. These admissible extensions are exactly the labellings that Doyle claims 
should be obtained by a TMS.
Goodwin’s algorithm fails in this respect and cannot therefore be considered correct.
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Glossary
Glossary of Symbols, Conventions and Formalisms
Conventions
CAPITAL ROMAN ordinary sets, subsets and anything not covered below.
small roman 
Bold
Italic
members of sets
defining sets for a particular IDN
function symbols (excepting valuations which use capital roman) 
and values assigned to nodes
Curly
Greek
sets of high level semantic or syntactic entities 
well-formed formula of a language
Sets and Things
Brackets
{ }
{ x lC  } 
ISI
( ... . )
<  .... >
ordinary sets
the set consisting of those x’s that satisfy condition C
modulus or size of set S
n-tuples or ordered sets
defining n-tuples of particular meanings
High Level Sets
A
C
•D
®aC®
L
<M
!A£
S e e
V
assumptions in the ATMS
class of semantic structures for a particular formal system
set of all possible dependencies within a given IDN framework
set of all possible assertional dependencies
logical language, or external language for IDN systems
set of models satisfying proposition a  |iWis really a function]
set of all possible nodes within a given IDN framework
semantic structure (or a logical model or interpretation)
set of possible truth values for a given logical system
Dependency Networks
1 ) £ ' / >  
I> a C 'A i
S*
V
y  INI
V
set of dependencies used in a particular network
set of assertional dependencies that can be added to a given network
set of nodes used in a particular network
set of summation functions that determine the values assigned to nodes 
set of values that can be assigned to nodes 
set of possible labelling of N, given an implicit ordering on N 
valuation (function) =  ( (n, v) 1 n e N, v e V  ) over some network 
consisting of assignments of values e V  to nodes e N
nil e V  
<N,1)>
Ai .... Ap — c
nil value corresponding to "no other value is supported" 
a network consisting of N nodes and I )  dependencies 
dependency of type i attached to or supporting c.
G1
Glossary
w ith typed  antecedent classes A! Ap 
>sl support list-justification /dependency
>cp cond itional p roof-justification/dependency
Functions
/: D — > R 
/: x I— >/(x)
/ I d
f
f
Pw
domain equation for/from  domain D to range or codomain R
equation for/ ,  mapping each element to its image
function /  restricted to domain D
n applications of function/
the limit of n applications of function/as n —» °°
power set function, returning all the subsets of a given set
Network Structure
*x )
C(n)
D( n)
£(<N,D>)
<N,D>+>£<N',D'>
«nf.v(d) returns the
co/w(d) returns the
cons(n) returns the
desc(n) returns the
pars(n) returns the
ancs(n) returns the
node(a) returns the
P( n) returns the
type function that returns the type of x,
usually a dependency or antecedent type
returns the list of dependencies having n as the antecedent
returns the list of dependencies having n as the consequent
(returns the) extensions of network <N,I)>
downstream composition of <N,D> with <N',D'>
deC(n)
( j  ants(A)
deD(n)
i(a, s)
K4(<N,I)>)
FN(n,V)
V°(d,V)
Fa(S,V)
s  (Vi ..... v p )
5D(v , ..... V p )
Jl(d).
Semantics
interpretation function returning truth value for formulae 
a  given some semantic structure S 
returns the set of admissible valuations of <N,I)>
calculates the value of node n given the valuation V 
calculates the value of dependency d given the valuation V 
calculates the value of the set of antecedents S 
given the valuation V
combines the values (vj vp) of dependencies 
to return a single value to be assigned to a node
combines the values (vj vp) of antecedent classes of a dependency, 
of type r(d), or of type i
G2
Glossary
SA(vi vp) combines the values (vj vp) of a set of antecedents,
SaA), 5a all of a given type f(A), or of type j for a dependency of type i
Language and Theorems
a , p, a i , . . . ,  a„ 
r, 0>,£
1
T
(n, v)
(d, v)
propositions or wff 
sets of propositions or wffs 
contradiction or bottom element of some lattice 
tautology or top element of some lattice 
a node/value pair, corresponding to a formula in IDN theorems 
that is satisfied by semantic structures containing a V s.t. V(n) = v 
a dependency/value pair, corresponding to a formula in IDN theorems 
that is satisfied by semantic structures containing a V s.t. KD(d ,V) = v 
equivalent in a meta theory sense.
meta theory implication, " if ... then ..." when talking about 
theoretical properties or in proofs, 
meta theory bi-conditional.
Symbols
r i=  P.
a i , . . . , O p | = p
the set of formulae T = a j , . . . ,  ctp entails p
r>a> the set of formulae T entails p for each P e <t>
a  1= P the single formula a  entails P
r /=  p r  does not entails P
r  vi=P r  validly entails p, i.e. T entails P and there is a model satisfying T
r  Mi=P T minimally entails p, i.e. T entails p and no subset of T entails p
r  Ri=p r  relevantly entails p, i.e. T validly and minimally entails P
r\=c p r  entails P in some logic L
r  i^ ol  P r  entails P in first order logic
r  i^ dn  P r  entails p in a generalised IDN framework
f  l= <S,D> P r  entails p w.r.t a given network <N,I)> acting as a background theory
n = r p r  entails P w.r.t a set of networks T.
r  i- p P is provable from the set of formulae T
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